Intellectuals Attack Laissez Faire, Imperialism & War, Trade Wars & Political Conflicts, Arms Race, Entangling alliances, National Hatreds, Fatal Miscalculations
A ler na integra, fica aqui uma parte do artigo (a do "Entangling alliances", no limite, se uma causa tivesse de ser escolhida, para mim seria esta): A Libertarian View of the Worst Catastrophe, by Jim Powell
"(...)The war began with an assassination and a series of miscalculations. On June 28, 1914, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was shot while driving through Sarajevo. The assassin was Gavrilo Princep, a Serbian nationalist student. Princep was involved with the Black Hand, a terrorist group promoting Greater Serbia. The Black Hand was directed by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević, head of Serbian military intelligence.
During the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars, Serbia had doubled its territory. Officials in Vienna believed that the Serbs coveted some of their territory, that Serbs had plotted the assassination, and that they must be stopped. But what was Austria-Hungary to do?
If Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia, Russia might back Serbia, because Slav nationalists were agitating for Russia to be the protector of fellow Slavs. The Russian army was about twice the size of the Austro-Hungarian army, so Russian intervention would spell trouble. Since Russia had an alliance with Britain and France, it was possible that Russian intervention might draw in those countries as well.
Moreover, Russia’s Czar Nicholas II knew that war meant risks for his regime. He had been humiliated just a few years before, in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) that triggered the Revolution of 1905 and brought the regime close to collapse. Russia certainly wasn’t prepared for a major war. Russia seemed unlikely to go into a war alone.
On July 3, Woodrow Wilson’s principal advisor Edward House reported that Foreign Secretary Grey let the Kaiser know about his desire for peace, but "Sir Edward said he did not wish to send anything official or in writing, for fear of offending French and Russian sensibilities." Apparently Grey’s commitments to these nations were such that he couldn’t function as a peacemaker.
Before deciding to take action against Serbia, Austria-Hungary needed help, and the most likely ally was Germany. On July 5, the Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II gave Austria-Hungary his famous "blank check" – supporting Austria-Hungary in its view that Serbia must be dealt with firmly. The conflict looked like another Balkan War – no big deal. Officials in Austria-Hungary expected that German backing would deter Russia from entering the conflict and help recruit Bulgaria as an ally. The Germans didn’t appear to be planning a general war, because when the Kaiser issued his "blank check," Moltke, Wilhelm Groener (head of the army’s railroad department) and Walther Nicolai (head of military intelligence) were all away on a summer vacation.
How could Germany and Russia fight each other? Kaiser Wilhelm II was a cousin of Czar Nicholas II and – one might add – an uncle of Britain’s King Edward VII. Surely, royals ought to be able to talk with one another and avoid a war.
On July 23, Austria-Hungary’s ambassador to Serbia presented an ultimatum: Serbia must eliminate terrorists based in the country and suppress publications critical of Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, representatives of Austria-Hungary must participate in the investigation of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand.
Serbia wasn’t ready for war, because it was still rebuilding its military forces after the recent Balkan Wars that had resulted in 91,000 Serbian casualties. In many Serbian infantry units, about a third of the soldiers lacked rifles. Accordingly, Serbia tried to defuse the situation, saying it would go along with Austria’s demands as much as possible. Serbia promised to suppress terrorism and publications critical of Austria-Hungary. The only point it couldn’t go along with was the idea of having foreigners involved with the investigation.
Austria ordered the mobilization of its army on July 23. Serbia ordered its army to mobilize two days later. Mobilizing an army didn’t mean war was inevitable, because it had served as a tool of diplomacy, to step up the pressure in a negotiation. But Austrian officials felt it was crucial to stop nationality conflicts from escalating before they blew apart their multi-national empire. On July 28, Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia.
The following day, Foreign Secretary Edward Grey told the Austrian Ambassador: "I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Serbia." Grey later confirmed his disinterest in the dispute: "The notion of being involved in war about a Balkan quarrel was repugnant. Serbia, to British people, was a country with which a few years ago we had severed diplomatic relations, because of a brutal murder of the King and Queen; and though that was over, and we were now on good terms, there was no sentiment urging us to go into a war on Serbia’s behalf."
Austrian Ambassador Friedrich Szápáry asked Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov not to mobilize the army, but then came reports that Austrian forces were bombarding Belgrade, the Serbian capital. On July 30, with the implicit support of Britain and France, Czar Nicholas II decided to order a mobilization of the Russian army against Austria-Hungary and Germany. Such a mobilization had long been viewed as an act of war. Presumably Russia’s ally France would soon join the war, and Germany would find itself fighting on two fronts. Germany’s best bet, militarily, seemed to be a quick victory over France in the west so it could focus on the much larger Russian armies in the east. Historian S. L. A. Marshall declared, "The news of full mobilization by Russia fixed Europe’s fate."
On August 1, Kaiser Wilhelm II supported his ally Austria-Hungary by declaring war against Russia. French war minister Cambon recalled demanding that Grey commit Britain to the defense of France, if France should enter the war. When Grey replied that the British government hadn’t decided what it would do, Cambon fumed: "After all that has passed between our two countries, after the agreement between your naval authorities and ours by which all our naval strength has been concentrated in the Mediterranean so as to release your fleet for concentration in the North Sea, so that if the German Fleet sweeps down the Channel and destroys Calais, Boulogne, and Cherbourg, there can be no resistance, you tell me that your Government cannot decide upon intervention? How am I to send such a message? It would fill France with rage and indignation. My people would say you betrayed us. It is not possible. It is true the agreements between your military and naval authorities have not been ratified by our Governments, but there is a moral obligation not to leave us unprotected."
August 3, Germany declared war against France. How could Britain enter the war, since there wasn’t an official alliance with France? British officials had discussed a naval blockade of Germany, and Chief of Staff John French expressed the view that "to bring the greatest pressure to bear upon Germany, it is essential that the Netherlands and Belgium should either be entirely friendly to this country, or that they should be definitely hostile, in which case we should extend the blockade to their ports." British officials contemplated violating the sovereignty of Belgium, yet the rationale for fighting Germany on behalf of France turned out to be the German invasion of Belgium on August 4. Britain cited it as an excuse to declare war against Germany.
All the belligerents expected war would be brief. None had plans for a long military campaign. Officials throughout Europe were shocked when, in the fall of 1914, it became apparent that the killing might go on for a long time.(...)."
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