sábado, 2 de outubro de 2004


Existem para aí umas bocas desajustadas (e estou a ser simpático), com origens num certo left-libertarianism (para os não iniciados nas tricas intra-libertarians e aquilo que se pode considerar já um histórico choque de personalidades entre Hoppe e Tom Palmer, admito que tudo isto possa parecer um pouco estranho) sobre Hans-Herman Hoppe e o melhor nestes casos é a apresentação dos originais:

1) Sobre a descentralização:

"Libertarians, Rothbard stressed in this connection, must be opposed, as are traditional conservatives (but unlike social democrats, neo-conservatives, and left-libertarians), on principled grounds to any and all centralization of state power, even and especially if such centralization involves a correct judgment (such as that abortion should be legal, or that taxes should be abolished).

It would be anti-libertarian, for instance, to appeal to the United Nations to order the breakup of a taxi-monopoly in Houston, or to the U.S. government to order Utah to abolish its state-certification requirement for teachers, because in doing so one would have illegitimately granted these state agencies jurisdiction over property that they plainly do not own (but others do): not only Houston or Utah, but every city in the world and every state in the U.S.

And while every state, small or large, violates the rights of private-property owners and must be feared and combated, large central states violate more people's rights and must be feared even more.

They do not come into existence ab ooa, but are the outgrowth of a process of eliminative competition among originally numerous independent small local states. Central states, and ultimately a single world state, represent the successful expansion and concentration of state power, i.e., of evil, and must accordingly be regarded as especially dangerous.

Hence, a libertarian, as his second-best solution, must always discriminate in favor of local and against central government, and he must always try to correct injustices at the level and location where they occur rather than empowering some higher (more centralized) level of government to rectify a local injustice."

2) A universalidade (igual validade para todos os seres humanos) das regras éticas:

"(...)A moral intuition, as important as it is, is not a proof, however. Yet there also exists proof of our moral intuition being correct.

The proof can be provided in a twofold manner. On the one hand, in spelling out the consequences that follow if one were to deny the validity of the institution of original appropriation and private property:

If a person A were not the owner of his own body and the places and goods originally appropriated and/or produced with this body as well as of the goods voluntarily (contractually) acquired from another previous owner, then only two alternatives exist:

Either another person B must be recognized as the owner of A’s body as well as the places and goods appropriated, produced or acquired by A. Or else all persons, A and B, must be considered equal co-owners of all bodies, places and goods.

In the first case, A would be reduced to the rank of B’s slave and object of exploitation. B is the owner of A’s body and all places and goods appropriated, produced, and acquired by A, but A in turn is not the owner of B’s body and the places and goods appropriated, produced and acquired by B.

Hence, under this ruling two categorically distinct classes of persons are constituted – Untermenschen such as A and Übermenschen such as B – to whom different "laws" apply. Accordingly, such ruling must be discarded as a human ethic equally applicable to everyone qua human being (rational animal). From the very outset, any such ruling can be recognized as not universally acceptable and thus cannot claim to represent law.

Because for a rule to aspire to the rank of a law – a just rule – it is necessary that such a rule apply equally and universally to everyone."

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