da série "este gajo podia ser bom pra caraças"

da série "este gajo é bom pra caraças", Henrique Raposo: "(...)O preço descoberto pelas autoridades tem muito pouco de fictício: uma vez que não estão obrigados a seguir regras de contabilidade e de gestão de risco, os agentes públicos não estão sujeitos à mesma impossibilidade de obter um preço rigoroso. No momento em que o mercado volta a funcionar normalmente, o banco central deixa de ser necessário. A regulação nunca o foi.

No essencial é este o plano proposto por Paulson e Bernanke. Há dois reparos a fazer. Primeiro, um plano semelhante devia ter sido proposto há muito. Segundo, urge explicar que a solução é um triunfo e não uma derrota da economia de mercado. Bruno Maçães"

Ou o triunfo de uma solução que derrota a economia de mercado a qual, de resto, não precisa de um banco central para nada, o qual, de resto, é o primeiro responsável pela causa primária de todas as crises, passadas, presentes e futuras, a começar... pela:

American´s Great Depression

Para quem gosta mesmo-mesmo de História da Economia e com introdução de Paul Johnson (sim, esse Paul Johnson):

"(...) We now see, thanks to Rothbard's insights, that the Hoover–Roosevelt period was really a continuum, that most of the "innovations" of the New Deal were in fact expansions or intensifications of Hoover solutions, or pseudo-solutions, and that Franklin Delano Roosevelt's administration differed from Herbert Hoover's in only two important respects—it was infinitely more successful in managing its public relations, and it spent rather more taxpayers' money. And, in Rothbard's argument, the net effect of the Hoover–Roosevelt continuum of policy was to make the slump more severe and to prolong it virtually to the end of the 1930s. The Great Depression was a failure not of capitalism but of the hyperactive state.

I will not spoil the reader's pleasure by entering more deeply into Rothbard's arguments. His book is an intellectual tour de force, in that it consists, from start to finish, of a sustained thesis, presented with relentless logic, abundant illustration, and great eloquence. I know of few books which bring the world of economic history so vividly to life, and which contain so many cogent lessons, still valid in our own day. It is also a rich mine of interesting and arcane knowledge, and I urge readers to explore its footnotes, which contain many delicious quotations from the great and the foolish of those days, three-quarters of a century ago. It is not surprising that the book is going into yet another edition. It has stood the test of time with success, even with panache, and I feel honored to be invited to introduce it to a new generation of readers."

Part I: BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY

• Chapter 1 THE POSITIVE THEORY OF THE CYCLE (p3)
  • Business cycles and business fluctuations
  • The problem: the cluster of error
  • The explanation: boom and depression
  • Secondary features of depression: deflationary credit contraction
  • Government depression policy: laissez-faire
  • Preventing depressions
  • Problems in the Austrian theory of the trade cycle
• Chapter 2 KEYNESIAN CRITICISMS OF THE THEORY (p37)
  • The liquidity "trap"
  • Wage rates and unemployment
• Chapter 3 SOME ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF DEPRESSION: A CRITIQUE (p55)
  • General overproduction
  • Underconsumption
  • The acceleration principle
  • Dearth of "investment opportunities"
  • Schumpeter's business cycle theory
  • Qualitative credit doctrines
  • Overoptimism and overpessimism

Part II: THE INFLATIONARY BOOM: 1921–1929

• Chapter 4 THE INFLATIONARY FACTORS (p85)
  • The definition of the money supply
  • Inflation of the money supply, 1921-1929
  • Generating the inflation, i: reserve requirements
  • Generating the inflation, ii: total reserves
  • Treasury currency
  • Bills discounted
  • Bills bought-acceptances
  • U.S. government securities
• Chapter 5 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFLATION (p137)
  • Foreign lending
  • Helping Britain
  • The crisis approaches
• Chapter 6 THEORY AND INFLATION: ECONOMISTS and THE LURE OF A STABLE PRICE LEVEL (p169)

Part III: THE GREAT DEPRESSION: 1929-1933 (p185)

• Chapter 7 PRELUDE TO DEPRESSION: MR. HOOVER AND Laissez-Faire
  • The development of Hoover's interventionism: unemployment
  • The development of Hoover's interventionism: labor relations
• Chapter 8 THE DEPRESSION BEGINS: PRESIDENT HOOVER TAKES COMMAND (p209)
  • The White House conferences
  • Inflating credit
  • Public works
  • The New Deal Farm Program
• Chapter 9 1930 (p239)
  • More inflation
  • The Smoot–Hawley Tariff
  • Hoover in the second half of 1930
  • The public works agitation
  • The fiscal burdens of government
• Chapter 10 1931—"The Tragic Year" (p257)
  • The American monetary picture
  • The fiscal burden of government
  • Public works and wage rates
  • Maintaining wage rates
  • Immigration restrictions
  • Voluntary relief
  • Hoover in the last quarter of 1931
  • The spread of collectivist ideas in the business world
• Chapter 11 THE HOOVER NEW DEAL OF 1932 (p285)
  • The tax increase
  • Expenditures versus economy
  • Public works agitation
  • The RFC
  • Governmental relief
  • The inflation program
  • The inflation agitation
  • Mr. Hoover's war on the stock market
  • The home loan bank system
  • The bankruptcy law
  • The fight against immigration
• Chapter 12 THE CLOSE OF THE HOOVER TERM (p321)
  • The attack on property rights: the final currency failure
  • Wages, hours, and employment during the depression
  • Conclusion: the lessons of Mr. Hoover's record