A tragédia

A principal tragédia de quem se afasta da visão estrita da defesa territorial, é que, tal como no intervencionismo económico, as aventuras militares mal fundamentadas e o desejo de exportar um qualquer ideal ao mundo (liberation!), à medida que vão mostrando as suas nefastas "unintended consequences" internas (déficits, dívida pública, etc) e externas (alvo para o ódio alheio, dar algumas razões certas às pessoas e causas erradas, a necessidade de mais compromissos, mais meios e correr ainda mais riscos de acontecimentos inesperados), a receita estatista é sempre a mesma:

- "self-denial", a negação de qualquer erro nos objectivos, na estratégia, nos meios e nos fins
- e pelo contrário, propor mais do mesmo
- e nunca, mas mesmo nunca, simplesmente deixar os outros resolver os seus problemas ("mind your own business" e já agora deixar às às populações tratarem dos seus próprios tiranos)

Por umas alegações de perigo nada bem justificadas e pelo idealismo de levar a democracia a culturas alheias, morreram civis (6000?), soldados (de um lado e outro), abre-se um campo de batalha mesmo a jeito para a junção do fundamentalismo (onde exisitia um estado secular) com quem simplesmente não gosta de ver o seu pais ocupado e proporciona-se a que um tirano seja percepcionado como um patriota (deixar morrer os filhos de Saddam e o seu sobrinho de 14 anos, num combate de 6 horas...) resistente ainda que um patriota tirano (e ainda que tenha sido ex-cliente dos "aliados" US e Uk).

Estamos portanto, no meio de uma tragédia a que provávelmente se seguirão outras, e em cada uma dirão: "isto não nos vai fazer recuar, pelo contrário, vai fazer aumentar a nossa determinação". Típico e previsível.

Em 1991, Sheldon L. Richman (na altura, senior editor at the Cato Institute), publicava um longo texto intitulado: "Ancient History": U.S. Conduct in the Middle East Since World War Il and the Folly Of Intervention.

No Executive Summary dizia:

"In the aftermath of the most overt and direct U.S. attempt to manage affairs in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf War, it is more important than ever to understand how the United States came to be involved in the region and the disastrous consequences of that involvement. President Bush's willingness to sacrifice American lives to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait, to restore the "legitimate" government of that feudal monarchy, and to create a "new world order" proceeds logically from the premises and policies of past administrations. Indeed, there is little new in Bush's new world order, except the Soviet Union's assistance. That may mean the new order will be far more dangerous than the old, because it will feature an activist U.S. foreign policy without the inhibitions that were formerly imposed by the superpower rivalry. That bodes ill for the people of the Middle East, as well as for the long-suffering American citizens, who will see their taxes continue to rise, their consumer economy increasingly distorted by military spending, and their blood spilled--all in the name of U.S. leadership."

Retenho também 3 citações:

1. "In 1796 George Washington, in his farewell address, offered advice that now seems aimed directly at those who constructed the foreign policy we have suffered with for the past 45 years:

Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and exces sive dislike of another, cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other. Real Patriots, who may resist the intriegues [sic] of the favorite, are liable to become suspected and odious; while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their interests.(229)"

2. "Reshaping the world was to be achieved only by example. As Sen. Robert A. Taft put it in 1951:

If we confine our activities to the field of moral leadership we shall be successful if our philosophy is sound and appeals to the people of the world. The trouble with those who advocate this [interventionist] policy is that they really do not confine themselves to moral leadership. They are inspired with the same kind of New Deal planned-control ideas abroad as recent Administrations have desired to endorse at home. In their hearts they want to force on these foreign peoples through the use of American money and even, perhaps, American arms the policies which moral leadership is able to advance only through the sound strength of its principles and the force of its persuasion. I do not think this moral leadership ideal justifies our engaging in any preventive war, or going to the defense of one country against another, or getting ourselves into a vulnerable fiscal and economic position at home which may invite war. I do not believe any policy which has behind it the threat of military force is justified as part of the basic foreign policy of the United States except to defend the liberty of our own people.(221)"

3. "Thomas Paine recognized long ago that "taxes were not raised to carry on wars, . . . wars were raised to carry on taxes."(223)"