Eric Voegelin e a Natureza do Direito

(adenda: impôe-se a substituição do termo "Lei" por Direito", por uma útil chamada de atenção e que agradeço desde já)

A propósito, um breve apontamento.

No seu, "The Nature of the Law" by Eric Voegelin, written in 1957 and published in The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, volume 27, The Nature of the Law and Related Writings, Louisiana State University Press, 1991:

"1. Society as a Self-Organizing Entity:

At the ontological core of normativity are two persons who issue rules:

- God
- reflecting man, using his reason and conscience

Beyond this there is no one (not even: parents, friends, teachers, elders, priests, philosophers, government officials) who can issue rules with normative authority. There is divine and natural law, but no autonomous social or historical law."

* Um exemplo claro como todo o espirito reflectidamente conservador é quase que intuitivamente levado a reconhecer a natureza absoluta do direito natural descoberta segunda a razão e consciência, passível de ser reconhecido e descoberta (não criada) pelo indivíduo, e não alterável pela sociedade (democracia, autocracia, etc), ou seja a Ordem Natural.

Depois, o passo óbvio sobre a necessidade do uso da força:

"4. The Use of Force

A legal order must be imposed by force because:

The previously mentioned discrepancy between true and empirical order means that some citizens will contend that a rule conflicts with the Ought. If they were allowed to disobey, society could not be maintained.

Although questions of truth rarely have unequivocal answers, specific policies must be selected and enforced. Legal decisions all have an element of arbitrariness.

Human nature requires it. (Aristotle's primary argument). Man's nature is to be a "person" governed by reason and conscience, but also not to be a person to the extent that he is governed by passions. There are men who never grow to maturity who must be directed by social pressures, energetic reminders, and ultimately by the threat of force.

The nature of man is not all "personal". His passions are "impersonal" and even obstruct the formation and action of the personal order in the soul.

Force is not required to impose order on the person, but on the impersonal nature of man, particularly when that nature is socially disruptive.

Perhaps force is not primarily used to protect society, but to restore or construct the personal order of the offender. The Ought has its seat in the person of every single man.

The issue of the use of force shows us that the impersonality of the legal order has its source in impersonality of human nature."

* O problema, no meu entender, é que se o Direito Natural tem um carácter autónomo e absoluto (e tudo se resume ao direito de propriedade: aquisição original/"homesteading" ou contratual), todo o indivíduo tem o direito a defendê-lo ... usando a "violência" como legítima defesa autónomamente. E assim, todo o arranjo contratual colectivo (vamos dizer um qualquer arranjo comunitário democrático que regulamenta) tem de partir do pressuposto do carácter de livre arbítrio/contratual/ na sua base (e de forma contínua, ou seja, é reversível), em que os seus membros voluntáriamente acordam (ou existe a presunção) submeter-se a "arranjos" em que abdicam de determinados direitos naturais individuais acatando um qualquer método de decisão colectivo.