Muitos conhecem os "federalists papers" que defenderam o modelo federal para os EUA na sua fundação. Mais raro é encontrar alguém que conheça os "anti-federalists papers" escritos por aqueles que se opuseram a uma Constituição (Jefferson por exemplo era céptico, Benjamim Franklin quando regressou ao seu Estado depois da assinatura da Constituição, perguntaram-lhe: "então o que é que resultou?", ao que respondeu: " A republic, if you can keep it"), porque já existiam os "Articles of Confederation" para organizar políticamente as relações entre os Estados soberanos que saíram da Revolução Americana (na verdade, um acto de separatismo do Império Britânico, que...incluiu...sim...actos de "terrorismo". Muitos esqueçem até que já depois da Revolução, James Madison em 1812 fez tudo para os EUA declarassem guerra aos Britânicos por causa do Canadá, precisamente quando aqueles combatiam contra Napoleão. A verdade é que, até muito tarde nesse século, o espírito anti-britânico era muito comum (e assim, talvez alguns perceberão melhor a oferta da Estátua da Liberdade pelos Franceses).
Para já fica aqui a lista, espero comentar alguns deles mais tarde, mas passem os olhos pelos títulos. No meu julgamento, quase tudo que os anti-federalists disseram acabou por passar-se. A primeira dos quais foi:
"Se aprovarem uma Constituição vamos acabar por ter uma Guerra Civil (bem, um Guerra entre Estados)." (No. 7 ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION WILL LEAD TO CIVIL WAR )
A outra foi que a partir do momento que se criava a figura de um Governo Federal, mesmo que estipulado para ter funções mínimas, este acabaria por submergir a soberania dos Estados. E assim foi. Novas interpretações da Constituição, o crescimento natural de qualquer poder político e as crises que inevitávelmente provoca e ainda as guerras em que se envolveu, tornaram (ou cada vez mais fazem do)o sonho americano em mais um Estado Social-democrata de poder centralizado, com tendências de Império, o que a prazo, só nos vai fazer esperar, pela sua queda. É o ciclo natural das civilizações que acabam por desabar no seu próprio peso (que deriva da inevitável centralização a prazo).
Introdução:
During the period from the drafting and proposal of the federal Constitution in September, 1787, to its ratification in 1789 there was an intense debate on ratification. The principal arguments in favor of it were stated in the series written by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay called the Federalist Papers, although they were not as widely read as numerous independent local speeches and articles. The arguments against ratification appeared in various forms, by various authors, most of whom used a pseudonym. Collectively, these writings have become known as the Anti-Federalist Papers.
No. 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION: A DANGEROUS PLAN OF BENEFIT ONLY TO THE "ARISTOCRATICK COMBINATION"
No. 2 "WE HAVE BEEN TOLD OF PHANTOMS"
No. 3 NEW CONSTITUTION CREATES A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; WILL NOT ABATE FOREIGN INFLUENCE; DANGERS OF CIVIL WAR AND DESPOTISM
No. 4 FOREIGN WARS, CIVIL WARS, AND INDIAN WARS - THREE BUGBEARS
No. 5 SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND - A CASE IN POINT
No. 6 THE HOBGOBLINS OF ANARCHY AND DISSENSIONS AMONG THE STATES
No. 7 ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION WILL LEAD TO CIVIL WAR
No. 8 "THE POWER VESTED IN CONGRESS OF SENDING TROOPS FOR SUPPRESSING INSURRECTIONS WILL ALWAYS ENABLE THEM TO STIFLE THE FIRST STRUGGLES OF FREEDOM"
No. 9 A CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT IS A TYRANNY
No. 10 ON THE PRESERVATION OF PARTIES, PUBLIC LIBERTY DEPENDS
No. 11 UNRESTRICTED POWER OVER COMMERCE SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
No. 12 HOW WILL THE NEW GOVERNMENT RAISE MONEY?
No. 13 THE EXPENSE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT
No. 14 EXTENT OF TERRITORY UNDER CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT TOO LARGE TO PRESERVE LIBERTY OR PROTECT PROPERTY
No. 15 RHODE ISLAND IS RIGHT!
No. 16 EUROPEANS ADMIRE AND FEDERALISTS DECRY THE PRESENT SYSTEM
No. 17 FEDERALIST POWER WILL ULTIMATELY SUBVERT STATE AUTHORITY
No. 18-20 WHAT DOES HISTORY TEACH? (PART 1)
No. 18-20 WHAT DOES HISTORY TEACH? (PART II)
No. 21 WHY THE ARTICLES FAILED
No. 22 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION SIMPLY REQUIRES AMENDMENTS, PARTICULARLY FOR COMMERCIAL POWER AND JUDICIAL POWER; CONSTITUTION GOES TOO FAR
No. 23 CERTAIN POWERS NECESSARY FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, CAN AND SHOULD BE LIMITED
No. 24 OBJECTIONS TO A STANDING ARMY (PART I)
No. 25 OBJECTIONS TO A STANDING ARMY (PART II)
No. 26 THE USE OF COERCION BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT (PART 1)
No. 27 THE USE OF COERCION BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT (PART 2)
No. 28 THE USE OF COERCION BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT (PART III)
No. 29 OBJECTIONS TO NATIONAL CONTROL OF THE MILITIA
No. 30-31 A VIRGINIA ANTIFEDERALIST ON THE ISSUE OF TAXATION
No. 32 FEDERAL TAXATION AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED POWERS (PART I)
No. 33 FEDERAL TAXATION AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED POWERS (PART II)
No. 34 THE PROBLEM OF CONCURRENT TAXATION
No. 35 FEDERAL TAXING POWER MUST BE RESTRAINED
No. 36 REPRESENTATION AND INTERNAL TAXATION
No. 37 FACTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION
No. 38 SOME REACTIONS TO FEDERALIST ARGUMENTS
No. 39 APPEARANCE AND REALITY-THE FORM IS FEDERAL; THE EFFECT IS NATIONAL
No. 40 ON THE MOTIVATIONS AND AUTHORITY OF THE FOUNDING
FATHERS
No. 41-43 (Part 1) Richard Henry Lee "THE QUANTITY OF POWER THE UNION MUST POSSESS IS ONE THING; THE MODE OF EXERCISING THE POWERS GIVEN IS QUITE A DIFFERENT CONSIDERATION"
No. 41-43 (Part II) (Richard Henry Lee) "THE QUANTITY OF POWER THE UNION MUST POSSESS IS ONE THING; THE MODE OF EXERCISING THE POWERS GIVEN IS QUITE A DIFFERENT CONSIDERATION"
No. 44 WHAT CONGRESS CAN DO; WHAT A STATE CAN NOT
No. 45 POWERS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DANGEROUS TO STATE GOVERNMENTS; NEW YORK AS AN EXAMPLE
No. 46 "WHERE THEN IS THE RESTRAINT?"
No. 47 "BALANCE" OF DEPARTMENTS NOT ACHIEVED UNDER NEW CONSTITUTION
No. 48 NO SEPARATION OF DEPARTMENTS RESULTS IN NO RESPONSIBILITY
No. 49 ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS (PART 1)
No. 50 ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS (PART 2)
No. 51 DO CHECKS AND BALANCES REALLY SECURE THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE?
No. 52 ON THE GUARANTEE OF CONGRESSIONAL BIENNIAL ELECTIONS
No. 53 A PLEA FOR THE RIGHT OF RECALL
No. 54 APPORTIONMENT AND SLAVERY: NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN VIEWS
No. 55 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 1)
No. 56 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 2)
No. 57 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 3)
No. 58 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 4)
No. 59 THE DANGER OF CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ELECTIONS
No. 60 WILL THE CONSTITUTION PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF FAVORITE CLASSES?
No. 61 QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS REGARDING THE ELECTION OF CONGRESSMEN
No. 62 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 1)
No. 63 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 2)
No. 64 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 3)
No. 65 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 4)
No. 66 From North Carolina
No. 67 VARIOUS FEARS CONCERNING THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
No. 68 ON THE MODE OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT
No. 69 THE CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE
No. 70 THE POWERS AND DANGEROUS POTENTIALS OF HIS ELECTED MAJESTY
No. 71 THE PRESIDENTIAL TERM OF OFFICE
No. 72 ON THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE; ON REELIGIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
No. 73 DOES THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO POWER INFRINGE ON THE SEPARATION OF DEPARTMENTS?
No. 74 THE PRESIDENT AS MILITARY KING
No. 75 A NOTE PROTESTING THE TREATY-MAKING PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
Nos. 76-77 AN ANTIFEDERALIST VIEW OF THE APPOINTING POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
Nos. 78-79 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 1)
No. 80 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 2)
No. 81 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 3)
No. 82 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 4)
No. 83 THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND THE ISSUE OF TRIAL BY JURY
No. 84 ON THE LACK OF A BILL OF RIGHTS
No. 85 CONCLUDING REMARKS: EVILS UNDER CONFEDERATION EXAGGERATED; CONSTITUTION MUST BE DRASTICALLY REVISED BEFORE ADOPTION
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