segunda-feira, 28 de dezembro de 2009
A crise e o keynesianismo
O pior de 2009: “a saída para a crise está no investimento público”. Por Rodrigo Adão da Fonseca.
terça-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2009
Ai, ai os Reguladores
FT:" Thirty global financial institutions make up a list that regulators are earmarking for cross-border supervision exercises, the Financial Times has learnt."
Não terá passado pela cabeça dos nossos queridos reguladores que tão bom trabalho fazem a assistir às bolhas de inflação de crédito, que acabam como sempre acabaram em crise financeira para não dizer falência técnica dos seus preciosos Bancos, que declarar estes ou aqueles como dentro da sua própria classificação de risco sistémico é como declarar que serão sempre e em qualquer situação, protegidos de incumprimentos.
O que por outro lado levanta a suspeita que outros não o serão.
O que levanta a dúvida se não será melhor passar a trabalhar com os primeiros.
O que vai conduzir a problemas com os segundos.
Porque como se sabe, todo e qualquer banco está sujeito ao risco sistémico fomentado pelos reguladores, no sentido que chegará que cerca de 5% dos depósitos sejam objecto de pedido de transferência para outra entidade, e o Banco em questão entrará em incumprimento.
Não terá passado pela cabeça dos nossos queridos reguladores que tão bom trabalho fazem a assistir às bolhas de inflação de crédito, que acabam como sempre acabaram em crise financeira para não dizer falência técnica dos seus preciosos Bancos, que declarar estes ou aqueles como dentro da sua própria classificação de risco sistémico é como declarar que serão sempre e em qualquer situação, protegidos de incumprimentos.
O que por outro lado levanta a suspeita que outros não o serão.
O que levanta a dúvida se não será melhor passar a trabalhar com os primeiros.
O que vai conduzir a problemas com os segundos.
Porque como se sabe, todo e qualquer banco está sujeito ao risco sistémico fomentado pelos reguladores, no sentido que chegará que cerca de 5% dos depósitos sejam objecto de pedido de transferência para outra entidade, e o Banco em questão entrará em incumprimento.
The Great Depression of the 14th Century
Murray N. Rothbard
[This article is excerpted from An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought, vol. 1, Economic Thought Before Adam Smith.]
The causes of the great depression of western Europe can be summed up in one stark phrase: the newly imposed domination of the State. During the medieval synthesis of the High Middle Ages there was a balance between the power of Church and State, with the Church slightly more powerful. In the 14th century that balance was broken, and the nation-state came to hold sway, breaking the power of the Church, taxing, regulating, controlling and wreaking devastation through virtually continuous war for over a century (the Hundred Years' War, from 1337 to 1453).[1]
The first and critically most important step in the rise in the power of the State at the expense of crippling the economy was the destruction of the fairs of Champagne. During the High Middle Ages, the fairs of Champagne were the main mart for international trade, and the hub of local and international commerce. These fairs had been carefully nurtured by being made free zones, untaxed or unregulated by the French kings or nobles, while justice was swiftly and efficiently meted out by competing private and merchants' courts. The fairs of Champagne reached their peak during the 13th century, and provided the center for land-based trade over the Alps from northern Italy, bearing goods from afar.
Then, in the early 14th century, Philip IV, the Fair, king of France (1285–1314), moved to tax, plunder, and effectively destroy the vitally important fairs of Champagne. To finance his perpetual dynastic wars, Philip levied a stiff sales tax on the Champagne fairs. He also destroyed domestic capital and finance by repeated confiscatory levies on groups or organizations with money. In 1308, he destroyed the wealthy Order of the Templars, confiscating their funds for the royal treasury. Philip then turned to impose a series of crippling levies and confiscations on Jews and northern Italians ("Lombard's") prominent at the fairs: in 1306, 1311, 1315, 1320 and 1321. Furthermore, at war with the Flemings, Philip broke the long-time custom that all merchants were welcome at the fairs, and decreed the exclusion of the Flemings. The result of these measures was a rapid and permanent decline of the fairs of Champagne and of the trading route over the Alps. Desperately, the Italian city-states began to reconstitute trade routes and sail around the Straits of Gibraltar to Bruges, which began to flourish even though the rest of Flanders was in decay.
It was particularly fateful that Philip the Fair inaugurated the system of regular taxation in France. Before then, there were no regular taxes. In the medieval era, while the king was supposed to be all-powerful in his own sphere, that sphere was restricted by the sanctity of private property. The king was supposed to be an armed enforcer and upholder of the law, and his revenues were supposed to derive from rents on royal lands, feudal dues and tolls. There was nothing that we would call regular taxation. In an emergency, such as an invasion or the launching of a crusade, the prince, in addition to invoking the feudal duty of fighting on his behalf, might ask his vassals for a subsidy; but that aid would be requested rather than ordered, and be limited in duration to the emergency period.
The perpetual wars of the 14th and the first half of the 15th centuries began in the 1290s, when Philip the Fair, taking advantage of King Edward I of England's war with Scotland and Wales, seized the province of Gascony from England. This launched a continuing warfare between England and Flanders on the one side, and France on the other, and led to a desperate need for funds by both the English and the French Crowns.
The merchants and capitalists at the fairs of Champagne might have money, but the largest and most tempting source for royal plunder was the Catholic Church. Both the English and French monarchs proceeded to tax the Church, which brought them into a collision course with the pope. Pope Boniface VIII (1294–1303) stoutly resisted this new form of pillage, and prohibited the monarchs from taxing the Church. King Edward reacted by denying justice in the royal courts to the Church, while Philip was more militant by prohibiting the transfer of Church revenue from France to Rome. Boniface was forced to retreat and to allow the tax, but his bull Unam Sanctam (1302) insisted that temporal authority must be subordinate to the spiritual. That was enough for Philip, who boldly seized the pope in Italy and prepared to try him for heresy, a trial only cut off by the death of the aged Boniface. At this point Philip the Fair seized the papacy itself, and brought the seat of the Roman Catholic Church from Rome to Avignon, where he proceeded to designate the pope himself. For virtually the entire 14th century, the pope, in his "Babylonian captivity," was an abject tool of the French king; the pope only returned to Italy in the early 15th century.
In this way, the once mighty Catholic Church, dominant power and spiritual authority during the High Middle Ages, had been brought low and made a virtual vassal of the royal plunderer of France.
The decline of Church authority, then, was matched by the rise in the power of the absolute State. Not content with confiscating, plundering, taxing, crushing the fairs of Champagne, and bringing the Catholic Church under his heel, Philip the Fair also obtained revenue for his eternal wars by debasement of the coinage and thereby generated a secular inflation
[This article is excerpted from An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought, vol. 1, Economic Thought Before Adam Smith.]
The causes of the great depression of western Europe can be summed up in one stark phrase: the newly imposed domination of the State. During the medieval synthesis of the High Middle Ages there was a balance between the power of Church and State, with the Church slightly more powerful. In the 14th century that balance was broken, and the nation-state came to hold sway, breaking the power of the Church, taxing, regulating, controlling and wreaking devastation through virtually continuous war for over a century (the Hundred Years' War, from 1337 to 1453).[1]
The first and critically most important step in the rise in the power of the State at the expense of crippling the economy was the destruction of the fairs of Champagne. During the High Middle Ages, the fairs of Champagne were the main mart for international trade, and the hub of local and international commerce. These fairs had been carefully nurtured by being made free zones, untaxed or unregulated by the French kings or nobles, while justice was swiftly and efficiently meted out by competing private and merchants' courts. The fairs of Champagne reached their peak during the 13th century, and provided the center for land-based trade over the Alps from northern Italy, bearing goods from afar.
Then, in the early 14th century, Philip IV, the Fair, king of France (1285–1314), moved to tax, plunder, and effectively destroy the vitally important fairs of Champagne. To finance his perpetual dynastic wars, Philip levied a stiff sales tax on the Champagne fairs. He also destroyed domestic capital and finance by repeated confiscatory levies on groups or organizations with money. In 1308, he destroyed the wealthy Order of the Templars, confiscating their funds for the royal treasury. Philip then turned to impose a series of crippling levies and confiscations on Jews and northern Italians ("Lombard's") prominent at the fairs: in 1306, 1311, 1315, 1320 and 1321. Furthermore, at war with the Flemings, Philip broke the long-time custom that all merchants were welcome at the fairs, and decreed the exclusion of the Flemings. The result of these measures was a rapid and permanent decline of the fairs of Champagne and of the trading route over the Alps. Desperately, the Italian city-states began to reconstitute trade routes and sail around the Straits of Gibraltar to Bruges, which began to flourish even though the rest of Flanders was in decay.
It was particularly fateful that Philip the Fair inaugurated the system of regular taxation in France. Before then, there were no regular taxes. In the medieval era, while the king was supposed to be all-powerful in his own sphere, that sphere was restricted by the sanctity of private property. The king was supposed to be an armed enforcer and upholder of the law, and his revenues were supposed to derive from rents on royal lands, feudal dues and tolls. There was nothing that we would call regular taxation. In an emergency, such as an invasion or the launching of a crusade, the prince, in addition to invoking the feudal duty of fighting on his behalf, might ask his vassals for a subsidy; but that aid would be requested rather than ordered, and be limited in duration to the emergency period.
The perpetual wars of the 14th and the first half of the 15th centuries began in the 1290s, when Philip the Fair, taking advantage of King Edward I of England's war with Scotland and Wales, seized the province of Gascony from England. This launched a continuing warfare between England and Flanders on the one side, and France on the other, and led to a desperate need for funds by both the English and the French Crowns.
The merchants and capitalists at the fairs of Champagne might have money, but the largest and most tempting source for royal plunder was the Catholic Church. Both the English and French monarchs proceeded to tax the Church, which brought them into a collision course with the pope. Pope Boniface VIII (1294–1303) stoutly resisted this new form of pillage, and prohibited the monarchs from taxing the Church. King Edward reacted by denying justice in the royal courts to the Church, while Philip was more militant by prohibiting the transfer of Church revenue from France to Rome. Boniface was forced to retreat and to allow the tax, but his bull Unam Sanctam (1302) insisted that temporal authority must be subordinate to the spiritual. That was enough for Philip, who boldly seized the pope in Italy and prepared to try him for heresy, a trial only cut off by the death of the aged Boniface. At this point Philip the Fair seized the papacy itself, and brought the seat of the Roman Catholic Church from Rome to Avignon, where he proceeded to designate the pope himself. For virtually the entire 14th century, the pope, in his "Babylonian captivity," was an abject tool of the French king; the pope only returned to Italy in the early 15th century.
In this way, the once mighty Catholic Church, dominant power and spiritual authority during the High Middle Ages, had been brought low and made a virtual vassal of the royal plunderer of France.
The decline of Church authority, then, was matched by the rise in the power of the absolute State. Not content with confiscating, plundering, taxing, crushing the fairs of Champagne, and bringing the Catholic Church under his heel, Philip the Fair also obtained revenue for his eternal wars by debasement of the coinage and thereby generated a secular inflation
domingo, 22 de novembro de 2009
terça-feira, 17 de novembro de 2009
domingo, 15 de novembro de 2009
A ética e a crise
Ethics alone will not prevent financial crises. Por Philip Booth.
Nearly all financial market “busts” are preceded by monetary “booms” and this one was no exception. When central banks hold interest rates down, credit spreads become depressed, economic activity and asset prices boom and bad risks begin to look like good risks. Whether you have a moral compass or not, it becomes very difficult to distinguish between good and bad risks.
(...)
Financiers responding to price signals drive wealth creation in financial markets. Ethical behaviour may – indeed will – promote more stable and effective markets. The problem is that, once governments interfere to the extent they have, we do not know what behaviour creates wealth and what behaviour feeds the boom. A moral compass might help someone wade through that environment but it would not help very much.
While some may argue that a return to ethics is needed to salvage a market economy it can also be argued that an unfettered free economy encourages virtue. The period from the late Victorian era to the 1970s has lots of examples. Stock exchanges were entirely self-regulating, based on trust and simple rules, until the advent of a statutory basis for regulation in 1986. Life insurance companies used to compete on how conservative they were until statutory regulation and the Policyholders’ Protection Act changed their focus. Before financial regulation and state guarantees, conservatism was a commercial selling point, including among banks.
Nearly all financial market “busts” are preceded by monetary “booms” and this one was no exception. When central banks hold interest rates down, credit spreads become depressed, economic activity and asset prices boom and bad risks begin to look like good risks. Whether you have a moral compass or not, it becomes very difficult to distinguish between good and bad risks.
(...)
Financiers responding to price signals drive wealth creation in financial markets. Ethical behaviour may – indeed will – promote more stable and effective markets. The problem is that, once governments interfere to the extent they have, we do not know what behaviour creates wealth and what behaviour feeds the boom. A moral compass might help someone wade through that environment but it would not help very much.
While some may argue that a return to ethics is needed to salvage a market economy it can also be argued that an unfettered free economy encourages virtue. The period from the late Victorian era to the 1970s has lots of examples. Stock exchanges were entirely self-regulating, based on trust and simple rules, until the advent of a statutory basis for regulation in 1986. Life insurance companies used to compete on how conservative they were until statutory regulation and the Policyholders’ Protection Act changed their focus. Before financial regulation and state guarantees, conservatism was a commercial selling point, including among banks.
sexta-feira, 6 de novembro de 2009
A origem do Estado
Anarquia, minarquia e grupos de malfeitores. Por Miguel Botelho Moniz.
Um minarquista pode reconhecer a origem fáctica de um estado como sendo resultado de um processo violento e ilegítimo sem necessariamente querer acabar com ele. Indo mais longe, e continuando a recorrer às ideias do próprio Nozick, o surgimento de um estado mínimo, “monopolista” num determinado território, não significa obrigatoriamente uma rejeição de teorias anarco-capitalistas, podendo ser perfeitamente uma conclusão natural e necessária da sua implementação. A questão não sai nunca do plano puramente académico, pois o facto inegével é que o(s) estado(s) existe(m), concepção imaculada ou não.
Um minarquista pode reconhecer a origem fáctica de um estado como sendo resultado de um processo violento e ilegítimo sem necessariamente querer acabar com ele. Indo mais longe, e continuando a recorrer às ideias do próprio Nozick, o surgimento de um estado mínimo, “monopolista” num determinado território, não significa obrigatoriamente uma rejeição de teorias anarco-capitalistas, podendo ser perfeitamente uma conclusão natural e necessária da sua implementação. A questão não sai nunca do plano puramente académico, pois o facto inegével é que o(s) estado(s) existe(m), concepção imaculada ou não.
quarta-feira, 4 de novembro de 2009
Restringir o impulso totalitário
o problema do estado. Por Rui A.
O espírito de cooperação e de contrato, que são a essência da vida social privada, coexistem, nem sempre da melhor maneira, com a soberania e o poder público. Mas nunca encontramos um sem o outro.
A História evidencia também que esse impulso político é ameaçador da liberdade e que o estado e o aparelho de poder são frequentemente postos à disposição de interesses egoístas e de grupo, prejudicando gravemente a liberdade individual e os direitos fundamentais que deveriam caber aos cidadãos. O modo de restringir o impulso totalitário de todo o poder não é, todavia, negar a existência inevitável de um domínio político nas sociedades humanas, pelo contrário, é aceitá-lo e encontrar as formas de o limitar e reconduzir às suas funções pactícias originárias.
O espírito de cooperação e de contrato, que são a essência da vida social privada, coexistem, nem sempre da melhor maneira, com a soberania e o poder público. Mas nunca encontramos um sem o outro.
A História evidencia também que esse impulso político é ameaçador da liberdade e que o estado e o aparelho de poder são frequentemente postos à disposição de interesses egoístas e de grupo, prejudicando gravemente a liberdade individual e os direitos fundamentais que deveriam caber aos cidadãos. O modo de restringir o impulso totalitário de todo o poder não é, todavia, negar a existência inevitável de um domínio político nas sociedades humanas, pelo contrário, é aceitá-lo e encontrar as formas de o limitar e reconduzir às suas funções pactícias originárias.
sexta-feira, 30 de outubro de 2009
Sobre paradoxos do actual sistema monetário
Pela primeira vez leio aquilo que já tinha escrito em tempos sobre paradoxos do sistema monetário actual (um onde o crescimento do stock de crédito se dá pela criação monetária).
E um deles era que quando o stock de empréstimos bancários diminui, isso faz "desaparecer" massa monetária, sendo o reverso óbvio de que quando o sistema bancário aumenta o stock de crédito, o faz pela pura criação de moeda, não porque a poupança monetária disponível para ser transferida aumentou.
E daí os ciclos de expansão, bolhas e crises económicas e bancárias (por isso, de certa forma, a falência potencial dos bancos nestas crises seria a consequência natural e até justa...mas que nominalmente nunca ocorrerá, será sempre a solução quantitativa inflacionista a prevalecer ).
O esquema é simples:
1. Concessão de crédito que marginalmente aumenta o stock total de crédito do sistema
Activo: novo crédito a empresa X
Passivo: novo DO (depósito à ordem)
2. Pagamento do crédito: o crédito desaparece por débito da DOs, e assim, o stock total de DOs também diminui, ou seja, deflação quantitativa de moeda.
Agora o interessante é que o simples pagamento de juros também diminui o stock de DOs, dado que é efectuado por débito das contas DOs, por isso, neste sistema precário, a quantidade de DO criada em cada ano digamos tem de ser no mínimo, maior que o total de juros debitados em DOs para a quantidade total de moeda não diminuir.
(Muito mais há a dizer como por exemplo que em tese um banco pode aumentar o capital de forma totalmente fictícia se simplesmente conceder crédito aos seus próprios futuros (ou correntes) accionistas, e criando os DOs respectivos que serão debitados pela subscrição do aumento de capital. O maravilhoso mundo criado pelos bancos centrais.)
Seja como for, pelas estatísticas presentes o stock de crédito bancário está mesmo a diminuir (nos EUA e creio que também na zona Euro) e a massa monetária desde Março tem tido um
crescimento aproximadamente nulo.
http://mises.org/story/3810#
Does a Fall in Credit Lead to Deflation?
Mises Daily: Thursday, October 29, 2009 by Frank Shostak
(...) Hence an increase in credit out of thin air, all other things being
equal, gives rise to an expansion in the money supply. A fall in
credit out of thin air, all other things being equal, results in a
contraction of the money supply.
So in this sense it is valid to argue that a fall in bank lending out
of thin air contributes to the decline in the rate of growth of the
money supply and thus to deflation.
sexta-feira, 16 de outubro de 2009
quarta-feira, 14 de outubro de 2009
The Next Bubble
Um artigo no WST diz:
"How the Fed Can Avoid the Next Bubble: The central bank needs to watch asset prices and raise rates quickly when it decides the time is right.
Ben Bernanke and the Federal Reserve face a number of very difficult challenges in the years ahead. They include:
• Resisting pressure to monetize deficits, which would eventually cause high inflation.
• Implementing an exit strategy from the massive monetary easing of the past year.
• Maintaining the Fed's independence, which has been compromised by the direct and indirect bailout of financial institutions and congressional attempts to micromanage the central bank.
• Properly calculating asset prices and the risk of asset bubbles according to the Taylor rule, an important guideline central banks use to set interest rates.
• Supervising and regulating the financial system more effectively, particularly in the role of "systemic risk" regulator."
Mas esta lista é tudo o que nunca os Bancos Centrais conseguiram fazer. E como é que sabem que não estamos novamente e já numa nova bolha? Pelos métodos empíricos com que conseguiram assistir ao desabar do sistema financeiro?
"How the Fed Can Avoid the Next Bubble: The central bank needs to watch asset prices and raise rates quickly when it decides the time is right.
Ben Bernanke and the Federal Reserve face a number of very difficult challenges in the years ahead. They include:
• Resisting pressure to monetize deficits, which would eventually cause high inflation.
• Implementing an exit strategy from the massive monetary easing of the past year.
• Maintaining the Fed's independence, which has been compromised by the direct and indirect bailout of financial institutions and congressional attempts to micromanage the central bank.
• Properly calculating asset prices and the risk of asset bubbles according to the Taylor rule, an important guideline central banks use to set interest rates.
• Supervising and regulating the financial system more effectively, particularly in the role of "systemic risk" regulator."
Mas esta lista é tudo o que nunca os Bancos Centrais conseguiram fazer. E como é que sabem que não estamos novamente e já numa nova bolha? Pelos métodos empíricos com que conseguiram assistir ao desabar do sistema financeiro?
segunda-feira, 12 de outubro de 2009
A ter em atenção
O crédito continua a contrair apesar do excesso de reservas actualmente detido pelos Bancos.
sexta-feira, 25 de setembro de 2009
quinta-feira, 17 de setembro de 2009
Ron Paul em 2003, House Financial Services Committe
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Subsidies Distort the Housing Market
House Financial Services Committee
Congressional Record—U.S. House of Representatives
September 10, 2003
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on the Treasury
Department’s views regarding Government Sponsored
Enterprises (GSEs). I would also like to thank Secretaries Snow
and Martinez for taking time out of their busy schedules to appear
before the committee.
I hope this committee spends some time examining the special
privileges provided to GSEs by the federal government. According
to the Congressional Budget Office, the housing-related GSEs
received $13.6 billion worth of indirect federal subsidies in fiscal
year 2000 alone. Today, I will introduce the Free Housing Market
Enhancement Act, which removes government subsidies from the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the
National Home Loan Bank Board.
One of the major government privileges granted to GSEs is a
line of credit with the United States Treasury. According to some
estimates, the line of credit may be worth over $2 billion. This
explicit promise by the Treasury to bail out GSEs in times of economic
difficulty helps the GSEs attract investors who are willing
to settle for lower yields than they would demand in the absence
of the subsidy. Thus, the line of credit distorts the allocation of
capital. More importantly, the line of credit is a promise on behalf
of the government to engage in a huge unconstitutional and
immoral income transfer from working Americans to holders of
GSE debt.
The Free Housing Market Enhancement Act also repeals the
explicit grant of legal authority given to the Federal Reserve to
purchase GSE debt. GSEs are the only institutions besides the
United States Treasury granted explicit statutory authority to
monetize their debt through the Federal Reserve. This provision
gives the GSEs a source of liquidity unavailable to their competitors.
The connection between the GSEs and the government helps
isolate the GSE management from market discipline. This isolation
from market discipline is the root cause of the recent reports
of mismanagement occurring at Fannie and Freddie. After all, if
Fannie and Freddie were not underwritten by the federal government,
investors would demand Fannie and Freddie provide
assurance that they follow accepted management and accounting
practices.
Ironically, by transferring the risk of a widespread mortgage
default, the government increases the likelihood of a painful crash
in the housing market. This is because the special privileges
granted to Fannie and Freddie have distorted the housing market
by allowing them to attract capital they could not attract under
pure market conditions. As a result, capital is diverted from its
most productive use into housing. This reduces the efficacy of the
entire market and thus reduces the standard of living of all Americans.
Despite the long-term damage to the economy inflicted by the
government’s interference in the housing market, the government’s
policy of diverting capital to other uses creates a short-term
boom in housing. Like all artificially-created bubbles, the boom in
housing prices cannot last forever. When housing prices fall,
homeowners will experience difficulty as their equity is wiped out.
Furthermore, the holders of the mortgage debt will also have a
loss. These losses will be greater than they would have otherwise
been had government policy not actively encouraged overinvestment
in housing.
Perhaps the Federal Reserve can stave off the day of reckoning
by purchasing GSE debt and pumping liquidity into the housing
market, but this cannot hold off the inevitable drop in the housing
market forever. In fact, postponing the necessary but painful market
corrections will only deepen the inevitable fall. The more people
invested in the market, the greater the effects across the economy
when the bubble bursts.
No less an authority than Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan has expressed concern that government subsidies provided
to GSEs make investors underestimate the risk of investing
in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to once again thank the Financial
Services Committee for holding this hearing. I would also like to
thank Secretaries Snow and Martinez for their presence here
today. I hope today’s hearing sheds light on how special privileges
granted to GSEs distort the housing market and endanger American
taxpayers. Congress should act to remove taxpayer support
from the housing GSEs before the bubble bursts and taxpayers are
once again forced to bail out investors who were misled by foolish
government interference in the market. I therefore hope this committee
will soon stand up for American taxpayers and investors by
acting on my Free Housing Market Enhancement Act.
quarta-feira, 26 de agosto de 2009
Imposto Negativo e o efeito tendencialmente auto-destrutivo do Estado-Social
Uma diferença entre o chamado imposto negativo (talvez deficientemente descrito no meu post anterior no VentoSueste e já comentado pelo Miguel Madeira) e por exemplo o nosso rendimento social de inserção (RSI) é (pelo menos em tese) o grau de eficiência da sua aplicação. Ou por outra, é a ainda não imediata e automática aplicação do RSI a todos (embora seja nítido que esteja a crescer a sua base), o facto de ter de ser pedido algures com maior ou menor dificuldade e exposição social, o facto de existir um filtro que avalia a situação, o facto de mesmo uma parte das pessoas que poderiam ter direito ao RSI e não o fazem (por pudor social, por ignorância, etc.)...faz com que funcione (ainda) como travão ao efeito (podemos baptiza-lo de “efeito tendencialmente auto-destrutivo do estado-social”?) que tentei anteriormente descrever.
Recorde-se, imposto negativo ou não (embora seja mais nítido se pensarmos em termos de imposto negativo)...
... todo o esquema de ajuda tende a desincentivar rendimentos imediatamente superiores, além do incentivo a beneficiar de forma permanente ou seja o desincentivo a tudo fazer para recuperar um rendimento superior.
O imposto negativo, em tese, seria aplicado de forma muito automática e o conceito é simples: Todas as pessoas com rendimentos inferiores por exemplo a 500 euros mensais (assim fosse decidido) receberiam a diferença para esses 500 euros. Podemos até imaginar que tal esquema fosse aplicado mensalmente (seria o ideal). Todos os restantes esquemas de ajuda poderiam como que desaparecer. Seria simples e eficiente decidir colectivamente e de forma igualitária que nível de redistribuição aos mais desfavorecidos se deseja.
Muito mais simples de analisar, de propor, de decidir, do que a habitual mistura de várias e complexas medidas de ajuda, uns cumulativos outros não.
O que quer dizer é que a democraticidade da comparação de propostas é quase impossível pela população votante, comparar com Proposta Partido A: 600 Euros, Partido B: 400 Euros.
Dito isto, ou seja, depois de defender que o imposto negativo parece responder em democraticidade, igualdade, eficiência, a tudo o que é suposto num Estado Social virado prioritariamente para os mais desfavorecidos – e o qual tudo tem para ser defendido de forma alargada…
… Parece-me que o imposto negativo torna claro, precisamente pela sua democraticidade e eficiência, o tal “efeito tendencialmente auto-destrutivo do estado-social”:
3. Rendimentos imediatamente superiores (para não falar dos inferiores) a 500 Euros são desincentivados a trabalhar mesmo que isso signifique passar a auferir menor rendimento
4. Necessário agora aumentar receita fiscal para um menor número de contribuintes
5. Aumenta assim a desutilidade de trabalhar dos rendimentos próximos de 500 Euros (rendimento líquido de imposto fica mais próximo dos 500 euros por isso… mais vale passar a beneficiar)
6. Reivindicação (ou proposta por partido) do aumento de 500 Euros para 550 Euros
… e assim começa novo “Round”, em que cada vez existem menos contribuintes para maior receita fiscal necessária e mais beneficiários.
A forma como o imposto é colectado parece-me uma questão menor. No final, todo o imposto recai sobre a produção (rendimento), se existir imposto sem existir rendimento (possível por exemplo no imposto sobre propriedade) ainda pior, o imposto recai sobre a propriedade obrigando à sua venda mesmo que em parcela para poder pagar o imposto.
terça-feira, 25 de agosto de 2009
As indústrias discográfica e cinematográfica e a pirataria
De vitória em vitória, até à derrota final. Por Miguel Botelho Moniz.
As indústrias discográfica e cinematográfica já deviam ter percebido que cada vez que derrotam um adversário na luta contra a pirataria, um pior surge. Um pouco como uma doença que sendo mal curada com antibióticos vai desenvolvendo resistência, o uso dos tribunais para lutar contra a pirataria torna-a inevitavelmente imparável.
quinta-feira, 13 de agosto de 2009
Robert Lucas e as expectativas
My Lucas Critique
Over at the Mises blog--and note that the Mises blog is different from the Mises Daily article--I have a short postabout Robert Lucas' defense of mainstream economics. Lucas basically argued that nobody could have predicted the housing crash, because if they had predicted it by the day before, then it would have happened the day before. And so on. I wrote:
In the comments Troy Camplin argued that, contrary to Lucas, the existence of price bubbles obviously shows the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) is false. I responded:
This is far too clever and slippery. Someone can evaluate a situation as unsustainable (or poised in an "unstable equilibrium") without being able to predict exactly when the break will occur....
Also...I'm starting to think the efficient markets hypothesis is a state of mind, a consciously chosen way of looking at the world. I'm not sure what it would mean to really falsify it. It seems that any attempt to test it would rely on assumptions about seemingly random events, which in the final analysis would mean you weren't really testing the efficient markets hypothesis alone.
In the comments Troy Camplin argued that, contrary to Lucas, the existence of price bubbles obviously shows the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) is false. I responded:
Troy,
Your understanding of what the EMH is, is obviously different from Lucas'. Lucas obviously is aware of what happened to housing prices, and he doesn't think it violated EMH.
This is partly what I was getting at in my post. I'm pretty sure that Lucas thinks the housing market was hit with a really big shock in 2006, and that made prices fall.
Lucas knows it must have been an unexpected shock, because...(you fill in the blanks).
So my point is that Lucas thinks he just empirically tested whether EMH held up during the housing boom and bust, and he thinks it passed through with flying colors. Yet what wouldn't pass with flying colors?
Don't misunderstand, I'm agreeing with you: The housing bubble is a great reason that I personally don't endorse the EMH. But technically speaking, the EMH is consistent with what just happened. So Lucas isn't wrong, he just doesn't realize how a priori his worldview is.
quarta-feira, 12 de agosto de 2009
Bubble Economics: The Illusion of Wealth, Douglas French
"Since 1998, the money supply (as measured by M2) has doubled. In fact, it has increased elevenfold since 1971, when we gave up the last ties of the gold standard. So we have an expansion in the money supply now that is similar to what we had during the Roaring Twenties. We also have a series of bubbles: a tech bubble, then a real-estate bubble — all part of what Bill Fleckenstein calls "Operation Enduring Bubble." Of course, inflation and the resulting bubbles have disastrous economic effects. But in Human Action, Mises wrote that
The boom produces impoverishment. But still more disastrous are its moral ravages. It makes people despondent and dispirited. The more optimistic they were under the illusory prosperity of the boom, the greater is their despair and their feeling of frustration. The individual is always ready to ascribe his good luck to his own efficiency and to take it as a well-deserved reward for his talent, application, and probity. But reverses of fortune he always charges to other people, and most of all to the absurdity of social and political institutions. He does not blame the authorities for having fostered the boom. He reviles them for the inevitable collapse.
That is exactly what most people are doing today. They're blaming Wall Street. Everyone congratulated themselves when their homes were doubling in value. Everybody thought they were smart to pick those stocks in their 401(k) plans. But now that the bubble has popped, it's all Wall Street's fault."
terça-feira, 28 de julho de 2009
sexta-feira, 24 de julho de 2009
"Com Lucros não há despedimento"
Se assim fosse:
- qualquer ganho de produtividade deixa de ser possível por Lei
- Se mesma produção via inovação passa a ser possível com 9 pessoas em vez de 10, e a redução fosse proibida, seria impossível reduzir custos e preços
quinta-feira, 9 de julho de 2009
quarta-feira, 8 de julho de 2009
segunda-feira, 29 de junho de 2009
Criação de moeda pelos Bancos I
O esquema dos aumentos de capital dos bancos financiando o Banco os próprios Accionistas
Movimentos contabilísticos:
1. Concessão de crédito por criação de moeda
Activo do Banco: Concessão de Crédito ao accionista A em X Euros
Passivo do Banco: Criação de moeda por crédito da conta DO do accionista A em X Euros
2. Aumento de Capital
Passivo do Banco: Conta DO de A é debitada em X Euros para pagamento do aumento de capital
Capitais Próprios do Banco: Aumento de Capital em X Euros
Resultado:
CP: Capitais Próprios sobem em X
C: Carteira de Crédito sobe em X
Rácio de CP para Crédito ou Activo até sobe para = (CP + X / C + X),
É só vantagens... tirando o facto de ser tudo uma ficção.
segunda-feira, 15 de junho de 2009
Islândia - Boom and Bust
In Iceland's specific case, broad-based monetary aggregates such as M1, grew at a rate of 20–30% per annum every year between 2002 and 2007 (...) With a bountiful quantity of liquidity available at historically low prices, the outlets of this monetary expansion saw their values rise to ever greater heights. The average house price in Iceland saw its value increase almost 30% in domestic króna, and every year between 2003 and 2007 saw a greater-than 10% annual price appreciation.
A significant boom had materialized, much of it realized in foreign currency at captivatingly low interest rates. However, when the house of cards finally came tumbling down, this boom sustained on foreign currencies soon came to an end.
Iceland's Banking Crisis: The Meltdown of an Interventionist Financial System, Mises Daily by Philipp Bagus and David Howden
quinta-feira, 11 de junho de 2009
Mises, o método da ciência económica e o seu conflito com o Historicismo alemão
Mises claimed in Human Action that the only pure economic science is radical apriorism – using solely deductive reason without the help of experience. He built his entire system on logic and self-evident assumptions, similar to geometry. Mises rejected all forms of inductive aposteriorism, or the use of empirical studies or history to prove a theory. Mises solemnly declared, “Its particular theorems are not open to any verification or falsification on the grounds of experience.” Mark Skousen
"Economics in the second German Reich, as represented by the government-appointed university professors, degenerated into an unsystematic, poorly assorted collection of various scraps of knowledge borrowed from history, geography, technology, jurisprudence, and party politics, larded with deprecatory remarks about the errors in the "abstractions" of the Classical School.
After 1866, the men who came into the academic career had only contempt for "bloodless abstractions." They published historical studies, preferably such as dealt with labor conditions of the recent past. Many of them were firmly convinced that the foremost task of economists was to aid the "people" in the war of liberation they were waging against the "exploiters."
This was the position Gustav Schmoller embraced with regard to economics. Again and again he blamed the economists for having prematurely made inferences from quantitatively insufficient material. What, in his opinion, was needed in order to substitute a realistic science of economics for the hasty generalizations of the British "armchair" economists was more statistics, more history, and more collection of "material." Out of the results of such research the economists of the future, he maintained, would one day develop new insights by "induction."
The political significance of the work of the Historical School consisted in the fact that it rendered Germany safe for the ideas, the acceptance of which made popular with the German people all those disastrous policies that resulted in the great catastrophes."
After 1866, the men who came into the academic career had only contempt for "bloodless abstractions." They published historical studies, preferably such as dealt with labor conditions of the recent past. Many of them were firmly convinced that the foremost task of economists was to aid the "people" in the war of liberation they were waging against the "exploiters."
This was the position Gustav Schmoller embraced with regard to economics. Again and again he blamed the economists for having prematurely made inferences from quantitatively insufficient material. What, in his opinion, was needed in order to substitute a realistic science of economics for the hasty generalizations of the British "armchair" economists was more statistics, more history, and more collection of "material." Out of the results of such research the economists of the future, he maintained, would one day develop new insights by "induction."
The political significance of the work of the Historical School consisted in the fact that it rendered Germany safe for the ideas, the acceptance of which made popular with the German people all those disastrous policies that resulted in the great catastrophes."
domingo, 31 de maio de 2009
domingo, 24 de maio de 2009
quarta-feira, 20 de maio de 2009
O custo da "segurança laboral"
Segurança laboral. Por André Abrantes Amaral.
De acordo com o INE, os recibos verdes aumentaram 50% em quatro anos. Agora que nos encontramos em vésperas de eleições para o Parlamento Europeu, vem inevitavelmente à conversa a segurança no emprego, que o modelo social europeu pretende garantir. No entanto, se há algo que muitas pessoas já sentiram na pele é a dificuldade de, estando desempregadas, arranjarem novo trabalho. Bem sei que não é fácil, mas convinha que fossemos honestos nesta matéria e tivéssemos em conta que, quanto mais custoso é despedir, mais difícil é contratar e mais complicada a vida para quem perde o emprego.
De acordo com o INE, os recibos verdes aumentaram 50% em quatro anos. Agora que nos encontramos em vésperas de eleições para o Parlamento Europeu, vem inevitavelmente à conversa a segurança no emprego, que o modelo social europeu pretende garantir. No entanto, se há algo que muitas pessoas já sentiram na pele é a dificuldade de, estando desempregadas, arranjarem novo trabalho. Bem sei que não é fácil, mas convinha que fossemos honestos nesta matéria e tivéssemos em conta que, quanto mais custoso é despedir, mais difícil é contratar e mais complicada a vida para quem perde o emprego.
sábado, 16 de maio de 2009
Pete Boettke sobre o Mises Institute
The Mises Institute Does Amazing Work. Por Pete Boettke.
The Mises Institute is the world's leading web-based resource for Austrian economics. Students interested in Austrian economics benefit greatly from the books and articles made available on their website. Also, the Mises Institute sponsors conferences that bring students in from throughout the world to learn about the teachings of Mises. And the scholars associated with the Mises Institute publish widely and have a broad audience.
I congratulate them on all this great work and I don't want my "dispute" over (a) GMU and (b) which direction forward for Austrian economics as a progressive research program in the modern economic profession to confuse people. The Mises Institute is not just an important resource for students of the Austrian school of economics, it has become an inspensible one thanks to the efforts of Lew and Jeff.
Also, I should add that on an ideological front the Mises Institute has been the most steadfast defender of libertarianism, anti-war, and a consistent voice against the policies that led us to our current situation, and the policy responses of Bush and now Obama.
The Mises Institute is the world's leading web-based resource for Austrian economics. Students interested in Austrian economics benefit greatly from the books and articles made available on their website. Also, the Mises Institute sponsors conferences that bring students in from throughout the world to learn about the teachings of Mises. And the scholars associated with the Mises Institute publish widely and have a broad audience.
I congratulate them on all this great work and I don't want my "dispute" over (a) GMU and (b) which direction forward for Austrian economics as a progressive research program in the modern economic profession to confuse people. The Mises Institute is not just an important resource for students of the Austrian school of economics, it has become an inspensible one thanks to the efforts of Lew and Jeff.
Also, I should add that on an ideological front the Mises Institute has been the most steadfast defender of libertarianism, anti-war, and a consistent voice against the policies that led us to our current situation, and the policy responses of Bush and now Obama.
quinta-feira, 14 de maio de 2009
Teoria Monetária: 100% de Reservas versus "Free Banking"
Para quem se interessar pelo assunto que mais controversia gera entre "austriacos" e quiser seguir a discussão que gerou (atá agora) 164 comentários onde tenho tido o prazer de participar, assinando como Carlos Novais, e com a participação de George Selgin e Lawrence H. White, ambos no lado "Free Banking" (na verdade as duas maiores autoridades académicas no assunto), pode encontrar na sequência de um post de George Selgin no Mises Institute: Interview on Free Banking.
O que está em questão é saber da possibilidade legal e económica, em liberdade económica de emissão de moeda e livre circulação, da existência de depósitos à ordem e emissão de notas com 100% de reservas ou com fixação livre por parte dos emitentes - situação a que provavelmente um dia chegaremos dada a tendência natural do presente regime intervencionista (como outros no passado) de colapsar ou o que seria melhor, a consciência da irracionalidade e de risco sistémico bem evidente nas crises cíclicas permitir a introdução da concorrência na emissão e circulação de moeda.
Coloco aqui os meus sucessivos comentários, a minha linha de argumentação corresponde a uma tese que eu espero vir a ser capaz de produzir num texto mais elaborado com a ajuda de Luis Aguiar Santos.
I.
Posted also in "Larry Sechrest's Free Banking: Live Blog Prelude"
In honest and free competition Free-Banking: "Good Money drives out Bad money", and that means... 100% Reserves because:
- "Free banking" to be honest require that banks that issue notes and accept deposits of a commodity (let´s say gold and silver) to be absolutely clear about the service and contract provided.
- "100% Reserve Bank" could say something like: "This note is a receipt of a gold coin deposit" or "Your balance in you demand deposit current account is covered 100% by gold deposits"
- Bank "20% partial reserve" should say: "this note or balance in demand deposit is a claim/IOU of gold coins covered at demand by at least 20% of gold"
So, the free banking argument is valid in the sense taht each issuer is perfectly clear about the contract established.
The thing that the "free banking" argument misses is that:
- notes/deposits from diferent issuers will not be in anyway fungible
- in a free market with an honest Free-Banking, Good Money will drive out Bad Money... just imagine an arbitrage between asking credit in a partial reserve bank (that wil expand it´s money supply wiht the new credit) and "buying" notes/deposits in a 100% reserve bank.
The partial reserve bank will trade at discount sooner or later.
The discount will also appear if you think yourself making a deposit of 100 gold coins that you are adding to your hoarding. In a partial reserve bank, in the moment that you deposit 100 coins, you are receiving notes/deposits that will be exchanged for sure at discount.
II.
1. Honest free banking requires that each partial reserve bank states clearly what the note/deposit issued means (ex: "This is not a 100% reserve bank. A minimum of 20% reserves will be deposit").
2. Notes issued by partial reserve banks will trade at discount because it´s possible to ask for loans (which will increase the partial reserve bank money supply) and buy a 100% reserve notes.
It seems that the defenders of "free banking" are willling to exchange theirs 100% reserve banks notes for "partial reserve notes" at par value... until....some one realizes that there is a risk in its partial reserve notes
At some point the discount must appear, the extra interest in deposits in partial reserve banks are a premium for its risk loosing power purchase and even default , not a "out of thin air" advantage against 100% reserve banks deposits.
3. It´s funny to realize that a "partial reserve bank" could use "100% reserve banks notes" as part of it´s reserve.
III.
A speculator could even ask for loans in a partial reserve bank and immediately call for the physical gold.
I suppose a partial reserve bank would want to control this possibility in some way.
And it is difficult to imagine that someone is willing to deposit physical gold in a partial reserve bank, knowing that maybe the free banking guys are right and no one will ask for a discount.
i think that the historical examples of at par exchange value to physical gold and silver are subject to critical review of things like clear disclaiming of the partial reserve banks.
(I have exchanged comments with historians here in Portugal where it seems different notes from different issuers were exchanged at different discounts but this is something to be confirmed).
As i said, a partial reserve bank could use 100% reserve note, but the other way around it is not possble. So...?
I am sure that people (or sofisticated speculators) would realize the difference on bank runs in one kind of bank and another.
IV.
Credit risk in 100% reserve banks does not have an impact in demand deposits.
Demand deposits are suposed to be equivalent to ... full hoarding. Only time deposits would be at risk.
PS: actually a 100% reserve bank must carry more than 100% reserves because of the time deposits that expiry and turns to demand deposits.
V.
I think one thing is certain in the current "consumer protection" legislation environment:
Pure receipts of gold deposit (100% RB) and "promisse of payment" (FRB) are different contracts and the client of one or another must be warned.
FRB defenders claims that promisse of payment and pure receipts will both be valued at par value.
100% RB defenders must prove that it is possible to arbitrage the risk, making loans in FRB notes (supply of promisse of payment is increased) and buying pure deposit certificates at par value (so the FRB says)... till for instance a last loan is made and the arbitrager ask for immediate redemption in physical cold, reducing the reserves ... till the market begins to ask for a discount for the FRB.
VI.
We can at least discuss at what level of reserves would today, in a age of information, cause a discount.
Would 5% of reserves notes (or promisses of payment) with public information be the same as 50% reserve notes?
Would the discount never happear beggining in 100% and ending in 0%?
Would not the process of risk arbitrage described make it appear sonner than latter?
What i am saying is that i agree with Free Banking, let them live. Let them put in the notes issued and in the deposit contracts the precise terms.and publishing what amount of reserves are held, making it clear the difference between physical and 100%RB notes and such FR promisses of payment.
And let´s buy all the physical gold at par value (if any) with money lent from a FRB (Free Bankers will sell it).
VII.
About George Selgin saying: "Even a pure gold system allows some scope for ABCT"
Two types of inflation:
- pure (let´s call it "pure") inflation that enters the economy through direct spending
- inflation through credit expansion
My opinion is that the first one causes prices to go up but not "pure" ABCT in the sense of serious direct misallocation between investment and previous and voluntary savings, although also interferes with relative prices and economic calculation
The second one is the root of ABCT.
The first one is caused by gold discoveries and at the present by printing money to pay for deficits (even if from buying public debt).
The second is the real ABCT problem because investment is funded by expansion of credit form pure money creation distorting interest rates and pressuring asset prices more than "consumer" prices.
VIII.
FRB Notes and deposits are honest if proper disclosure and with that i think the term "note" and "deposit" is not apropriate for FRB, but "promisses of payment" and "credit current account" (or something like that).
Only 100% RB should be able to use the ter "note" and "demand deposit".
If the market would ask for a discount or not between "promisses of payment" or not is the real discussion that is worthy.
O que está em questão é saber da possibilidade legal e económica, em liberdade económica de emissão de moeda e livre circulação, da existência de depósitos à ordem e emissão de notas com 100% de reservas ou com fixação livre por parte dos emitentes - situação a que provavelmente um dia chegaremos dada a tendência natural do presente regime intervencionista (como outros no passado) de colapsar ou o que seria melhor, a consciência da irracionalidade e de risco sistémico bem evidente nas crises cíclicas permitir a introdução da concorrência na emissão e circulação de moeda.
Coloco aqui os meus sucessivos comentários, a minha linha de argumentação corresponde a uma tese que eu espero vir a ser capaz de produzir num texto mais elaborado com a ajuda de Luis Aguiar Santos.
I.
Posted also in "Larry Sechrest's Free Banking: Live Blog Prelude"
In honest and free competition Free-Banking: "Good Money drives out Bad money", and that means... 100% Reserves because:
- "Free banking" to be honest require that banks that issue notes and accept deposits of a commodity (let´s say gold and silver) to be absolutely clear about the service and contract provided.
- "100% Reserve Bank" could say something like: "This note is a receipt of a gold coin deposit" or "Your balance in you demand deposit current account is covered 100% by gold deposits"
- Bank "20% partial reserve" should say: "this note or balance in demand deposit is a claim/IOU of gold coins covered at demand by at least 20% of gold"
So, the free banking argument is valid in the sense taht each issuer is perfectly clear about the contract established.
The thing that the "free banking" argument misses is that:
- notes/deposits from diferent issuers will not be in anyway fungible
- in a free market with an honest Free-Banking, Good Money will drive out Bad Money... just imagine an arbitrage between asking credit in a partial reserve bank (that wil expand it´s money supply wiht the new credit) and "buying" notes/deposits in a 100% reserve bank.
The partial reserve bank will trade at discount sooner or later.
The discount will also appear if you think yourself making a deposit of 100 gold coins that you are adding to your hoarding. In a partial reserve bank, in the moment that you deposit 100 coins, you are receiving notes/deposits that will be exchanged for sure at discount.
II.
1. Honest free banking requires that each partial reserve bank states clearly what the note/deposit issued means (ex: "This is not a 100% reserve bank. A minimum of 20% reserves will be deposit").
2. Notes issued by partial reserve banks will trade at discount because it´s possible to ask for loans (which will increase the partial reserve bank money supply) and buy a 100% reserve notes.
It seems that the defenders of "free banking" are willling to exchange theirs 100% reserve banks notes for "partial reserve notes" at par value... until....some one realizes that there is a risk in its partial reserve notes
At some point the discount must appear, the extra interest in deposits in partial reserve banks are a premium for its risk loosing power purchase and even default , not a "out of thin air" advantage against 100% reserve banks deposits.
3. It´s funny to realize that a "partial reserve bank" could use "100% reserve banks notes" as part of it´s reserve.
III.
A speculator could even ask for loans in a partial reserve bank and immediately call for the physical gold.
I suppose a partial reserve bank would want to control this possibility in some way.
And it is difficult to imagine that someone is willing to deposit physical gold in a partial reserve bank, knowing that maybe the free banking guys are right and no one will ask for a discount.
i think that the historical examples of at par exchange value to physical gold and silver are subject to critical review of things like clear disclaiming of the partial reserve banks.
(I have exchanged comments with historians here in Portugal where it seems different notes from different issuers were exchanged at different discounts but this is something to be confirmed).
As i said, a partial reserve bank could use 100% reserve note, but the other way around it is not possble. So...?
I am sure that people (or sofisticated speculators) would realize the difference on bank runs in one kind of bank and another.
IV.
Credit risk in 100% reserve banks does not have an impact in demand deposits.
Demand deposits are suposed to be equivalent to ... full hoarding. Only time deposits would be at risk.
PS: actually a 100% reserve bank must carry more than 100% reserves because of the time deposits that expiry and turns to demand deposits.
V.
I think one thing is certain in the current "consumer protection" legislation environment:
Pure receipts of gold deposit (100% RB) and "promisse of payment" (FRB) are different contracts and the client of one or another must be warned.
FRB defenders claims that promisse of payment and pure receipts will both be valued at par value.
100% RB defenders must prove that it is possible to arbitrage the risk, making loans in FRB notes (supply of promisse of payment is increased) and buying pure deposit certificates at par value (so the FRB says)... till for instance a last loan is made and the arbitrager ask for immediate redemption in physical cold, reducing the reserves ... till the market begins to ask for a discount for the FRB.
VI.
We can at least discuss at what level of reserves would today, in a age of information, cause a discount.
Would 5% of reserves notes (or promisses of payment) with public information be the same as 50% reserve notes?
Would the discount never happear beggining in 100% and ending in 0%?
Would not the process of risk arbitrage described make it appear sonner than latter?
What i am saying is that i agree with Free Banking, let them live. Let them put in the notes issued and in the deposit contracts the precise terms.and publishing what amount of reserves are held, making it clear the difference between physical and 100%RB notes and such FR promisses of payment.
And let´s buy all the physical gold at par value (if any) with money lent from a FRB (Free Bankers will sell it).
VII.
About George Selgin saying: "Even a pure gold system allows some scope for ABCT"
Two types of inflation:
- pure (let´s call it "pure") inflation that enters the economy through direct spending
- inflation through credit expansion
My opinion is that the first one causes prices to go up but not "pure" ABCT in the sense of serious direct misallocation between investment and previous and voluntary savings, although also interferes with relative prices and economic calculation
The second one is the root of ABCT.
The first one is caused by gold discoveries and at the present by printing money to pay for deficits (even if from buying public debt).
The second is the real ABCT problem because investment is funded by expansion of credit form pure money creation distorting interest rates and pressuring asset prices more than "consumer" prices.
VIII.
FRB Notes and deposits are honest if proper disclosure and with that i think the term "note" and "deposit" is not apropriate for FRB, but "promisses of payment" and "credit current account" (or something like that).
Only 100% RB should be able to use the ter "note" and "demand deposit".
If the market would ask for a discount or not between "promisses of payment" or not is the real discussion that is worthy.
quarta-feira, 6 de maio de 2009
Desculpem lá a presunção, mas este discurso é muito ... CN
(e felizmente para melhor)
Negócios:
Paulo Rangel diz que Estado está "num caminho de declínio"
"O Estado é a criação humana que imita Deus. É omnipresente, é omnisciente e nunca ninguém o vê"
"Acho que o Estado está num estado final, não sei prever é quando. Está claramente num caminho de declínio. A União Europeia é uma solução para um Mundo que tem algumas parecenças com a Idade Média",
"tem de competir com um conjunto de organizações", a nível local, supranacional, desportivo, religioso ou confessional, para concluir que: "o Mundo é mais competitivo". "
Via outra fonte diz qualquer coisa como ""...uma Europa medieval, com tribunais mas sem Estado, mais civil e menos política"
Negócios:
Paulo Rangel diz que Estado está "num caminho de declínio"
"O Estado é a criação humana que imita Deus. É omnipresente, é omnisciente e nunca ninguém o vê"
"Acho que o Estado está num estado final, não sei prever é quando. Está claramente num caminho de declínio. A União Europeia é uma solução para um Mundo que tem algumas parecenças com a Idade Média",
"tem de competir com um conjunto de organizações", a nível local, supranacional, desportivo, religioso ou confessional, para concluir que: "o Mundo é mais competitivo". "
Via outra fonte diz qualquer coisa como ""...uma Europa medieval, com tribunais mas sem Estado, mais civil e menos política"
segunda-feira, 4 de maio de 2009
Os "depósitos" à ordem
BPP suspende pagamentos ... com autorização do Banco de Portugal (BdP).
Parece que os Bancos só estão obrigados a fazer pagamentos se o puderem fazer. Porque se não o puderem fazer, o Bdp actua com o seu privilégio de poder substituir-se ao direito comercial e civil permitindo aos Bancos fugirem ao processo de falência.
Assim, quando falamos dos depósitos à ordem, é mais um factor de incerteza a adicionar às reservas parciais:
1- os depósitos à ordem de moeda só existem realmente em moeda no banco numa pequena porção (3% a 5%), o que faz com que no limite apenas os primeiros 3% a 5% a "correr" (hoje é mais via pedidos de transferência electrónica) ao banco recebam o seu dinheiro (ou será crédito ao banco?).
2- e para piorar, quem queira levantar o seu dinheiro e perante a impossibilidade do Banco o realizar, não pode recorrer ao pedido de falência e despoletar quanto antes a sua liquidação.
Parece que os Bancos só estão obrigados a fazer pagamentos se o puderem fazer. Porque se não o puderem fazer, o Bdp actua com o seu privilégio de poder substituir-se ao direito comercial e civil permitindo aos Bancos fugirem ao processo de falência.
Assim, quando falamos dos depósitos à ordem, é mais um factor de incerteza a adicionar às reservas parciais:
1- os depósitos à ordem de moeda só existem realmente em moeda no banco numa pequena porção (3% a 5%), o que faz com que no limite apenas os primeiros 3% a 5% a "correr" (hoje é mais via pedidos de transferência electrónica) ao banco recebam o seu dinheiro (ou será crédito ao banco?).
2- e para piorar, quem queira levantar o seu dinheiro e perante a impossibilidade do Banco o realizar, não pode recorrer ao pedido de falência e despoletar quanto antes a sua liquidação.
quarta-feira, 29 de abril de 2009
A Credit-Crunch Reader
Free-market blog and think-tank responses to the crash of 2008
In the 29th IEA Current Controversies Paper, Robert Rosenbleeth provides a valuable compendium of free-market blog and think-tank responses to the crash of 2008. A short summary of each article or paper is provided, together with a link to the original piece.
Material is selected from the world's most renowned classical-liberal and liberarian think tanks, including the Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation and the Ludwig von Mises Institute, as well as the Institute of Economic Affairs.
The overriding message from these readings is clear. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the crash was not the result of unchecked "laissez-faire" capitalism. In fact the credit crunch can be explained by a combination of misguided regulation, government intervention and loose monetary policy. Unfortunately, as the authors point out, governments' responses to the credit crunch would appear to be equally ill-conceived.
In the 29th IEA Current Controversies Paper, Robert Rosenbleeth provides a valuable compendium of free-market blog and think-tank responses to the crash of 2008. A short summary of each article or paper is provided, together with a link to the original piece.
Material is selected from the world's most renowned classical-liberal and liberarian think tanks, including the Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation and the Ludwig von Mises Institute, as well as the Institute of Economic Affairs.
The overriding message from these readings is clear. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the crash was not the result of unchecked "laissez-faire" capitalism. In fact the credit crunch can be explained by a combination of misguided regulation, government intervention and loose monetary policy. Unfortunately, as the authors point out, governments' responses to the credit crunch would appear to be equally ill-conceived.
segunda-feira, 27 de abril de 2009
quinta-feira, 23 de abril de 2009
Deflaçãofobia
De 1801 a 1900 (que terá tido algum crescimento...) os preços nos EUA cairam exactamente 50%.
Ver "Consumer Price Index (Estimate) 1800-2008" via Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Apesar do apriorismo ser suficiente para concluir que numa economia livre com moeda estável ("Am i repeating myself?") o crescimento económico traduz-se precisamente em queda de preços....
(sim, é verdade que queda de preços pode ocorrer precisamente pelo oposto, uma crise inevitável após uma bolha fomentada artificialmente por expansão de crédito e moeda, mas aqui a queda de preços é também uma consequência - não a causa - e um processo de cura)
... vamos ver se os factos atrapalham.
Ver "Consumer Price Index (Estimate) 1800-2008" via Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Apesar do apriorismo ser suficiente para concluir que numa economia livre com moeda estável ("Am i repeating myself?") o crescimento económico traduz-se precisamente em queda de preços....
(sim, é verdade que queda de preços pode ocorrer precisamente pelo oposto, uma crise inevitável após uma bolha fomentada artificialmente por expansão de crédito e moeda, mas aqui a queda de preços é também uma consequência - não a causa - e um processo de cura)
... vamos ver se os factos atrapalham.
sábado, 18 de abril de 2009
sexta-feira, 17 de abril de 2009
O Estado e a corrupção
Corrupção I. Por João Miranda.
Um sistema suficientemente corrupto torna-se capaz de gerar rendimentos lícitos para os seus membros. Isto porque os tentáculos do sistema conseguem chegar a todos os órgãos legítimos do regime. Conseguem chegar à justiça, ao Parlamento, ao governo, à administração pública e à polícia. A corrupção deixa de ser uma actividade marginal e torna-se rapidamente na forma de funcionamento normal e legal do aparelho de Estado.
Um sistema suficientemente corrupto torna-se capaz de gerar rendimentos lícitos para os seus membros. Isto porque os tentáculos do sistema conseguem chegar a todos os órgãos legítimos do regime. Conseguem chegar à justiça, ao Parlamento, ao governo, à administração pública e à polícia. A corrupção deixa de ser uma actividade marginal e torna-se rapidamente na forma de funcionamento normal e legal do aparelho de Estado.
quarta-feira, 15 de abril de 2009
New Deal: a realidade
Taxa de desemprego durante a Grande Depressão (foi Grande porque o New Deal tornou-a grande...)
1930 8.7%
1931 15.9%
1932 23.6%
1933 24.9%
1934 21.7%
1935 20.1%
1936 16.9%
1937 14.3%
1938 19.0%
1939 17.2%
Fonte: http://www.huppi.com/kangaroo/Timeline.htm
1930 8.7%
1931 15.9%
1932 23.6%
1933 24.9%
1934 21.7%
1935 20.1%
1936 16.9%
1937 14.3%
1938 19.0%
1939 17.2%
Fonte: http://www.huppi.com/kangaroo/Timeline.htm
Contra o pensamento único
A era do pensamento único. Por Filipe Faria.
Já todos conhecem o lobo mau, chama-se neoliberalismo selvagem (peço desculpa pela redundância mas é assim que se costuma dizer nas tabernas e nas associações de estudantes universitários), é contra ele que o estado deve lutar.
Já todos conhecem o lobo mau, chama-se neoliberalismo selvagem (peço desculpa pela redundância mas é assim que se costuma dizer nas tabernas e nas associações de estudantes universitários), é contra ele que o estado deve lutar.
quinta-feira, 9 de abril de 2009
domingo, 5 de abril de 2009
sábado, 4 de abril de 2009
Boas notícias: Obama vai fazer nascer um novo (e melhor) Reagan
Inovar é ...arranjar desculpas para inflacionar mais e sempre mais usando termos "complexos" que escondam a estupidez a misticismo da coisa.
Carlos Santos representa o state of the art da coisa: "O que é inovador aqui é a possibilidade que está a ser dada ao FMI de emitir novos DES, até um máximo de 250.000 milhões, sem ter que existir um depósito real de divisas. Isto é, o FMI passa a poder valer-se de um instrumento semelhante ao Quantitative Easing dos Bancos Centrais. O FMI emitirá SDR nesse montante e irá distribuí-los pelos diversos países, aumentando portanto os direitos de cada um em reservas em divisas, sem qualquer contrapartida real para o fundo."
Carlos Santos representa o state of the art da coisa: "O que é inovador aqui é a possibilidade que está a ser dada ao FMI de emitir novos DES, até um máximo de 250.000 milhões, sem ter que existir um depósito real de divisas. Isto é, o FMI passa a poder valer-se de um instrumento semelhante ao Quantitative Easing dos Bancos Centrais. O FMI emitirá SDR nesse montante e irá distribuí-los pelos diversos países, aumentando portanto os direitos de cada um em reservas em divisas, sem qualquer contrapartida real para o fundo."
E a terminar:
"Porque verdadeiramente, foi Obama o construtor de consensos, e nesse domínio fica sempre melhor ter sido um americano a enterrar os 30 anos de Reaganomics! O modelo de mercado regulado e com direitos laborais chegou hoje, e aterrou em Londres."
Reagan conseguiu ser popular no meio do combate imensamente corajoso ao inflacionismo dos anos 70 produzido pela doutrina económica de então e que emergiu outra vez agora (sem se diagnosticar que foi o inflacionismo do crédito que originou esta recessão - como todas as outras - o que levaria a culpar os Bancos Centrais e a sua completa des-regulação das reservas).
Por comparação Obama quer ser popular cavalgando o facilitismo do inflacionismo. Obama vai conseguir desenterrar a necessidade de um novo (e esperemos ainda bastante mais, digamos, ortodoxo) Reagan.
Aliás consegue-se vislumbrar que sairá algures entre o movimento de Ron Paul (ou pelo menos influenciado por) e nova Alternative Right (ver o fenómeno Glenn Beck - não sei já deram conta disso,e fica aqui o aviso) que começa a destronar o domínio proto-neo-conservador á direita.
sexta-feira, 3 de abril de 2009
G20: vandalismo e neo-keynesianismo em Londres
G-20: Londres dominada por Hunos, ou uma reedição do Braveheart? Por Rodrigo Adão da Fonseca.
Tweeting G20
G20 - parece que vão incentivar as exportações... mas isso não equivale a incentivar as importações de alguém? Ou será para Marte?
G20 - parece que vão vender ouro do FMI para tirar moeda da economia para depois terem moeda para dar de volta à economia
G20 - se temos um trilião para combater a crise porque é que tivemos mesmo a crise?
G20 - parece que vão vender ouro do FMI para tirar moeda da economia para depois terem moeda para dar de volta à economia
G20 - se temos um trilião para combater a crise porque é que tivemos mesmo a crise?
quinta-feira, 2 de abril de 2009
Gold Watch
ECB sells 35.5 tonnes of gold: bank: "While the ECB did not provide financial details of the sale, with gold prices at around 920 dollars an ounce, the latest sales would have a value on the order of 1.15 billion dollars (870 million euros)."
PS: Notável que a cotação se tenha mantido acima dos 900 Usd por onça. A verdade é que o ETF GLD negociado em NY (título representativo de ouro físico negociado como uma acção) tem sido um dos grandes veículos (e têm sido lançadas outros veículos similares e concorrentes em várias bolsas - o mais recente na Índia) de aumento de procura de ouro físico, contando já com mais de 1 000 toneladas e um valor de mercado aproximado de 30.5 mil milhões de Usd. Um excelente veículo de investimento em ouro (mas que não deve substituir, mas sim complementar, a posse física de ouro).
"Imparidades" e os Capitais Próprios dos Bancos
Negócios: "O colapso da banca islandesa e a crise bancária nos Estados Unidos obrigaram a Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD) a registar imparidades no valor global de 145 milhões de euros, de acordo com o parecer do conselho fiscal do banco publicado juntamente com o relatório e contas da instituição."
Fica melhor do que "prejuízos" ou "perdas". Parece algo externo à gestão.
Mas objectivamente, hoje em dia, ao contrário de outros tempos, os Bancos praticamente só precisam de capital por causa das "imparidades" potenciais nos seus investimentos quando antes, os Bancos precisavam de capital em moeda pura como parte das "reservas" para os seus depósitos.
Mas dado que hoje as reservas (o dinheiro efectivamente detido) é de apenas 3% a 5% da totalidade dos depósitos, e quando são insuficientes os Bancos Centrais "injectam" mais, os Bancos só precisam de capital por causa das flutuações do preços dos seus investimentos.
Fica melhor do que "prejuízos" ou "perdas". Parece algo externo à gestão.
Mas objectivamente, hoje em dia, ao contrário de outros tempos, os Bancos praticamente só precisam de capital por causa das "imparidades" potenciais nos seus investimentos quando antes, os Bancos precisavam de capital em moeda pura como parte das "reservas" para os seus depósitos.
Mas dado que hoje as reservas (o dinheiro efectivamente detido) é de apenas 3% a 5% da totalidade dos depósitos, e quando são insuficientes os Bancos Centrais "injectam" mais, os Bancos só precisam de capital por causa das flutuações do preços dos seus investimentos.
A vida tranquila dos grandes depositantes
Negócios: A administração do Banco Português de Negócios (BPN) está preocupada com a dimensão das saídas de depósitos da instituição e admite que a liquidez do banco atingiu valores insustentáveis a curto prazo.
"A saída diária de depósitos, em valores que chegam a atingir as dezenas e mesmo as centenas de milhões de euros, sem a necessária e vital compensação, pela via da captação de novos depósitos, está a conduzir a instituição para uma situação muito delicada e de extrema gravidade", escreveu o administrador, acrescentando que o cenário descrito "compromete seriamente o futuro do banco".
PS: Esta nota interna, como se pode perceber é uma fullfilling prophecy.
As intervenções iniciais em Bancos, com injecção imediata de liquidez e reservas de emergência e ainda garantias, destinam-se a permitir que os maiores depositantes e credores mais informados retirem o seu dinheiro com traquilidade, aqueles que de resto, colocam um Banco em situação de insolvência ao esgotar os 3% a 5% de reservas para a totalidade de depósitos. Depois só mais tarde é que os restantes depositantes são confrontados com os factos, podendo acreditar ou confiar mais ou menos na capacidade do intervencionismo. Neste caso, menos.
No final, os grandes depositantes são os que estão sempre garantidos pelo sistema. Quando se lembram de "fugir" de um banco colocando-o sem reservas (de resto, acto perfeitamente legítimo e racional), aparecem sempre estas reservas para poderem retirar os seus depósitos com a traquilidade de saber que o sistema o protege.
terça-feira, 31 de março de 2009
Leituras sobre o Estado e o Capitalismo
Estado Empreendedor versus Estado Árbitro. Por João Miranda.
Capitalismo de Estado. Por André Abrantes Amaral.
Capitalismo de Estado. Por André Abrantes Amaral.
segunda-feira, 30 de março de 2009
Gold Watch
Russia backs return to Gold Standard to solve financial crisis: Russia has become the first major country to call for a partial restoration of the Gold Standard to uphold discipline in the world financial system
Econometria na Economia? (II)
Mises's radically fundamental opposition to econometrics now
becomes clear. Econometrics not only attempts to ape the natural
sciences by using complex heterogeneous historical facts as if they were
repeatable homogeneous laboratory facts; it also squeezes the qualitative
complexity of each event into a quantitative number and then compounds
the fallacy by acting as if these quantitative relations remain constant in
human history. In striking contrast to the physical sciences, which rest on
the empirical discovery of quantitative constants, econometrics, as Mises
repeatedly emphasized, has failed to discover a single constant in human
history. And given the ever-changing conditions of human will,
knowledge, and values and the differences among men, it is
inconceivable that econometrics can ever do so.
Far from being opposed to history, the praxeologist, and not the
supposed admirers of history, has profound respect for the irreducible
and unique facts of human history. Furthermore, it is the praxeologist
who acknowledges that individual human beings cannot legitimately be
treated by the social scientist as if they were not men who have minds
and act upon their values and expectations, but stones or molecules
whose course can be scientifically tracked in alleged constants or
quantitative laws. Moreover, as the crowning irony, it is the praxeologist
who is truly empirical because he recognizes the unique and
heterogeneous nature of historical facts; it is the self-proclaimed
"empiricist" who grossly violates the facts of history by attempting to
reduce them to quantitative laws."
Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics by Murray Rothbard
becomes clear. Econometrics not only attempts to ape the natural
sciences by using complex heterogeneous historical facts as if they were
repeatable homogeneous laboratory facts; it also squeezes the qualitative
complexity of each event into a quantitative number and then compounds
the fallacy by acting as if these quantitative relations remain constant in
human history. In striking contrast to the physical sciences, which rest on
the empirical discovery of quantitative constants, econometrics, as Mises
repeatedly emphasized, has failed to discover a single constant in human
history. And given the ever-changing conditions of human will,
knowledge, and values and the differences among men, it is
inconceivable that econometrics can ever do so.
Far from being opposed to history, the praxeologist, and not the
supposed admirers of history, has profound respect for the irreducible
and unique facts of human history. Furthermore, it is the praxeologist
who acknowledges that individual human beings cannot legitimately be
treated by the social scientist as if they were not men who have minds
and act upon their values and expectations, but stones or molecules
whose course can be scientifically tracked in alleged constants or
quantitative laws. Moreover, as the crowning irony, it is the praxeologist
who is truly empirical because he recognizes the unique and
heterogeneous nature of historical facts; it is the self-proclaimed
"empiricist" who grossly violates the facts of history by attempting to
reduce them to quantitative laws."
Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics by Murray Rothbard
Armadilha de liquidez
Ou outra forma de dizer "insolvência". Muitos economistas preferem falar de "armadilha de liquidez", como se culpa da "insolvência" fosse da armadilha de liquidez". Uma das actividades preferidas do maistream académico é baralhar a si mesmo e aos outros trocadno causas e consequências, depois juntam expressões vazias e algumas expressões matemáticas e no fim recomendam mais inflacionismo, crédito e despesa do Estado.
Negócios: "Banca espanhola afunda após intervenção na Caja Castilla-La Mancha"
domingo, 29 de março de 2009
Merkel (proto-austrian)
Finantial Times: “This crisis did not come about because we issued too little money but because we created economic growth with too much money, and it was not sustainable growth,” said Ms Merkel.
sábado, 28 de março de 2009
quinta-feira, 26 de março de 2009
quarta-feira, 25 de março de 2009
Bancos Centrais: como esconder informação "relevante"
... para o nosso próprio bem. A hipocrisia não tem limites.
"The Congresswoman from Minnesota asks Bankster Puppet Bernanke why it is not public information as to which banks go to the "Federal" Reserve for loans
Komrade Bernanke's basic response is that if this information were made public, the public might wrongly perceive that the borrowing banks might be in weaker shape than those banks that are not borrowing." LRCBlog
"The Congresswoman from Minnesota asks Bankster Puppet Bernanke why it is not public information as to which banks go to the "Federal" Reserve for loans
Komrade Bernanke's basic response is that if this information were made public, the public might wrongly perceive that the borrowing banks might be in weaker shape than those banks that are not borrowing." LRCBlog
A Ética Jesuíta do Capitalismo
(Law, Legislation and Liberty) FA Hayek Épilogue, note 44 :
"Long before Calvin, the Italian and Dutch commercial towns had practised and later the Spanish Schoolmen codified the rules which made the modern market economy possible. See in this connection particularly H. M. Robertson, Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism (Cambridge, 1933), a book which, if it had not appeared at a time when it practically remained unknown in Germany, should have disposed once and for all of the Weberian myth of the Protestant source of capitalist ethics. He shows that if any religious influences were at work, it was much more the Jesuits than the Calvinists who assisted the rise of the ‘capitalist spirit’"
"Long before Calvin, the Italian and Dutch commercial towns had practised and later the Spanish Schoolmen codified the rules which made the modern market economy possible. See in this connection particularly H. M. Robertson, Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism (Cambridge, 1933), a book which, if it had not appeared at a time when it practically remained unknown in Germany, should have disposed once and for all of the Weberian myth of the Protestant source of capitalist ethics. He shows that if any religious influences were at work, it was much more the Jesuits than the Calvinists who assisted the rise of the ‘capitalist spirit’"
terça-feira, 24 de março de 2009
Get ready for...
Negócios: "A inflação no Reino Unido aumentou no mês passado de forma inesperada, depois dos custos dos bens alimentares terem subido.
O índice de preços no consumidor subiu 3,2% em Fevereiro, contra o mesmo período do ano anterior, anunciou o Departamento de Estatística britânico, segundo a Bloomberg.
Este valor surpreendeu os economistas contactados pela agência noticiosa norte-americana que aguardavam uma inflação de 2,6%."
Sim, precisamos de uma moeda mundial
Uma que seria seleccionada naturalmente: Ouro.
E exigiria uma grande e apertada "regulação" das "autoridades":
* que as notas e depósitos à ordem representem quantidades físicas realmente depositadas à guarda e não como crédito ao banco.
* que os bancos que emitissem notas e depósitos sem cobertura a 100% tornem explícito tal possibilidade nas suas notas e depósitos (e assim, não poderiam nunca ser fungíveis com os primeiros... sendo com toda a probabilidade trocados a desconto).
E sendo assim, os bancos para concederem crédito (coitadinhos...) teriam de convencer primeiro aforradores a concederem formalmente crédito ao banco (podemos chamar de "depósitos a prazo"), e assim exercerem de forma honesta e com racionalidade económica a função de intermediação entre poupança prévia e concessão de crédito.
PS: Diga-se que a única "regulação" e "autoridade" necessária aqui é o direito civil onde o contrato de depósito civil por um lado e o de crédito por outro está definido.
PS2: Seria provável que a prata e outros pudessem também ser utilizados para menores denominações e utilização física amoedada.
PS3: Não existe nenhum fascínio pelo ouro. Resulta apenas ser o elemento cuja quantidade total disponível é a mais estável que se conhece (dado o seu não consumo e a produção anual extremamente modesta relativamente ao stock total disponível).
Adenda: FT China calls for new reserve currency "China’s central bank on Monday proposed replacing the US dollar as the international reserve currency with a new global system controlled by the International Monetary Fund."
E exigiria uma grande e apertada "regulação" das "autoridades":
* que as notas e depósitos à ordem representem quantidades físicas realmente depositadas à guarda e não como crédito ao banco.
* que os bancos que emitissem notas e depósitos sem cobertura a 100% tornem explícito tal possibilidade nas suas notas e depósitos (e assim, não poderiam nunca ser fungíveis com os primeiros... sendo com toda a probabilidade trocados a desconto).
E sendo assim, os bancos para concederem crédito (coitadinhos...) teriam de convencer primeiro aforradores a concederem formalmente crédito ao banco (podemos chamar de "depósitos a prazo"), e assim exercerem de forma honesta e com racionalidade económica a função de intermediação entre poupança prévia e concessão de crédito.
PS: Diga-se que a única "regulação" e "autoridade" necessária aqui é o direito civil onde o contrato de depósito civil por um lado e o de crédito por outro está definido.
PS2: Seria provável que a prata e outros pudessem também ser utilizados para menores denominações e utilização física amoedada.
PS3: Não existe nenhum fascínio pelo ouro. Resulta apenas ser o elemento cuja quantidade total disponível é a mais estável que se conhece (dado o seu não consumo e a produção anual extremamente modesta relativamente ao stock total disponível).
Adenda: FT China calls for new reserve currency "China’s central bank on Monday proposed replacing the US dollar as the international reserve currency with a new global system controlled by the International Monetary Fund."
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Mensagens (Atom)
João Miranda faz a defesa do Imposto Negativo, e eu deixei um comentário:
Parece uma boa ideia e eficiente, mas na verdade é uma má ideia e precisamente pela sua eficiência.
Em experiência locais feitas nos EUA, o imposto negativo teve consequências imediatas nos incentivos a trabalhar e em outros factores como em manter os casamentos.
Por exemplo, é observado que aquelas pessoas de baixa formação que conseguem recuperar do desemprego, a característica que tinham era conseguir manter-se casado e conseguir trabalhar um ano num emprego de salário mínimo. Quem o conseguia, logo a seguir conseguia ir subindo em melhores empregos e retomar uma vida com mínimo de qualidade.
Com a introdução do imposto negativo observaram que a percentagem de divórcios aumentava muitíssimo e a situação passava a ser permanente.
Assim, quanto maior é o rendimento mínimo mais caro fica trabalhar e receber um salário, aumentando o número de pessoas nesse regime. Em termos teóricos depois, é preciso aumentar os impostos para pagar ao número crescente de pessoas, o que diminui o salário líquido de todos, o que aumenta o custo de trabalhar relativamente a ficar a receber o rendimento mínimo.
Existe assim, uma tendência natural para o número de pessoas ir aumentado e os impostos terem que subir sobre um número cada vez menor de pessoas a trabalhar.
Teoricamente parece que existem razões para prever o colapso.
Assim, na medida em que os actuais programas são diversos e obrigam as pessoas a andar e a perder tempo e em filas, isso funciona como travão para que as pessoas usem esse programas sociais.
Basicamente, um Estado Social eficiente, significa uma eficiência total em todos as unintended consequences do Estado Social.