Against a priori history

"The theoretical reason why focussing on democracy or dictatorship misses the point is that States—all States—rule their population and de­cide whether or not to make war. And all States, whether formally a democracy or dictatorship or some other brand of rule, are run by a ruling elite. Whether or not these elites, in any particular case, will make war upon another State is a function of a complex interweaving web of causes, including temperament of the rulers, the strength of their enemies, the inducements for war, public opinion.

While public opinion has to be gauged in either case, the only real difference between a democracy and a dictatorship on making war is that in the former more propaganda must be beamed at one's subjects to engineer their approval. Intensive propaganda is necessary in any case—as we can see by the zealous opinion-moulding behavior of all modern warring States. But the democratic State must work harder and faster. And also the democratic State must be more hypocritical in using rhetoric designed to appeal to the values of the masses: justice, freedom, national interest, patriotism, world peace, etc. So in democratic States, the art of propagan­dizing their subjects must be a bit more sophisticated and refined. But this, as we have seen, is true of all governmental decisions, not just war or peace. For all governments—but especially democratic govern­ments—must work hard at persuading their subjects that all of their deeds of oppression are really in their subjects' best interests.

What we have said about democracy and dictatorship applies equally to the lack of correlation between degrees of internal freedom in a coun­try and its external aggressiveness. Some States have proved themselves perfectly capable of allowing a considerable degree of freedom internally while making aggressive war abroad; other States have shown themselves capable of totalitarian rule internally while pursuing a pacific foreign policy. The examples of Uganda, Albania, China, Great Britain, etc., apply equally well in this comparison.

In short, libertarians and other Americans must guard against a priori history: in this case, against the assumption that, in any conflict, the State which is more democratic or allows more internal freedom is neces­sarily or even presumptively the victim of aggression by the more dictato­rial or totalitarian State. There is simply no historical evidence whatever for such a presumption. (...)

For war and a phony "external threat" have long been the chief means by which the State wins back the loyalty of its subjects. As we have seen, war and militarism were the gravediggers of classical liberalism; we must not allow the State to get away with this ruse ever again." For a New Liberty

PS: Claro que num tempo em que as mentes estão receptivas ao argumento de que as guerras e os seus danos inevitáveis (de curto prazo e longo prazo) são justificadas para derrubar um regime não-democrático e substitui-lo pelas maravilhas da social-democracia (mesmo sendo imprevisivel se é uma mudança estável) fica quase demonstrado que "agora" as democracias são mesmo mais militaristas que as não-democracias (ainda que advoguem que no longo prazo, o que se procura é menos militarismo e menos guerras, e na prática estejamos numa "permanent war for permanet peace").