domingo, 13 de junho de 2010
sexta-feira, 16 de abril de 2010
Keynesianismo e "Austrianismo"
quarta-feira, 14 de abril de 2010
Thomas Jefferson on [Central Banking] U.S. Bank
Declaration of Independence in 1776, President Thomas Jefferson on U.S. Bank, December 13, 1803:
From a passage in the letter of the President, I observe an idea of establishing a branch bank of the United States in New Orleans. This institution is one of the most deadly hostility existing, against the principles and form of our Constitution.
The nation is, at this time, so strong and united in its sentiments, that it cannot be shaken at this moment. But suppose a series of untoward events should occur, sufficient to bring into doubt the competency of a republican government to meet a crisis of great danger, or to unhinge the confidence of the people in the public functionaries; an institution like this, penetrating by its branches every part of the Union, acting by command and in phalanx, may, in a critical moment, upset the government.
I deem no government safe which is under the vassalage of any self-constituted authorities, or any other authority than that of the nation, or its regular functionaries. What an obstruction could not this bank of the United States, with all its branch banks, be in time of war? It might dictate to us the peace we should accept, or withdraw its aids.
Ought we then to give further growth to an institution so powerful, so hostile? That it is so hostile we know,
- 1, from a knowledge of the principles of the persons composing the body of directors in every bank, principal or branch; and those of most of the stockholders:
- 2, from their opposition to the measures and principles of the Government, and to the election of those friendly to them: and
- 3, from the sentiments of the newspapers they support.
Now, while we are strong, it is the greatest duty we owe to the safety of our Constitution, to bring this powerful enemy to a perfect subordination under its authorities. The first measure would be to reduce them to an equal footing only with other banks, as to the favors of the Government. But, in order to be able to meet a general combination of the banks against us, in a critical emergency, could we not make a beginning towards an independent use of our own money, towards holding our own bank in all the deposits where it is received, and letting the treasurer give his draft or note, for payment at any particular place, which, in a well conducted government, ought to have as much credit as any private draft, or bank note, or bill, and would give us the same facilities which we derive from the banks?
segunda-feira, 12 de abril de 2010
Copenhaga: In Defense of Capitalism
Program
Saturday 24th april
08.30 – 09.00 – Registration & coffee
09.00 – 09.05 – Welcome
09.05 – 09.45 – Opening remarks by Lars Seier Chritensen, Founder & CEO of Saxo Bank
09.45 – 10.45 – Common Objections to Capitalism - Art Carden, USA
10.45 – 11.00 – Break
11.00 – 11.30 – Q&A with Art Carden
11.30 – 12.45 – Lunch
12.45 – 13.45 – Why our current financial system is socialistic and an explanation of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory – Philipp Bagus, Spain/Germany
13.45 – 14.15 – Q&A with Philipp Bagus, Spain/Germany
14.15 – 14.30 – Break
14.30 – 15.30 – Capitalism and Peace – Professor Indra de Soysa from NTNU in Trondheim, Norway
15.30 – 16.00 – Q&A with Indra de Soysa
16.00 – 17.00 – Networking with beverage and snacks
Sunday 25th April
08.30 – 09.00 – Registration and coffee
09.00 – 10.00 – Keynesian Economics – The beast that will not die – Peter G. Klein
10.00 – 10.30 – Q&A with Peter G. Klein
10.30 – 10.45 – Break
10.45 – 11.45 – Democracy and Paper Money - Thorsten Polleit
11.45 – 12.15 – Q&A with Thorsten Polleit
12.15 – 13.15 – Lunch
13.15 – 14.30 – Creating competition in the government industry – Patri Friedman including Q&A
14.30 – 14.45 – Break
14.45 – 15.45 – Panel debate
15.45 – 16.00 – Closing Remarks
sexta-feira, 2 de abril de 2010
Equilíbrio, eficiência e processo de mercado
terça-feira, 12 de janeiro de 2010
O Debate (intra-"austríaco") Padrão-Ouro Reservas 100% versus Free-Banking
Finalmente consegui expor adequadamente (penso) a minha argumentação que em Free-Banking mas com distinção entre notas/depósitos de Bancos com 100% de reservas e os outros... "good money [100% reservas] will drive out bad money [reservas parciais]".
No LvMI Blog no post The Legitimacy of Loan Maturity Mismatching: Bagus & Howden vs. Barnett & Block, by Stephan Kinsella
Carlos Novais:
TGGP:
Carlos, you are talking about what "would" happen. We don't have to guess about hypotheticals, we can look at the actual history of free banking to see what happened.
Because the fractional reserve bank pays interest while the 100% reserve bank requires you to pay them a warehousing fee.
If the promises of payment did indeed trade at a discount then the 100% reserve bank could sell you their notes, and then demand a greater amount of coins from the fractional bank than they bought the promises for. This would inhibit the willingness of the fractional bank to issue too many promises.
Carlos Novais:
TGGP
“Carlos, you are talking about what "would" happen. We don't have to guess about hypotheticals, we can look at the actual history of free banking to see what happened.”
History tell us that (Rothbard) “money-brokers” that tried to arbitrage discount fractional reserve notes of distresses banks buying them at discount and requiring delivery of physical gold or silver were more or less forbidden directly or indirectly of doing it. But discounts did happen.
History tells us the contractual analysis innocently or conveniently was deficient. The traditional banking secrecy served the cause for the general public to not realize the money expansion feature. Even today with so much consumer protection never we see a proposal for real time disclosure of reserve of banks or for instance the banks identities involved in central banks injections or loans.
The fungible feature at par it’s a requirement for bad money to drive out good money but that it´s only possible if the system provides anonymous money creation and circulation, making the appearance of bad money (today would be the demand deposits in riskier banks) being the same as good money (demand deposits in less riskier banks).
This crisis established finally in the minds of public, that every single demand deposit is equal to another because it will be always guaranteed in full by states and central banks.
"Because the fractional reserve bank pays interest while the 100% reserve bank requires you to pay them a warehousing fee."
Correction: Pays interest in the form of more "promises of payment" of gold.
Credit in the form of “promises of payment” would be contractually different form credit in the form of 100% Reserve Notes. Certainly the person that makes a loan in physical gold wants to receive an interest and nominal in physical gold or will ask a premium for a different thing.
I can imagine contracts that could be delivered in bonds not money, but that does not make “Bond” a form of money, because bonds are settled has promises of money.
“This would inhibit the willingness of the fractional bank to issue too many promises.”
And this would be the process of good money driving out bad money. Physical gold and 100% reserve notes and demand deposits would be the money against all other quasi monies would be priced against.
Promises of payment would carry an additional risk that must be priced and which carry a cost of gathering information.
TGGP:
How were people forbidden from engaging in arbitrage in
"History tells us the contractual analysis innocently or conveniently was deficient"
What? I don't understand what you are trying to say.
"Pays interest in the form of more "promises of payment" of gold."
People that actually tried to redeem those promises got their gold. But back then the promises were deemed essentially good as gold.
"This crisis"
What are you referring to? The recent recession?
Carlos Novais:
TGGP
(...)
During the panic of 1819, when banks collapsed after an inflationary boom lasting until 1817, obstacles and intimidation were often the lot of those who attempted to press the banks to fulfill their contractual obligation to pay in specie.
(...)
” Yet two days after this seemingly tough action, it passed another law relieving banks of any obligation to redeem notes held by money brokers, “the major force ensuring the people of this state from the evil arising from the demands made on the banks of this state for gold and silver by brokers.”
2-There were arbitragers between notes and the delivery of specimen (and redeem of notes were suspended to protect fractional notes when most required).
3-Strangely there was not notes labeled has 100% reserve ones.
The jurisprudence and the economic profession did not make the distinction and so did not required proper labeling (“promises of payment” versus true “Notes” or Demand Deposits” or “Receipts”). Conveniently we could add.
Carlos Novais, you make me laugh. A note is a promise to pay, by definition!
Demand obligations cannot trade at a discount, since they are redeemable at the issuer at par.
Beefcake the Mighty:
Great posts, Carlos. BTW your English is fine and your statements very clear. David Hilary is just being a cunt (as usual).