Rasputine era meio louco mas uma das coisas lúcidas que fez (quando a Aústria declarou guerra à Sérvia pela alegada participação desta no atentado ao seu Príncipe herdeiro) foi avisar o Czar para não declarar guerra à Aústria porque nas suas visões as monarquias iriam cair assim como cairíam milhoes de mortos - por ironia do destino uma doeça temporária impediu Rasputine de falar com o Czar antes da sua declaração de Guerra.
Todos os Impérios europeus foram militaristas na altura, ainda assim, na moral vigente de hoje, a Austria pretendeu apenas conter o terrorismo Sérvio e a Alemanha foi sua aliada quando a Rùssia e França se quiseram opor (mais tarde ajudados pelo Império Britanico).
A lição a tirar é que a Guerra destrói, nada constrói. Foi dessa destruição que nasceu o comunismo e fascismo. A outra lição é que no que diz respeito à "teoria das alianças", fácilmente se demonstra que tornam todos os conflitos locais potencialmente em conflitos globais.
sexta-feira, 31 de outubro de 2003
Jacobino, eu?
Tom Friedman no NYT:
“This is the most radical-liberal revolutionary war the U.S. has ever launched — a war of choice to install some democracy in the heart of the Arab-Muslim world."
“This is the most radical-liberal revolutionary war the U.S. has ever launched — a war of choice to install some democracy in the heart of the Arab-Muslim world."
The "Externalities" Argument
A importante refutacao do argumento das externalidades, cavalo de tróia para todo o tipo de estatismo.
É importante reter que a utilidade é um conceito individual e subjectivo (nao colectivo e objectivo) que nao é passivel de mensuracao numa escala cardinal.
As utilidades entre alternativas reais discretas (nao continuas, por exemplo: a preferencia entre ter um carro versus 2 cavalos) sao dispostas em termos ordinais na nossa percepcao. Portanto, grande parte do trabalho feito sobre utilidades por economistas está errado e apenas servem para justificar a accao coerciva do Estado sobre escolhas individuais que óbviamente têm impacto (positivo ou negativo) em terceiros.
Mas a aceitar o argumento, abrimos caminho ao estudante que diz: "nós ao estudar já vamos beneficiar a "sociedade", portanto esta deve e tem mesmo de me pagar por essa grande externalidade positiva de que vai beneficiar".
O problema, claro, é que eu nao quero pagar-lhe, sr. estudante (e sr. economista), porque já tenho de pagar a minha para nao me tornar numa externalidade negativa para a "sociedade". Agora se sou obrigado a pagar a sua, você mesmo torna-se na minha pior externalidade negativa.
"...a similar error as Coase did when he claimed that the liability decision of a court will not affect the allocation of resources (given zero transaction costs). If, for example, factory pollution will destroy an object of high sentimental value but low market value, the property owner might not have the means to bribe the factory owner to cease polluting. In this case, Coase's Theorem does not hold true. Likewise, if a liability decision accounts only for the market value of destroyed property, the externality will not be "corrected" for objects with any sentimental value.
A more modern Austrian approach to externalities is to show that they are impossible to calculate on a meaningful scale. Rothbard showed that traditional welfare economics was flawed because it is impossible to make an interpersonal comparison of utility. In other words, happiness cannot be measured on a quantitative scale in the same way voltage can be. This means that it is impossible to rationally calculate the utility gained or lost through government intervention.
Since the tax or subsidy proposed to correct an externality must be accomplished through some sort of government coercion, it is clear that not everyone will expect to benefit from the policy. How then are we to decide whether the policy's results add to net social utility or not? No number can be calculated, even in theory, to provide the net benefit from intervention, or even to say if the net benefit is positive or negative. One can only expect an increase in net benefit through the voluntary actions of people; an act indicates a preference for that chosen action over all other available options. The result is that the declaration of an externality is purely arbitrary.'"
É importante reter que a utilidade é um conceito individual e subjectivo (nao colectivo e objectivo) que nao é passivel de mensuracao numa escala cardinal.
As utilidades entre alternativas reais discretas (nao continuas, por exemplo: a preferencia entre ter um carro versus 2 cavalos) sao dispostas em termos ordinais na nossa percepcao. Portanto, grande parte do trabalho feito sobre utilidades por economistas está errado e apenas servem para justificar a accao coerciva do Estado sobre escolhas individuais que óbviamente têm impacto (positivo ou negativo) em terceiros.
Mas a aceitar o argumento, abrimos caminho ao estudante que diz: "nós ao estudar já vamos beneficiar a "sociedade", portanto esta deve e tem mesmo de me pagar por essa grande externalidade positiva de que vai beneficiar".
O problema, claro, é que eu nao quero pagar-lhe, sr. estudante (e sr. economista), porque já tenho de pagar a minha para nao me tornar numa externalidade negativa para a "sociedade". Agora se sou obrigado a pagar a sua, você mesmo torna-se na minha pior externalidade negativa.
"...a similar error as Coase did when he claimed that the liability decision of a court will not affect the allocation of resources (given zero transaction costs). If, for example, factory pollution will destroy an object of high sentimental value but low market value, the property owner might not have the means to bribe the factory owner to cease polluting. In this case, Coase's Theorem does not hold true. Likewise, if a liability decision accounts only for the market value of destroyed property, the externality will not be "corrected" for objects with any sentimental value.
A more modern Austrian approach to externalities is to show that they are impossible to calculate on a meaningful scale. Rothbard showed that traditional welfare economics was flawed because it is impossible to make an interpersonal comparison of utility. In other words, happiness cannot be measured on a quantitative scale in the same way voltage can be. This means that it is impossible to rationally calculate the utility gained or lost through government intervention.
Since the tax or subsidy proposed to correct an externality must be accomplished through some sort of government coercion, it is clear that not everyone will expect to benefit from the policy. How then are we to decide whether the policy's results add to net social utility or not? No number can be calculated, even in theory, to provide the net benefit from intervention, or even to say if the net benefit is positive or negative. One can only expect an increase in net benefit through the voluntary actions of people; an act indicates a preference for that chosen action over all other available options. The result is that the declaration of an externality is purely arbitrary.'"
Alexis de Tocqueville
"The American Republic will endure, until politicians realize they can bribe the people with their own money."
Nota: Claro que hoje, muito haveria a dizer sobre os politicos e a social-democracia na Europa.
Nota: Claro que hoje, muito haveria a dizer sobre os politicos e a social-democracia na Europa.
O "senhor gastador"
O Intermitente chamou-me a atenção para um excelente conto no Público de ontem, assinado por um tal José Futscher - leitura mandatória aqui (para ler antes que deixe de estar on-line).
Uma grande verdade
Os "Boys" e a Constituição, Por FRANCISCO TEIXEIRA DA MOTA
"O Estado tem crescido de uma forma desmesurada. Mas, hoje em dia, o Estado surge, muitas vezes, com novas roupagens. Até parece que não é Estado... A "privatização" da actuação do Estado e dos seus serviços através do recurso a múltiplas figuras jurídicas tem sido uma constante. "
Este é em poucas palavras o grande problema dos neo-liberais e da Escola de Chicago.
"O Estado tem crescido de uma forma desmesurada. Mas, hoje em dia, o Estado surge, muitas vezes, com novas roupagens. Até parece que não é Estado... A "privatização" da actuação do Estado e dos seus serviços através do recurso a múltiplas figuras jurídicas tem sido uma constante. "
Este é em poucas palavras o grande problema dos neo-liberais e da Escola de Chicago.
Re: Cartaz no Merde in France
Foi a Guerra e o militarismo exarcebado que quem em primeira ordem criaram o comunismo (pela queda do Czar) e o fascismo (pela queda das monarquias da europa central e itália) ao destruirem a velha civilização onde tinha nascido o Liberalismo Clássico (nomeadamente a Escola Austriaca no Império Austro-Húngaro).
Porquê? "The international law ... is the old-fashioned libertarian law as had voluntarily emerged in previous centuries and has nothing to do with the modem statist accretion of "collective security." Collective security forces a maximum escalation of every local war into a worldwide war – the precise reversal of the libertarian objective of reducing the scope of any war as much as possible. "
Quanto à escravatura, até dà vontade de rir. A Europa acabou com ela pacíficamente e a Guerra Civil Americana deu-se para preservar (anti-constitucionalmente) o Federalismo pela força negando o Direito de Secessão - o que acabará mais tarde ou mais cedo por acontecer na Europa.
Que fazer?
"The laws of neutrality are designed to keep any war that breaks out confined to the warring States themselves, without aggression against the States or particularly the peoples of the other nations.
Hence the importance of such ancient and now forgotten American principles as "freedom of the seas" or severe limitations upon the rights of warring States to blockade neutral trade with the enemy country. In short, the libertarian tries to induce neutral States to remain neutral in any inter-State conflict and to induce the warring States to observe fully the rights of neutral citizens. "
E porquê?
"Suppose that Jones, in the course of his "just war" against the ravages of Smith, should kill a few innocent people, and suppose that he should declaim, in defense of this murder, that he was simply acting on the slogan, "Give me liberty or give me death." The absurdity of this "defense" should be evident at once, for the issue is not whether Jones was willing to risk death personally in his defensive struggle against Smith; the issue is whether he was willing to kill other people in pursuit of his legitimate end. For Jones was in truth acting on the completely indefensible slogan: "Give me liberty or give them death" surely a far less noble battle cry."
Ler em:
"War, Peace, and the State", by Murray N. Rothbard
This article, which first appeared in The Standard for April 1963, is collected in Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays.
Porquê? "The international law ... is the old-fashioned libertarian law as had voluntarily emerged in previous centuries and has nothing to do with the modem statist accretion of "collective security." Collective security forces a maximum escalation of every local war into a worldwide war – the precise reversal of the libertarian objective of reducing the scope of any war as much as possible. "
Quanto à escravatura, até dà vontade de rir. A Europa acabou com ela pacíficamente e a Guerra Civil Americana deu-se para preservar (anti-constitucionalmente) o Federalismo pela força negando o Direito de Secessão - o que acabará mais tarde ou mais cedo por acontecer na Europa.
Que fazer?
"The laws of neutrality are designed to keep any war that breaks out confined to the warring States themselves, without aggression against the States or particularly the peoples of the other nations.
Hence the importance of such ancient and now forgotten American principles as "freedom of the seas" or severe limitations upon the rights of warring States to blockade neutral trade with the enemy country. In short, the libertarian tries to induce neutral States to remain neutral in any inter-State conflict and to induce the warring States to observe fully the rights of neutral citizens. "
E porquê?
"Suppose that Jones, in the course of his "just war" against the ravages of Smith, should kill a few innocent people, and suppose that he should declaim, in defense of this murder, that he was simply acting on the slogan, "Give me liberty or give me death." The absurdity of this "defense" should be evident at once, for the issue is not whether Jones was willing to risk death personally in his defensive struggle against Smith; the issue is whether he was willing to kill other people in pursuit of his legitimate end. For Jones was in truth acting on the completely indefensible slogan: "Give me liberty or give them death" surely a far less noble battle cry."
Ler em:
"War, Peace, and the State", by Murray N. Rothbard
This article, which first appeared in The Standard for April 1963, is collected in Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays.
quinta-feira, 30 de outubro de 2003
Cartaz no Merde in France
Nesta posta no "Merde in France" está um cartaz que diz o seguinte:
"Except for ending Slavery, Fascism and Nazism, WAR HAS NEVER SOLVED ANYTHING"
Este é um excelente blog que devemos seguir diáriamente!
"Except for ending Slavery, Fascism and Nazism, WAR HAS NEVER SOLVED ANYTHING"
Este é um excelente blog que devemos seguir diáriamente!
Prof. Doutor JORGE MIRANDA
No Eclético deu-se notícia do evento:
"Novo Tratado europeu: um outro olhar" Prossegue amanhã, QUARTA-FEIRA, 29 DE OUTUBRO, ÀS 18H00, o Ciclo de Audições intitulado "Novo Tratado europeu: um outro olhar". Será orador principal o Prof. Doutor JORGE MIRANDA, que falará sobre o tema A PRETENSA CONSTITUIÇÃO EUROPEIA.
Infelizmente não assisti mas na reportagem da TV pareceu-me defender consistentemente (eu não sou jurista) o referendo e a necessidade da preservarmos o valor último da nossa Constituição (o que creio, põe de lado qualquer possibilidade de proto Estado federal).
Muito bem.
"Novo Tratado europeu: um outro olhar" Prossegue amanhã, QUARTA-FEIRA, 29 DE OUTUBRO, ÀS 18H00, o Ciclo de Audições intitulado "Novo Tratado europeu: um outro olhar". Será orador principal o Prof. Doutor JORGE MIRANDA, que falará sobre o tema A PRETENSA CONSTITUIÇÃO EUROPEIA.
Infelizmente não assisti mas na reportagem da TV pareceu-me defender consistentemente (eu não sou jurista) o referendo e a necessidade da preservarmos o valor último da nossa Constituição (o que creio, põe de lado qualquer possibilidade de proto Estado federal).
Muito bem.
quarta-feira, 29 de outubro de 2003
Destaques
A Defense of the Traditional Austrian Theory of Interest by Paul Cwik ( Auburn University )
10/8/2003
Oakeshott and Mises on Understanding Human Action
by Gene Callahan ( Mises Institute )
10/7/2003
The Value and Limits of Democracy
by Tibor R. Machan ( Chapman University )
10/2/2003
10/8/2003
Oakeshott and Mises on Understanding Human Action
by Gene Callahan ( Mises Institute )
10/7/2003
The Value and Limits of Democracy
by Tibor R. Machan ( Chapman University )
10/2/2003
Familia e militarismo
As a radical AND a reactionary--a patriot of the old America--I am appalled by the violence done by the military-industrial complex at home as well as abroad. The images of families cleaved by the Iraqi War and occupation should outrage family-values conservatives--many of whom, especially at the grass roots, are sincere and decent, no matter how weasely the Bennetts and Bauers are. Here is yet another issue on which good people of the Greenish left and anti-imperialist right ought to unite: the first casualty of the militarized U.S. state is the family.
Authentic conservatives--those who defended the near and dear things against remote and abstract powers--used to understand the iniquity of militarism. In 1945, Mrs. Cecil Norton Broy, representing a ladies' study club in Arlington, Virginia, told a roomful of snickering U.S. senators that an interventionist foreign policy would lead to "the further disruption of normal American family life...Our men would be like hired mercenary soldiers going forth to protect the commercial interests of greed and power. Our men thus forced into foreign service would see little if any of their native soil again. We would be working on the principle of scattering the most virile of our men over the face of the globe."...
The leadership of the family values Right is hopelessly compromised by its long-term adulterous affair with the Republican Party. But plenty of good folks who call themselves "conservatives" mean by that now-useless term that they believe in the integrity of families and small communities and detest the vulgar, home-wrecking, and even murderous intrusions of corporate capitalism and Big Government. As they watch this latest American diaspora, as young husbands and wives tearfully leave spouses and children and extended families to serve the Empire, we should remind them that the only foreign policy compatible with healthy family life is one of peace and non-intervention.
Come home, America. Come HOME.
Authentic conservatives--those who defended the near and dear things against remote and abstract powers--used to understand the iniquity of militarism. In 1945, Mrs. Cecil Norton Broy, representing a ladies' study club in Arlington, Virginia, told a roomful of snickering U.S. senators that an interventionist foreign policy would lead to "the further disruption of normal American family life...Our men would be like hired mercenary soldiers going forth to protect the commercial interests of greed and power. Our men thus forced into foreign service would see little if any of their native soil again. We would be working on the principle of scattering the most virile of our men over the face of the globe."...
The leadership of the family values Right is hopelessly compromised by its long-term adulterous affair with the Republican Party. But plenty of good folks who call themselves "conservatives" mean by that now-useless term that they believe in the integrity of families and small communities and detest the vulgar, home-wrecking, and even murderous intrusions of corporate capitalism and Big Government. As they watch this latest American diaspora, as young husbands and wives tearfully leave spouses and children and extended families to serve the Empire, we should remind them that the only foreign policy compatible with healthy family life is one of peace and non-intervention.
Come home, America. Come HOME.
On Oct. 29, 1929
Black Tuesday descended upon the New York Stock Exchange. Prices collapsed amid panic selling and thousands of investors were wiped out as America's Great Depression began.
Em 1913 foi criado o FED para "proteger" e regular o sistema bancário mas em 15 anos apenas de expansionismo monetário criaram as condições para o "boom" e inevitável colapso conhecido como a Grande Depressão. O que é atribuido ao Capitalismo em geral deveu-se de facto à criação do Banco Central.
Em 1931 Roosevelt, por ordem executiva, obriga todos os particulares a entregarem o seu Ouro recebendo "paper money" desvalorizado (de 20 Usd a onça para 35) e institui um desastroso programa de intervencionismo que prolonga a crise por mais 2 décadas.
Em 1913 foi criado o FED para "proteger" e regular o sistema bancário mas em 15 anos apenas de expansionismo monetário criaram as condições para o "boom" e inevitável colapso conhecido como a Grande Depressão. O que é atribuido ao Capitalismo em geral deveu-se de facto à criação do Banco Central.
Em 1931 Roosevelt, por ordem executiva, obriga todos os particulares a entregarem o seu Ouro recebendo "paper money" desvalorizado (de 20 Usd a onça para 35) e institui um desastroso programa de intervencionismo que prolonga a crise por mais 2 décadas.
terça-feira, 28 de outubro de 2003
Constituição Europeia
No Mata-Mouros chama-se a atenção para "O Euro-deputado Luís Marinho" que "discorre hoje no Diário Económico". Nomeadamente:
"não é preciso nenhuma tese académica para perceber que, fora da Europa, Portugal não tem destino. É esse o risco que nos faz incorrer quem, invocando o interesse e a identidade nacional, acaba por facilitar o deslize para a saída de Portugal da União. O que, obviamente, não tem nada de patriótico nem de respeitável."
Portugal, difícilmente sai do Continente a não ser talvez, numa Jangada de Pedra, portanto, concordo com o sr. Euro- deputado.
Agora a decisão de fazer parte da União ou não pode dizer muito do patriotismo e respeitabilidade. Enquanto esta é uma União voluntária e as Constituições Nacionais são soberanas e as decisões tomadas no ambito Europeu são voluntárias (e em voluntárias enquadro as decisões com que não concordamos mas que voluntáriamente adoptamos) está tudo muito bem.
Quando querem implementar o cavalo de tróia para um Estado Europeu, que mais tarde ou mais cedo terá a capacidade de impor a sua ordem constitucional, está tudo muito mal.
A história americana prova que o modelo federal resvala para uma União imposta pela força (Guerra entre Estados Americana). Querem ver um Lincoln europeu a falar Francês ou Alemão, a impor a União pela força? Estou a ser histérico? Digam isso a George Wasghinton e Thomas Jefferson.
A rejeição do tratado deve passar por não querermos perder a nossa soberania e por não querermos um super-estado europeu. Ambas as razões são compatíveis com querermos ser um país livre, aberto e fazendo parte de um forum inter-governamental europeu.
A pior das razões será mesmo "A esperança de uma influência europeia que regule a globalização num mundo multipolar ficará pelo caminho."
A globalização não necessita de regulação, apenas que abram as fronteiras (nomeadamente aos agricultores do terceiro mundo) - comprar e vender livremente é um direito humano humano inalienável, e forçar um mundo multipolar construindo uma alternativa/oposição ao Americanos é repetir o pior dos erros destes.
A Europa como alternativa aos US deve precisamente recusar o seu modelo federalista.
"não é preciso nenhuma tese académica para perceber que, fora da Europa, Portugal não tem destino. É esse o risco que nos faz incorrer quem, invocando o interesse e a identidade nacional, acaba por facilitar o deslize para a saída de Portugal da União. O que, obviamente, não tem nada de patriótico nem de respeitável."
Portugal, difícilmente sai do Continente a não ser talvez, numa Jangada de Pedra, portanto, concordo com o sr. Euro- deputado.
Agora a decisão de fazer parte da União ou não pode dizer muito do patriotismo e respeitabilidade. Enquanto esta é uma União voluntária e as Constituições Nacionais são soberanas e as decisões tomadas no ambito Europeu são voluntárias (e em voluntárias enquadro as decisões com que não concordamos mas que voluntáriamente adoptamos) está tudo muito bem.
Quando querem implementar o cavalo de tróia para um Estado Europeu, que mais tarde ou mais cedo terá a capacidade de impor a sua ordem constitucional, está tudo muito mal.
A história americana prova que o modelo federal resvala para uma União imposta pela força (Guerra entre Estados Americana). Querem ver um Lincoln europeu a falar Francês ou Alemão, a impor a União pela força? Estou a ser histérico? Digam isso a George Wasghinton e Thomas Jefferson.
A rejeição do tratado deve passar por não querermos perder a nossa soberania e por não querermos um super-estado europeu. Ambas as razões são compatíveis com querermos ser um país livre, aberto e fazendo parte de um forum inter-governamental europeu.
A pior das razões será mesmo "A esperança de uma influência europeia que regule a globalização num mundo multipolar ficará pelo caminho."
A globalização não necessita de regulação, apenas que abram as fronteiras (nomeadamente aos agricultores do terceiro mundo) - comprar e vender livremente é um direito humano humano inalienável, e forçar um mundo multipolar construindo uma alternativa/oposição ao Americanos é repetir o pior dos erros destes.
A Europa como alternativa aos US deve precisamente recusar o seu modelo federalista.
Iraq, Iran, and September 11: A Chronology
Mr. Hornberger is founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation in Fairfax, Va.
1951 — Iranian people democratically elect Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh as Iranian premier.
1953 — U.S. government, operating through the CIA, ousts Mossadegh in favor of shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, a cruel and tyrannical dictator who, with U.S. government support, brutalizes his own people for the next 25 years.
1980s — U.S. government enters into partnership with Saddam Hussein, dictator of Iraq, to retaliate against Iran. U.S. government furnishes chemical and biological weapons to Saddam.
Late 1980s — With U.S. government’s support and assistance, Saddam uses U.S.-government-supplied chemical weapons against Iranian troops.
1986 — U.S. government enters into partnership with Osama bin Laden and other Islamic radicals to resist Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
1991 — Saddam contends that neighbor Kuwait is stealing Iraqi oil through slant drilling and is also violating contractual agreements in OPEC.
Saddam signals partner U.S. government of intention to invade Kuwait to resolve dispute.
U.S. government, through U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie, expresses no objections, stating, “We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait ... . Kuwait is not associated with America.”
1991 — Saddam invades Kuwait to resolve slant-drilling and OPEC dispute.
President George H.W. Bush turns on partner Saddam and declares him to be a new “Hitler,” effectively dissolving the long partnership between U.S. government and Saddam. Bush declares intention to attack Iraq with UN assistance to repel Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
1991 — Persian Gulf War. UN forces, led by U.S. government, defeat Iraq and oust Iraq from Kuwait. UN and President George H.W. Bush leave Saddam in power but require him to dismantle his nuclear facilities and chemical and biological weapons.
1991 — U.S. government attempts to oust Saddam from power through UN-enforced military-economic blockade, also known as “sanctions,” against the Iraqi people, which continues to the present. According to UN officials, sanctions contribute to the deaths of multitudes of Iraqi children, with estimates ranging from hundreds of thousands to a million.
Early 1990s — U.S. government establishes illegal no-fly zones over Iraq, resulting in a continuous U.S. bombing campaign against Iraq to the present. Illegal bombing campaign kills hundreds of Iraqi people.
1993 — U.S. World Trade Center terrorist bomber cites death of Iraqi children as a motivating factor in bombing attack.
1996 — Osama bin Laden turns against former partner U.S. government and declares war against United States, stating in part, “More than 600,000 Iraqi children have died due to lack of food and medicine and as a result of the unjustifiable aggression imposed on Iraq and its nation.”
1996 — U.S. government, through U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, announces that the deaths of half-a-million Iraqi children resulting from the military-economic blockade against Iraq have been “worth it.”
1998-2000 — High UN officials resign posts in protest against deaths of Iraqi children from sanctions.
2001 — September 11 terrorist attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon. U.S. government declares perpetual “war on terrorism”.
2002 — President George W. Bush repeats President George H.W. Bush’s 1991 declaration that former U.S. government partner Saddam is a “Hitler” and that therefore he must be ousted from power, 12 years after the Persian Gulf War. Bush claims that former partner Saddam hates America for its “freedom and values.”
Bush cites former partner Saddam’s acquisition of nuclear components and biological and chemical weapons (including those obtained from the United States) as proof that Saddam presents a dire threat to the United States.
2002 — UN Security Council, prodded by U.S. government, requires Saddam to file updated weapons report fully accounting for nuclear components and biological and chemical weaponry.
1951 — Iranian people democratically elect Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh as Iranian premier.
1953 — U.S. government, operating through the CIA, ousts Mossadegh in favor of shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, a cruel and tyrannical dictator who, with U.S. government support, brutalizes his own people for the next 25 years.
1980s — U.S. government enters into partnership with Saddam Hussein, dictator of Iraq, to retaliate against Iran. U.S. government furnishes chemical and biological weapons to Saddam.
Late 1980s — With U.S. government’s support and assistance, Saddam uses U.S.-government-supplied chemical weapons against Iranian troops.
1986 — U.S. government enters into partnership with Osama bin Laden and other Islamic radicals to resist Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
1991 — Saddam contends that neighbor Kuwait is stealing Iraqi oil through slant drilling and is also violating contractual agreements in OPEC.
Saddam signals partner U.S. government of intention to invade Kuwait to resolve dispute.
U.S. government, through U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie, expresses no objections, stating, “We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait ... . Kuwait is not associated with America.”
1991 — Saddam invades Kuwait to resolve slant-drilling and OPEC dispute.
President George H.W. Bush turns on partner Saddam and declares him to be a new “Hitler,” effectively dissolving the long partnership between U.S. government and Saddam. Bush declares intention to attack Iraq with UN assistance to repel Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
1991 — Persian Gulf War. UN forces, led by U.S. government, defeat Iraq and oust Iraq from Kuwait. UN and President George H.W. Bush leave Saddam in power but require him to dismantle his nuclear facilities and chemical and biological weapons.
1991 — U.S. government attempts to oust Saddam from power through UN-enforced military-economic blockade, also known as “sanctions,” against the Iraqi people, which continues to the present. According to UN officials, sanctions contribute to the deaths of multitudes of Iraqi children, with estimates ranging from hundreds of thousands to a million.
Early 1990s — U.S. government establishes illegal no-fly zones over Iraq, resulting in a continuous U.S. bombing campaign against Iraq to the present. Illegal bombing campaign kills hundreds of Iraqi people.
1993 — U.S. World Trade Center terrorist bomber cites death of Iraqi children as a motivating factor in bombing attack.
1996 — Osama bin Laden turns against former partner U.S. government and declares war against United States, stating in part, “More than 600,000 Iraqi children have died due to lack of food and medicine and as a result of the unjustifiable aggression imposed on Iraq and its nation.”
1996 — U.S. government, through U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, announces that the deaths of half-a-million Iraqi children resulting from the military-economic blockade against Iraq have been “worth it.”
1998-2000 — High UN officials resign posts in protest against deaths of Iraqi children from sanctions.
2001 — September 11 terrorist attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon. U.S. government declares perpetual “war on terrorism”.
2002 — President George W. Bush repeats President George H.W. Bush’s 1991 declaration that former U.S. government partner Saddam is a “Hitler” and that therefore he must be ousted from power, 12 years after the Persian Gulf War. Bush claims that former partner Saddam hates America for its “freedom and values.”
Bush cites former partner Saddam’s acquisition of nuclear components and biological and chemical weapons (including those obtained from the United States) as proof that Saddam presents a dire threat to the United States.
2002 — UN Security Council, prodded by U.S. government, requires Saddam to file updated weapons report fully accounting for nuclear components and biological and chemical weaponry.
The Myth of National Defense, by Hans-Hermann Hoppe
This is the introduction to The Myth of National Defense: Essays on the Theory and History of Security Production
Governments are supposed to protect us from terrorism. Yet what has been the U.S. government’s role in the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon?
The U.S. government commands a "defense" budget of $400 billion per annum ... It employs a worldwide network of spies and informants. However, it was unable to prevent commercial airliners from being hijacked and used as missiles against prominent civilian and military targets.
Worse, the U.S. government did not only fail to prevent the disaster of September 11, it actually contributed to the likelihood of such an event.
In pursuing an interventionist foreign policy (taking the form of economic sanctions, troops stationed in more than 100 countries, relentless bombings, propping up despotic regimes, taking sides in irresolvable land and ethnic disputes, and otherwise attempting political and military management of whole areas of the globe), the government provided the very motivation for foreign terrorists and made the U.S. their prime target.
Moreover, how was it possible that men armed with no more than box cutters could inflict the terrible damage they did? Obviously, this was possible only because the government prohibited airlines and pilots from protecting their own property by force of arms, thus rendering every commercial airline vulnerable and unprotected against hijackers. A $50 pistol in the cockpit could have done what $400 billion in the hands of government were unable to do.
And what was the lesson drawn from such failures? In the aftermath of the events, the U.S. foreign policy became even more aggressively interventionist and threatening.
Governments are supposed to protect us from terrorism. Yet what has been the U.S. government’s role in the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon?
The U.S. government commands a "defense" budget of $400 billion per annum ... It employs a worldwide network of spies and informants. However, it was unable to prevent commercial airliners from being hijacked and used as missiles against prominent civilian and military targets.
Worse, the U.S. government did not only fail to prevent the disaster of September 11, it actually contributed to the likelihood of such an event.
In pursuing an interventionist foreign policy (taking the form of economic sanctions, troops stationed in more than 100 countries, relentless bombings, propping up despotic regimes, taking sides in irresolvable land and ethnic disputes, and otherwise attempting political and military management of whole areas of the globe), the government provided the very motivation for foreign terrorists and made the U.S. their prime target.
Moreover, how was it possible that men armed with no more than box cutters could inflict the terrible damage they did? Obviously, this was possible only because the government prohibited airlines and pilots from protecting their own property by force of arms, thus rendering every commercial airline vulnerable and unprotected against hijackers. A $50 pistol in the cockpit could have done what $400 billion in the hands of government were unable to do.
And what was the lesson drawn from such failures? In the aftermath of the events, the U.S. foreign policy became even more aggressively interventionist and threatening.
O Alargamento das Drogas
"A União Europeia ainda está nos primórdios de uma política de drogas comum, como ainda o está em muitos outros temas, a exemplo do que acontece no sector da defesa. Cada um dos 15 estados-membros segue a sua própria política de prevenção, tratamento, redução de danos ou de combate ao tráfico"
Comentário: os global tudo não conseguem dormir descansados, incomodados com a diversidade de soluções descentralizadas.
Porque raio terá de existir um política concertada da droga? É precisamente nas questões de dúvidas éticas sobre a legitimidade de se poder condicionar as escolhas individuais, que mais deve ser aplicado o princípio do localismo.
Questões como a droga e a prostituição, entendidas como actos voluntários, devem sujeitas a regulação altamente descentralizada - tipo Municipal e Freguesia, precisamente o oposto de qualquer política Europeia. Estes actos não podem ser considerados crime, mas sim sujeitos a regulação conforme os princípios consensuais em cada comunidade. E estes princípios consensuais variam de comunidade para comunidade.
Acima de tudo, cada um é livre de assumir as consequências dos seus actos, e as empresas devem também poder descriminar livremente quanto a aceitar ou não, que um seu empregado possa ser utilizador de drogas.
Desta forma, não precisamos de qualquer política, nem nacional nem europeia. A ordem natural das coisas sairá do equilíbrio entre livre arbítrio e o direito à exclusão inerente à propriedade privada. E assim, teremos certamente, uma sociedade bem mais conservadora mas sem moralismos hipócritas coercivos da direita bafienta nem o amoralismo progressista da esquerda por todos os direitos individuais disfuncionais que se esquece, contudo, que o livre contrato e arbítrio também é válido para toda a esfera económica.
Também errado no texto é: "A produção de ópio no Afeganistão está paulatinamente a regressar a níveis anteriores ao derrube da governação Taliban e a ser escoada através da Rússia e da Ucrânia para os países do Centro da Europa."
A pura verdade é que foram os Talibans que erradicaram a produção de ópio, pelo qual, meses antes da invasão e ocupação do Afeganistão (bem...de Kabul) , recebiam ajuda dos US, portanto deve ler-se: "a regressar a níveis anteriores à governação Taliban".
Fizeram de toda uma religião - os Talibans – inimigos (não será racismo?), no primeiro passo para fazer todos os árabes e muçulmanos inimigos, mudam regimes para levar a felicidade aos povos... colhem tempestades. Os engenheiros sociais nunca desistem contudo, recomendarão sempre mais do mesmo, orgulhosos da sua polida "moral stand", enquanto espalham a desordem social e o caos à sua volta. Grrr.
Comentário: os global tudo não conseguem dormir descansados, incomodados com a diversidade de soluções descentralizadas.
Porque raio terá de existir um política concertada da droga? É precisamente nas questões de dúvidas éticas sobre a legitimidade de se poder condicionar as escolhas individuais, que mais deve ser aplicado o princípio do localismo.
Questões como a droga e a prostituição, entendidas como actos voluntários, devem sujeitas a regulação altamente descentralizada - tipo Municipal e Freguesia, precisamente o oposto de qualquer política Europeia. Estes actos não podem ser considerados crime, mas sim sujeitos a regulação conforme os princípios consensuais em cada comunidade. E estes princípios consensuais variam de comunidade para comunidade.
Acima de tudo, cada um é livre de assumir as consequências dos seus actos, e as empresas devem também poder descriminar livremente quanto a aceitar ou não, que um seu empregado possa ser utilizador de drogas.
Desta forma, não precisamos de qualquer política, nem nacional nem europeia. A ordem natural das coisas sairá do equilíbrio entre livre arbítrio e o direito à exclusão inerente à propriedade privada. E assim, teremos certamente, uma sociedade bem mais conservadora mas sem moralismos hipócritas coercivos da direita bafienta nem o amoralismo progressista da esquerda por todos os direitos individuais disfuncionais que se esquece, contudo, que o livre contrato e arbítrio também é válido para toda a esfera económica.
Também errado no texto é: "A produção de ópio no Afeganistão está paulatinamente a regressar a níveis anteriores ao derrube da governação Taliban e a ser escoada através da Rússia e da Ucrânia para os países do Centro da Europa."
A pura verdade é que foram os Talibans que erradicaram a produção de ópio, pelo qual, meses antes da invasão e ocupação do Afeganistão (bem...de Kabul) , recebiam ajuda dos US, portanto deve ler-se: "a regressar a níveis anteriores à governação Taliban".
Fizeram de toda uma religião - os Talibans – inimigos (não será racismo?), no primeiro passo para fazer todos os árabes e muçulmanos inimigos, mudam regimes para levar a felicidade aos povos... colhem tempestades. Os engenheiros sociais nunca desistem contudo, recomendarão sempre mais do mesmo, orgulhosos da sua polida "moral stand", enquanto espalham a desordem social e o caos à sua volta. Grrr.
Realistas começam a fazer-se notar
New Foreign Policy Coalition Warns of US 'Empire Building'
Doug Bandow, a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy - a group of scholars and analysts whose political views encompass all sides of the foreign policy debate - said the United States government is getting bigger as troop deployments overseas increase.
"Basically, if you're going to have big government abroad, you've got to be prepared to have big government at home. One aspect of that is if you want an imperial foreign policy, you're going to need an imperial military to carry it out," Bandow said.
"It's very hard to maintain garrisons all over the world in unpleasant places with a volunteer military," Bandow added.
Doug Bandow, a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy - a group of scholars and analysts whose political views encompass all sides of the foreign policy debate - said the United States government is getting bigger as troop deployments overseas increase.
"Basically, if you're going to have big government abroad, you've got to be prepared to have big government at home. One aspect of that is if you want an imperial foreign policy, you're going to need an imperial military to carry it out," Bandow said.
"It's very hard to maintain garrisons all over the world in unpleasant places with a volunteer military," Bandow added.
segunda-feira, 27 de outubro de 2003
Queen "concerned" about the Constitution
The comments came after a report in the Daily Telegraph claiming that the Queen is becoming concerned that the Constitution might underline her role as monarch.
The Palace has asked for documents on the Constitution to be passed to them.
However, both No. 10 and Buckingham palace said they did not recognise the report.
The London-based campaign group Vote 2004, which is fighting for a referendum, welcomed any sign of a softening in Mr Blair's position.
Campaign Director Neil O Brien told the EUobserver, "it's good that for the first time the Government are admitting that there might be a need for a referendum".
"Even the Prime Minister's top advisors are telling him his refusal to give voters a say is now untenable. He should listen to them urgently".
The Palace has asked for documents on the Constitution to be passed to them.
However, both No. 10 and Buckingham palace said they did not recognise the report.
The London-based campaign group Vote 2004, which is fighting for a referendum, welcomed any sign of a softening in Mr Blair's position.
Campaign Director Neil O Brien told the EUobserver, "it's good that for the first time the Government are admitting that there might be a need for a referendum".
"Even the Prime Minister's top advisors are telling him his refusal to give voters a say is now untenable. He should listen to them urgently".
How States Fall and Liberty Triumphs
...every time you learn something new about liberty; share a book, article or idea; contribute to a good cause; write a letter to the editor; or give another hero of liberty moral support, you are taking a sledgehammer to the foundation of despotism in our time.
All states everywhere enjoy power only because people are willing to continue to obey and not challenge the powers that be. This means that power is ultimately based on that illusive notion called legitimacy. Legitimacy can vanish in an instant, exposed as a façade that covers up the massive looting machine that is government. It is the role of all of us to break the silence.
All states everywhere enjoy power only because people are willing to continue to obey and not challenge the powers that be. This means that power is ultimately based on that illusive notion called legitimacy. Legitimacy can vanish in an instant, exposed as a façade that covers up the massive looting machine that is government. It is the role of all of us to break the silence.
Secessão
China warns of Taiwan 'disaster': "HONG KONG, China (CNN) -- Beijing has delivered its toughest warning to date against Taiwan holding a pro-independence referendum or changing its constitution to pursue full sovereign status."
Agora, só existe uma forma de encara esta notícia: ou o "Ocidente" declara e adopta o princípio de que um referendo pode decidir criar territórios "self-government" pela Secessão e adopta regras (contitucionais, etc) pacíficas de assim suceder (procurando estabelecer ao mesmo tempo figuras normativas intermédias - federalismo interno - para prevenir a Secessão radical), ou só pode esperar que a China retome um seu antigo território.
Em que é que ficamos?
Agora, só existe uma forma de encara esta notícia: ou o "Ocidente" declara e adopta o princípio de que um referendo pode decidir criar territórios "self-government" pela Secessão e adopta regras (contitucionais, etc) pacíficas de assim suceder (procurando estabelecer ao mesmo tempo figuras normativas intermédias - federalismo interno - para prevenir a Secessão radical), ou só pode esperar que a China retome um seu antigo território.
Em que é que ficamos?
Referendo
A pergunta parece óbvia:
"Concorda que o tratado Constitucional europeu seja ratificado por Portugal?"
Se a pergunta não pode ser feita porque os tratados não podem ser referendados, como pode então alguma vez a nossa Constituição deixar de ser o texto de auto-soberania de Portugal?
E depois, como é que um tratado pode por a nossa Constituição como subsidiária? Não é isso anti-constitucional por definição?
Ou seja, se é um tratado, não pode "anular" a Constituição, se não é um tratado, pode ser referendado, não?
Se não pode, precisamente porque é um assunto "constitucional", como pode uma Assembleia da Républica eleita para defender a actual Constituição, conspirar para a pôr "debaixo" de estrangeiros (de vez em quando é preciso dar os nomes devidos às coisas), sem consulta democrática?
Conclusão: apenas um referendo com maioria mais do que simples - pessoalmente aí uns 80% - pode obrigar os restantes a pór em causa o nosso "self-government".
A "construção europeia" não tem de implicar perda de soberania.
Digamos que as acções de coordenação europeia (directivas, etc) poderão ser simplesmente aplicadas voluntáriamente pelos governos. Assim, se a aceitação é voluntária e enquanto o for, só serão propostas medidas de enorme consenso nos diferentes Estados.
Em suma, não é necessário tratado constitucional nem federalismo. Só será necessário para um dia, ser aplicada a força por um exército "europeu" para negar o direito de recusa a aplicar decisões "maioritárias" ou mesmo impedir a saída da "ordem constitucional europeia".
"Concorda que o tratado Constitucional europeu seja ratificado por Portugal?"
Se a pergunta não pode ser feita porque os tratados não podem ser referendados, como pode então alguma vez a nossa Constituição deixar de ser o texto de auto-soberania de Portugal?
E depois, como é que um tratado pode por a nossa Constituição como subsidiária? Não é isso anti-constitucional por definição?
Ou seja, se é um tratado, não pode "anular" a Constituição, se não é um tratado, pode ser referendado, não?
Se não pode, precisamente porque é um assunto "constitucional", como pode uma Assembleia da Républica eleita para defender a actual Constituição, conspirar para a pôr "debaixo" de estrangeiros (de vez em quando é preciso dar os nomes devidos às coisas), sem consulta democrática?
Conclusão: apenas um referendo com maioria mais do que simples - pessoalmente aí uns 80% - pode obrigar os restantes a pór em causa o nosso "self-government".
A "construção europeia" não tem de implicar perda de soberania.
Digamos que as acções de coordenação europeia (directivas, etc) poderão ser simplesmente aplicadas voluntáriamente pelos governos. Assim, se a aceitação é voluntária e enquanto o for, só serão propostas medidas de enorme consenso nos diferentes Estados.
Em suma, não é necessário tratado constitucional nem federalismo. Só será necessário para um dia, ser aplicada a força por um exército "europeu" para negar o direito de recusa a aplicar decisões "maioritárias" ou mesmo impedir a saída da "ordem constitucional europeia".
sábado, 25 de outubro de 2003
O ridículo
Portugal multado em 2,5 milhões por produzir leite em excesso
Porque raio tenho eu de pagar uma "multa" porque existe um "excesso"? Se existe um "excesso" o natural seria eu comprar o leite mais barato, não?
Porque raio tenho eu de pagar uma "multa" porque existe um "excesso"? Se existe um "excesso" o natural seria eu comprar o leite mais barato, não?
O referendo
Creio que é chegada a altura de tentarmos unir todas as vontades de todos os quadrantes que rejeitam o tratado Constitucional e o conceito de federalismo Europeu. A preservação da soberania é incompatível com o federalismo, como prova a história americana.
O federalismo é um conceito válido para aplicar internamente, na senda de uma real descentralização política e administrativa mantendo-se ao mesmo tempo a unidade da Nação. Quando aplicada externamente, e embora não seja sua intenção, encerra em si os germens de uma centralização supra-nacional progressiva.
Uma das noções que deve ser rejeitada inclui a da necessidade de eleições gerais europeias para um parlamento europeu. Este não tem qualquer função útil a não ser criar uma elite receptiva a sonhos de um Estado Europeu a debitar legislação "democrática" sobre tudo e sobre nada.
A democracia pode ser o menos mau dos sistemas, mas para assim ser, tem de preservar uma escala humana e aplicada em grupos separados com alguma homogeneidade cultural, étnica, religiosa, etc. Para entender isto temos de imaginar que raio de validade teria uma democracia mundial - será que os “global democrats” pelo fim da história conseguem defender que as escolhas saídas de referendos mundiais são legítimas?
Se o tratado for aprovado, o passo até impostos europeus e uma defesa interna e externa europeia, é pequeno, altura em que quem quiser afastar-se será já considerado um perigoso separatista e fomentador de terrorismo nacionalista e obviamente um acto anti-constitucional contra o qual o exército europeu terá legitimidade para combater. Tipo, uma força de intervenção (ocupação) europeia, constituída por espanhóis e alemães, para preservar a ordem constitucional (a europeia, claro) na nossa pátria Lusitana.
Não sou eu que sou pessimista, é a história que o é. Não foi o federalismo alemão, ao unir as centenas de pequenas regiões e estados autónomos que permitiu que o Kaiser ambicionasse a um Império como o Britânico e o Francês? Não foi a "Guerra Civil" americana a prova de que uma Federação cria uma elite centralista que mais tarde tende a negar o Direito de Secessão?
O federalismo é um conceito válido para aplicar internamente, na senda de uma real descentralização política e administrativa mantendo-se ao mesmo tempo a unidade da Nação. Quando aplicada externamente, e embora não seja sua intenção, encerra em si os germens de uma centralização supra-nacional progressiva.
Uma das noções que deve ser rejeitada inclui a da necessidade de eleições gerais europeias para um parlamento europeu. Este não tem qualquer função útil a não ser criar uma elite receptiva a sonhos de um Estado Europeu a debitar legislação "democrática" sobre tudo e sobre nada.
A democracia pode ser o menos mau dos sistemas, mas para assim ser, tem de preservar uma escala humana e aplicada em grupos separados com alguma homogeneidade cultural, étnica, religiosa, etc. Para entender isto temos de imaginar que raio de validade teria uma democracia mundial - será que os “global democrats” pelo fim da história conseguem defender que as escolhas saídas de referendos mundiais são legítimas?
Se o tratado for aprovado, o passo até impostos europeus e uma defesa interna e externa europeia, é pequeno, altura em que quem quiser afastar-se será já considerado um perigoso separatista e fomentador de terrorismo nacionalista e obviamente um acto anti-constitucional contra o qual o exército europeu terá legitimidade para combater. Tipo, uma força de intervenção (ocupação) europeia, constituída por espanhóis e alemães, para preservar a ordem constitucional (a europeia, claro) na nossa pátria Lusitana.
Não sou eu que sou pessimista, é a história que o é. Não foi o federalismo alemão, ao unir as centenas de pequenas regiões e estados autónomos que permitiu que o Kaiser ambicionasse a um Império como o Britânico e o Francês? Não foi a "Guerra Civil" americana a prova de que uma Federação cria uma elite centralista que mais tarde tende a negar o Direito de Secessão?
Reagan e o Líbano
The road to the October 1983 suicide bombing began with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. The Israelis claimed the invasion was justified in retaliation for PLO attacks on Israelis.
But, as New York Times correspondent Thomas Friedman noted in his book From Beirut to Jerusalem, "the number of Israeli casualties the PLO guerillas in Lebanon actually inflicted were minuscule (one death in the 12 months before the invasion)."
Defense Minister Ariel Sharon told the Israeli cabinet that his "Operation Peace for Galilee" would extend only 40 kilometers into Lebanon.
… the U.S. embassy in Beirut "sent cable after cable to Washington, warning that an Israeli invasion would provoke terrorism and undermine America’s standing in the Arab world, but not a word came back."
When Palestinians fought back tenaciously, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) responded with indiscriminate bombing. The Palestinian Red Crescent estimated that fourteen thousand people, mostly civilians, were killed and wounded in the first month of the Israeli invasion.
… The U.S. government signed an agreement with Arafat, pledging that U.S. forces would safeguard civilians who stayed behind. Once the PLO withdrew from Beirut, the U.S. troops were pulled out and put back on Navy ships.
…As Thomas Friedman noted, "Although the Israelis confiscated the arms of all of the Moslem groups in West Beirut, they made no attempt to disarm the Christian Phalangist militiamen in East Beirut."
Sharon invited Lebanese Phalangist militia units trained and equipped by Israel to enter the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. …The militia entered the camps and over the next 48 hours, more than seven hundred Palestinian women, children, and men were executed; many corpses were mutilated.
Palestinian sources estimated that the death toll was much higher. Israeli troops launched flares over the camps to illuminate them throughout the night and provided the Phalangists with food and water during their respites from the killings. Palestinian women sought to escape the slaughter but "the Israelis encircling the area refused to let anyone cross their lines." … After the Phalangists finished, they brought in bulldozers to create mass graves. More Palestinians may have been killed at the two camps than the total number of Israelis killed by the PLO in the previous decade.
… An Israeli government commission concluded a few months later that "Minister of Defense [Sharon] bears personal responsibility" for the debacle. Sharon resigned as defense minister as a result of the commission report.
The carnage at Sabra and Shatila threatened to plunge Lebanon back into total chaos, and Reagan quickly agreed to a Lebanese request to send US troops back into Beirut. Reagan repeatedly called for Israeli withdrawal from Beirut and declared: "Israel must have learned that there is no way it can impose its own solutions on hatreds as deep and bitter as those that produced this tragedy."
The massacres of the Palestinian refugees catapulted the U.S. much deeper into the Lebanese quagmire.
On April 23, 1983, Reagan announced to the press: "The tragic and brutal attack on our embassy in Beirut has shocked us all and filled us with grief. Yet, because of this latest crime we are more resolved than ever to help achieve the urgent and total withdrawal of all American forces from Lebanon, or I should say, all foreign forces. I’m sorry. Mistake." But the actual mistake was a U.S. policy that would cost hundreds of Americans their lives.
On September 13 Reagan authorized Marine commanders in Lebanon to call in air strikes and other attacks against the Muslims to help the Christian Lebanese army. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger vigorously opposed the new policy, fearing it would make American troops far more vulnerable.
The suicide truck attack on October 23 stunned the world. Yet, as Colin Powell, who was then a major general, later observed in his autobiography: "Since [the Muslims] could not reach the battleship, they found a more vulnerable target, the exposed Marines at the airport."
…
A few months later, U.S. troops were quietly removed from Beirut. But the U.S. continued an aggressive posture in the area – as well as providing massive arms and aid to the Israeli army that was seeking to suppress and rule much of southern Lebanon.
The U.S. intervention into Beirut did nothing to stabilize or pacify the region.
Now, 20 years later, the main lesson that Bush seems to draw from Beirut is the need to "be tough." Bush declared on September 7: "In the past, the terrorists have cited the examples of Beirut and Somalia, claiming that if you inflict harm on Americans, we will run from a challenge. In this, they are mistaken."
…
The issue is not whether the US runs from a challenge: but whether political leaders have any incentive to learn from the deaths of American soldiers. And judging from Bush’s challenge to those who are killing Americans in Iraq – "Bring ’em on!" – there is scant hope for the learning curve of the current Oval Office occupant.
October 23, 2003
James Bovard is the author of Terrorism & Tyranny: Trampling Freedom, Justice, and Peace to Rid the World of Evil (Palgrave MacMillan).
But, as New York Times correspondent Thomas Friedman noted in his book From Beirut to Jerusalem, "the number of Israeli casualties the PLO guerillas in Lebanon actually inflicted were minuscule (one death in the 12 months before the invasion)."
Defense Minister Ariel Sharon told the Israeli cabinet that his "Operation Peace for Galilee" would extend only 40 kilometers into Lebanon.
… the U.S. embassy in Beirut "sent cable after cable to Washington, warning that an Israeli invasion would provoke terrorism and undermine America’s standing in the Arab world, but not a word came back."
When Palestinians fought back tenaciously, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) responded with indiscriminate bombing. The Palestinian Red Crescent estimated that fourteen thousand people, mostly civilians, were killed and wounded in the first month of the Israeli invasion.
… The U.S. government signed an agreement with Arafat, pledging that U.S. forces would safeguard civilians who stayed behind. Once the PLO withdrew from Beirut, the U.S. troops were pulled out and put back on Navy ships.
…As Thomas Friedman noted, "Although the Israelis confiscated the arms of all of the Moslem groups in West Beirut, they made no attempt to disarm the Christian Phalangist militiamen in East Beirut."
Sharon invited Lebanese Phalangist militia units trained and equipped by Israel to enter the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. …The militia entered the camps and over the next 48 hours, more than seven hundred Palestinian women, children, and men were executed; many corpses were mutilated.
Palestinian sources estimated that the death toll was much higher. Israeli troops launched flares over the camps to illuminate them throughout the night and provided the Phalangists with food and water during their respites from the killings. Palestinian women sought to escape the slaughter but "the Israelis encircling the area refused to let anyone cross their lines." … After the Phalangists finished, they brought in bulldozers to create mass graves. More Palestinians may have been killed at the two camps than the total number of Israelis killed by the PLO in the previous decade.
… An Israeli government commission concluded a few months later that "Minister of Defense [Sharon] bears personal responsibility" for the debacle. Sharon resigned as defense minister as a result of the commission report.
The carnage at Sabra and Shatila threatened to plunge Lebanon back into total chaos, and Reagan quickly agreed to a Lebanese request to send US troops back into Beirut. Reagan repeatedly called for Israeli withdrawal from Beirut and declared: "Israel must have learned that there is no way it can impose its own solutions on hatreds as deep and bitter as those that produced this tragedy."
The massacres of the Palestinian refugees catapulted the U.S. much deeper into the Lebanese quagmire.
On April 23, 1983, Reagan announced to the press: "The tragic and brutal attack on our embassy in Beirut has shocked us all and filled us with grief. Yet, because of this latest crime we are more resolved than ever to help achieve the urgent and total withdrawal of all American forces from Lebanon, or I should say, all foreign forces. I’m sorry. Mistake." But the actual mistake was a U.S. policy that would cost hundreds of Americans their lives.
On September 13 Reagan authorized Marine commanders in Lebanon to call in air strikes and other attacks against the Muslims to help the Christian Lebanese army. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger vigorously opposed the new policy, fearing it would make American troops far more vulnerable.
The suicide truck attack on October 23 stunned the world. Yet, as Colin Powell, who was then a major general, later observed in his autobiography: "Since [the Muslims] could not reach the battleship, they found a more vulnerable target, the exposed Marines at the airport."
…
A few months later, U.S. troops were quietly removed from Beirut. But the U.S. continued an aggressive posture in the area – as well as providing massive arms and aid to the Israeli army that was seeking to suppress and rule much of southern Lebanon.
The U.S. intervention into Beirut did nothing to stabilize or pacify the region.
Now, 20 years later, the main lesson that Bush seems to draw from Beirut is the need to "be tough." Bush declared on September 7: "In the past, the terrorists have cited the examples of Beirut and Somalia, claiming that if you inflict harm on Americans, we will run from a challenge. In this, they are mistaken."
…
The issue is not whether the US runs from a challenge: but whether political leaders have any incentive to learn from the deaths of American soldiers. And judging from Bush’s challenge to those who are killing Americans in Iraq – "Bring ’em on!" – there is scant hope for the learning curve of the current Oval Office occupant.
October 23, 2003
James Bovard is the author of Terrorism & Tyranny: Trampling Freedom, Justice, and Peace to Rid the World of Evil (Palgrave MacMillan).
sexta-feira, 24 de outubro de 2003
Os realistas contra-atacam
Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy: www.realisticforeignpolicy.org
A Statement of Principles by the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy
Against the backdrop of an ever-bloodier conflict in Iraq, American foreign policy is moving in a dangerous direction toward empire.
Worrisome imperial trends are apparent in the Bush administration's National Security Strategy. That document pledges to maintain America's military dominance in the world, and it does so in a way that encourages other nations to form countervailing coalitions and alliances. We can expect, and are seeing now, multiple balances of power forming against us. People resent and resist domination, no matter how benign.
We are a diverse group of scholars and analysts from across the political spectrum who believe that the move toward empire must be halted immediately. We are united by our desire to turn American national security policy toward realistic and sustainable measures for protecting U.S. vital interests in a manner that is consistent with American values.
The need for a change in direction is particularly urgent because imperial policies can quickly gain momentum, with new interventions begetting new dangers and, thus, the demand for further actions. If current trends are allowed to continue, we may well end up with an empire that most Americans-especially those whose sons and daughters are, or will be, sent into harm's way-don't really favor. The issue must be the subject of a broad public debate. The time for debate is now.
The American people have not embraced the idea of an American empire, and they are unlikely to do so. Since rebelling against the British Empire, Americans have resisted the imperial impulse, guided by the Founders' frequent warnings that republic and empire are incompatible. Empire is problematic because it subverts the freedoms and liberties of citizens at home while simultaneously thwarting the will of people abroad. An imperial strategy threatens to entangle America in an assortment of unnecessary and unrewarding wars.
There are ominous signs that the strategy of empire has already begun to erode our fundamental rights and liberties. More and more power is being claimed by the executive branch. And on the economic front, an imperial strategy threatens to weaken us as a nation, overextending and bleeding the economy and straining our military and federal budgets.
The defenders of empire assert that the horrific acts of terrorism on September 11, 2001, demand that we assume new financial burdens to fund an expansive national security strategy, relax our commitment to individual liberty at home, and discard our respect for state sovereignty abroad. Nothing could be further from the truth. Following 9/11, we should have refocused our attention on the very real threats facing us in the 21st century. As a nation, we must not allow the events of 9/11 to be used as a pretext for reshaping American foreign policy in a manner inconsistent with our traditions and values and contrary to our true interests.
We the undersigned announce the launching of a campaign to promote a realistic foreign policy for America. In the weeks and months ahead, our coalition will be hosting policy forums and conferences, publishing papers and articles, and appearing on television and radio to articulate the case against empire.
John Quincy Adams once declared that America "goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own." Those wise words still ring true. A restrained and focused foreign policy will best protect the liberty and safety of the American people in the 21st century. Conversely, an imperial policy will jeopardize all that we hold dear.
Posted by cpreble at September 15, 2003 02:33 PM
A Statement of Principles by the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy
Against the backdrop of an ever-bloodier conflict in Iraq, American foreign policy is moving in a dangerous direction toward empire.
Worrisome imperial trends are apparent in the Bush administration's National Security Strategy. That document pledges to maintain America's military dominance in the world, and it does so in a way that encourages other nations to form countervailing coalitions and alliances. We can expect, and are seeing now, multiple balances of power forming against us. People resent and resist domination, no matter how benign.
We are a diverse group of scholars and analysts from across the political spectrum who believe that the move toward empire must be halted immediately. We are united by our desire to turn American national security policy toward realistic and sustainable measures for protecting U.S. vital interests in a manner that is consistent with American values.
The need for a change in direction is particularly urgent because imperial policies can quickly gain momentum, with new interventions begetting new dangers and, thus, the demand for further actions. If current trends are allowed to continue, we may well end up with an empire that most Americans-especially those whose sons and daughters are, or will be, sent into harm's way-don't really favor. The issue must be the subject of a broad public debate. The time for debate is now.
The American people have not embraced the idea of an American empire, and they are unlikely to do so. Since rebelling against the British Empire, Americans have resisted the imperial impulse, guided by the Founders' frequent warnings that republic and empire are incompatible. Empire is problematic because it subverts the freedoms and liberties of citizens at home while simultaneously thwarting the will of people abroad. An imperial strategy threatens to entangle America in an assortment of unnecessary and unrewarding wars.
There are ominous signs that the strategy of empire has already begun to erode our fundamental rights and liberties. More and more power is being claimed by the executive branch. And on the economic front, an imperial strategy threatens to weaken us as a nation, overextending and bleeding the economy and straining our military and federal budgets.
The defenders of empire assert that the horrific acts of terrorism on September 11, 2001, demand that we assume new financial burdens to fund an expansive national security strategy, relax our commitment to individual liberty at home, and discard our respect for state sovereignty abroad. Nothing could be further from the truth. Following 9/11, we should have refocused our attention on the very real threats facing us in the 21st century. As a nation, we must not allow the events of 9/11 to be used as a pretext for reshaping American foreign policy in a manner inconsistent with our traditions and values and contrary to our true interests.
We the undersigned announce the launching of a campaign to promote a realistic foreign policy for America. In the weeks and months ahead, our coalition will be hosting policy forums and conferences, publishing papers and articles, and appearing on television and radio to articulate the case against empire.
John Quincy Adams once declared that America "goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own." Those wise words still ring true. A restrained and focused foreign policy will best protect the liberty and safety of the American people in the 21st century. Conversely, an imperial policy will jeopardize all that we hold dear.
Posted by cpreble at September 15, 2003 02:33 PM
Consequências imprevistas bem previsíveis
Syria, Long Ruthlessly Secular, Sees Fervent Islamic Resurgence
"Two decades after Syria ruthlessly uprooted militant Islam, this most secular of Arab states is experiencing a dramatic religious resurgence." By NEIL MacFARQUHAR, NYT.
Depois da genial estratégia de acabar pela invasão e ocupação militar, com um regime secular no Iraque que não oferecia perigo e criar a melhor das causas nas piores mãos (fundamentalismo aliado a resistentes nacionalistas) temos o surgimento do islamismo no estado secular da Síria.
Devemos isto a quem? Bin Laden não podia estar mais satisfeito e este até deve ter vontade de parafrasear Lenin: "o Ocidente venderá a corda com que será enforcado".
Como diz Paul Craig Roberts: "More dangerous an enemy of the US and its traditional values than Muslims, neo-Jacobins have seized control of the Bush presidency and US foreign policy. They will stop at nothing to achieve their goal of World War IV in the Middle East."
Ainda criticam a França, antiga potência colonial lá do burgo, por ter relações com a Síria (ainda secular). Talvez prefiram alguns, daqui a uns tempos, entenderem-se com um regime fundamentalista - tal como poderá vir a acontece no Iraque ou nas várias partes em que este provávelmente irá desagregar-se.
Para isso já arranjaram mais um motivo para aplicar sanções económicas. Boa medida. Muito Liberal. O povo vai compreender as razões e virar-se para...o Islão.
"Two decades after Syria ruthlessly uprooted militant Islam, this most secular of Arab states is experiencing a dramatic religious resurgence." By NEIL MacFARQUHAR, NYT.
Depois da genial estratégia de acabar pela invasão e ocupação militar, com um regime secular no Iraque que não oferecia perigo e criar a melhor das causas nas piores mãos (fundamentalismo aliado a resistentes nacionalistas) temos o surgimento do islamismo no estado secular da Síria.
Devemos isto a quem? Bin Laden não podia estar mais satisfeito e este até deve ter vontade de parafrasear Lenin: "o Ocidente venderá a corda com que será enforcado".
Como diz Paul Craig Roberts: "More dangerous an enemy of the US and its traditional values than Muslims, neo-Jacobins have seized control of the Bush presidency and US foreign policy. They will stop at nothing to achieve their goal of World War IV in the Middle East."
Ainda criticam a França, antiga potência colonial lá do burgo, por ter relações com a Síria (ainda secular). Talvez prefiram alguns, daqui a uns tempos, entenderem-se com um regime fundamentalista - tal como poderá vir a acontece no Iraque ou nas várias partes em que este provávelmente irá desagregar-se.
Para isso já arranjaram mais um motivo para aplicar sanções económicas. Boa medida. Muito Liberal. O povo vai compreender as razões e virar-se para...o Islão.
Num futuro próximo, na Europa...
Ainda hoje, a "Guerra Civil" Americana é vista como uma guerra para libertar escravos. Mas Lincoln nunca expressou essa vontade a não ser tardiamente, porque o que estava em questão era a preservação da União pela força e a negação do Direito de Secessão pelos Estados do Sul. Diga-se até, que a solução defendida por Lincoln era precisamente a expatriação para...a Libéria.
Onde existia toda a certeza nesse Direito, na Constituição, anos mais tarde foi negada por truques de interpretação e à custa de 700 000 mortos.
Num futuro próximo da Europa Federal, vão dizer qualquer coisa como o que seguinte (de alguém - Sandefur - que defende que a Secessão não é legítima do âmbito da Constituição Federalista Americana):
"Unilateral secession is unconstitutional and illegal. The President of the United States is charged with the Constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. If people resist him at point of arms—that is to say, if they initiate force—he has the Constitutional authority to use arms to enforce the law, even if that means killing people."
o autor continua e diz:
"Secession might, however, be a legitimate act of revolution, if it were done to preserve freedom against oppression, as was the case in the American Revolution. That, however, was not the case in the Civil War, because the south seceded, not to preserve freedom, but to perpetuate the enslavement of millions of innocents."
Stephan Kinsella então pergunta:
"if I understand your theory correctly, EVEN IF the South did NOT have slavery, it would STILL not be an act of revolution--because unlike the US revolting from Britain, the South didn't have a reason to revolt, it was not responding to a long train of acts of despotism etc."
Sandefur responde:
"That's right. It would be an initiation of force [by the South]."
Stephan Kinsella, comenta a resposta:
"So, he explicitly admits that whether or not the South had slavery in 1861, their act of secession from the US that atually existed at the time, would have been illegal and NOT a justified act of revolution. How he can continue to maintain that slavery is relevant even to his own theory, I have no idea."
e Thomas DiLorenzo acrescenta:
Sandfur says unilateral secession is always and everwhere illegal and unconstitutional.
But this ignores such facts as that in the Declaration the states are continually referred to as "free and independent," or sovereign. The same is true of the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.
The word secession is not even in the Constitution, so Sandefur is simpy making this assertion up. In fact, the Tenth Amendment, which reserves all powers not delegated to the federal governemnt to the citizens and the states, allows for secession.
As I document in The Real Lincoln, this was the view of the majority of Northern opinion makers in 1860. Sandefur and his fellow Straussian neocon Lincoln idolaters ignore all of this, however, since it doesn't fit their fairy tale version of history.
He also ignores the fact that Lincoln himself, as well as the U.S. Congress, declared to the world in 1861 that they had no intention of disturbing Southern slavery and that their purpose was "to save the union."
Lincoln idolaters like Sandefur even ignore Lincoln's own words in order to fabricate endless excuses for the empire that Lincoln did more than anyone to create. Lincoln never said he invaded the South to free the slaves; this is all a part of the Straussian fantasy world that smartass Sandefur lives in.
Onde existia toda a certeza nesse Direito, na Constituição, anos mais tarde foi negada por truques de interpretação e à custa de 700 000 mortos.
Num futuro próximo da Europa Federal, vão dizer qualquer coisa como o que seguinte (de alguém - Sandefur - que defende que a Secessão não é legítima do âmbito da Constituição Federalista Americana):
"Unilateral secession is unconstitutional and illegal. The President of the United States is charged with the Constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. If people resist him at point of arms—that is to say, if they initiate force—he has the Constitutional authority to use arms to enforce the law, even if that means killing people."
o autor continua e diz:
"Secession might, however, be a legitimate act of revolution, if it were done to preserve freedom against oppression, as was the case in the American Revolution. That, however, was not the case in the Civil War, because the south seceded, not to preserve freedom, but to perpetuate the enslavement of millions of innocents."
Stephan Kinsella então pergunta:
"if I understand your theory correctly, EVEN IF the South did NOT have slavery, it would STILL not be an act of revolution--because unlike the US revolting from Britain, the South didn't have a reason to revolt, it was not responding to a long train of acts of despotism etc."
Sandefur responde:
"That's right. It would be an initiation of force [by the South]."
Stephan Kinsella, comenta a resposta:
"So, he explicitly admits that whether or not the South had slavery in 1861, their act of secession from the US that atually existed at the time, would have been illegal and NOT a justified act of revolution. How he can continue to maintain that slavery is relevant even to his own theory, I have no idea."
e Thomas DiLorenzo acrescenta:
Sandfur says unilateral secession is always and everwhere illegal and unconstitutional.
But this ignores such facts as that in the Declaration the states are continually referred to as "free and independent," or sovereign. The same is true of the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.
The word secession is not even in the Constitution, so Sandefur is simpy making this assertion up. In fact, the Tenth Amendment, which reserves all powers not delegated to the federal governemnt to the citizens and the states, allows for secession.
As I document in The Real Lincoln, this was the view of the majority of Northern opinion makers in 1860. Sandefur and his fellow Straussian neocon Lincoln idolaters ignore all of this, however, since it doesn't fit their fairy tale version of history.
He also ignores the fact that Lincoln himself, as well as the U.S. Congress, declared to the world in 1861 that they had no intention of disturbing Southern slavery and that their purpose was "to save the union."
Lincoln idolaters like Sandefur even ignore Lincoln's own words in order to fabricate endless excuses for the empire that Lincoln did more than anyone to create. Lincoln never said he invaded the South to free the slaves; this is all a part of the Straussian fantasy world that smartass Sandefur lives in.
Property and Order
Um importantíssimo texto que se pode resumir na frase:
"It is respect for the boundary line separating your and my property interests that fosters both individual liberty and social order. This is why property, liberty, and social order, are simply different ways of talking about the same thing."
A ordem social, tão cara ao sentimento conservador, emana do direito à propriedade privada. E toda a desordem social emana dos ataques à propriedade privada. A instituição da família tradicional, enquanto célula social que tem um património real acumulado lentamente e perpetuado par as gerações seguintes (com a experiência sob a forma de as tradições que favorecem uma hierarquia natural – o patriarca, o clã, a comunidade), está sobre a ataque do racionalismo progressista do Estado moderno, porque através da regulação coerciva dos testamentos, dos impostos sobre a propriedade e rendimentos e ainda de doação, viola o direito à propriedade privada desmembrando esta função de regulação natural da ordem social.
Ao socializar a responsabilidade de tratamento dos mais velhos, ao socializar a tarefa de educar colectivamente os mais novos, com padrões pretensamente amorais e neutros, caímos lentamente no "admirável mundo novo", e hoje, até quem se diz conservador, assina por baixo de todas as instituições colectivizantes do Estado moderno.
Hoje as hierarquias naturais nascem da estrutura do Estado e daqueles que este favorece, ontem emanavam da "natural order". Não temos que nos admirar por todo o comportamento disfuncional da juventude e da sociedade em geral, infantilizada e sujeita às ideologias e modas do momento.
“Is there any social problem which, at its core, is not produced by a disrespect for the inviolability of property interests?
...
In each such instance, conflicts are created and maintained by government policies and practices that forcibly deprive a property owner of decision making control over something he or she owns.
Whether the ownership interest is in oneself, or in those external resources that a person requires in order to promote his or her interests or to otherwise express one’s purpose in life, the state is inevitably at war with property owners.
It is in this sense that every state – whatever its outer form, its constituency, or its rationale for existence – is socialistic. To whatever degree the state exists, it claims the rightful authority to preempt the control individuals have over their property.
...
Because all political systems are wars against the private ownership of property, statists must redefine social and political issues to exclude "property" as the defining factor.
...
One can go down the list of other "social" problems occasioned by the refusal to recognize the inviolability of property boundaries as the underlying cause. The distinction between victimizing crimes (e.g., murder, rape, robbery, arson, etc.) and victimless crimes (e.g., drug use, prostitution, gambling, etc.) is that the former category involve violations of individual property interests, while the latter do not. In fact, properly understood, the criminalization of any voluntary action is a violation of individual property interests...
In both the above examples, a conflict is created because of the state’s existence: if government schools and courthouses are owned by the state, and if we believe in the lie that "we are the government," then each of us will want governmental policy to reflect our desires and interests.
...
Taxation and eminent domain involve the forcible expropriation of private property. If a street mugger took your property in such ways we would refer to it as "theft," but our political conditioning will not permit such candid responses to confiscations by the state.
...
There is a causal connection between property ownership and responsibility for one’s decision making. As one who makes decisions over my own life and property, I am responsible for the consequences of my actions.
But to the degree the state preempts private decision making, it restricts an individual’s sense of responsibility for his or her actions. If the state insists upon controlling our behavior, is it not easy to see how individuals might come to believe that they are not responsible for their acts?
...
This important lesson was finally learned, late in life, by the noted Marxist, Max Eastman, who observed:
It seems obvious to me now – though I was slow coming to the conclusion – that the institution of private property, the dispersion of power and importance that goes with it, has been a main factor in producing that limited amount of free-and-equalness which Marx hoped to render infinite by abolishing this institution.”
Butler Shaffer teaches at the Southwestern University School of Law.
"It is respect for the boundary line separating your and my property interests that fosters both individual liberty and social order. This is why property, liberty, and social order, are simply different ways of talking about the same thing."
A ordem social, tão cara ao sentimento conservador, emana do direito à propriedade privada. E toda a desordem social emana dos ataques à propriedade privada. A instituição da família tradicional, enquanto célula social que tem um património real acumulado lentamente e perpetuado par as gerações seguintes (com a experiência sob a forma de as tradições que favorecem uma hierarquia natural – o patriarca, o clã, a comunidade), está sobre a ataque do racionalismo progressista do Estado moderno, porque através da regulação coerciva dos testamentos, dos impostos sobre a propriedade e rendimentos e ainda de doação, viola o direito à propriedade privada desmembrando esta função de regulação natural da ordem social.
Ao socializar a responsabilidade de tratamento dos mais velhos, ao socializar a tarefa de educar colectivamente os mais novos, com padrões pretensamente amorais e neutros, caímos lentamente no "admirável mundo novo", e hoje, até quem se diz conservador, assina por baixo de todas as instituições colectivizantes do Estado moderno.
Hoje as hierarquias naturais nascem da estrutura do Estado e daqueles que este favorece, ontem emanavam da "natural order". Não temos que nos admirar por todo o comportamento disfuncional da juventude e da sociedade em geral, infantilizada e sujeita às ideologias e modas do momento.
“Is there any social problem which, at its core, is not produced by a disrespect for the inviolability of property interests?
...
In each such instance, conflicts are created and maintained by government policies and practices that forcibly deprive a property owner of decision making control over something he or she owns.
Whether the ownership interest is in oneself, or in those external resources that a person requires in order to promote his or her interests or to otherwise express one’s purpose in life, the state is inevitably at war with property owners.
It is in this sense that every state – whatever its outer form, its constituency, or its rationale for existence – is socialistic. To whatever degree the state exists, it claims the rightful authority to preempt the control individuals have over their property.
...
Because all political systems are wars against the private ownership of property, statists must redefine social and political issues to exclude "property" as the defining factor.
...
One can go down the list of other "social" problems occasioned by the refusal to recognize the inviolability of property boundaries as the underlying cause. The distinction between victimizing crimes (e.g., murder, rape, robbery, arson, etc.) and victimless crimes (e.g., drug use, prostitution, gambling, etc.) is that the former category involve violations of individual property interests, while the latter do not. In fact, properly understood, the criminalization of any voluntary action is a violation of individual property interests...
In both the above examples, a conflict is created because of the state’s existence: if government schools and courthouses are owned by the state, and if we believe in the lie that "we are the government," then each of us will want governmental policy to reflect our desires and interests.
...
Taxation and eminent domain involve the forcible expropriation of private property. If a street mugger took your property in such ways we would refer to it as "theft," but our political conditioning will not permit such candid responses to confiscations by the state.
...
There is a causal connection between property ownership and responsibility for one’s decision making. As one who makes decisions over my own life and property, I am responsible for the consequences of my actions.
But to the degree the state preempts private decision making, it restricts an individual’s sense of responsibility for his or her actions. If the state insists upon controlling our behavior, is it not easy to see how individuals might come to believe that they are not responsible for their acts?
...
This important lesson was finally learned, late in life, by the noted Marxist, Max Eastman, who observed:
It seems obvious to me now – though I was slow coming to the conclusion – that the institution of private property, the dispersion of power and importance that goes with it, has been a main factor in producing that limited amount of free-and-equalness which Marx hoped to render infinite by abolishing this institution.”
Butler Shaffer teaches at the Southwestern University School of Law.
quinta-feira, 23 de outubro de 2003
o Estado e a Guerra
O Estado, dizem os Liberais, é um mal necessário (por mim, é mesmo um mal desnecessário).
É uma entidade que colecta receitas sem contratos e impõe serviços sem contratos e tem o monopólio do uso da força e a capacidade de proclamar unilateralmente o que é legal ou não, num determinado espaço territorial.
Convenhamos que não é difícil chegar à conclusão de que se tem de existir deve ser limitado. Primeiro porque no Estado, seja qual for o seu regime, se reúne uma minoria de pessoas que com os recursos e vidas dos outros, tem a capacidade potencial de fazer "política" e onde se inclui a "política" da guerra.
A guerra é a ausência de lei, onde o monopolista e guardião dessa lei, dá licença para matar e o pratica em massa sem ser objecto do julgamento dentro da "rule of law".
A guerra, tal como o Estado, é inevitável e um mal necessário? Talvez o seja, mas tudo deve ser feito para que seja evitável, por isso temos os princípios da não ingerência em regimes, da legítima defesa, da contenção de conflitos locais pela neutralidade dos terceiros, etc.
Acima de tudo, cada Estado Nação, deve compreender a validade e mesmo a inevitabilidade de adoptar os princípios liberais, e sendo essa tarefa já bem difícil de se conseguir e manter internamente, tudo se perderá quando nos deixamos levar por um falso altruísmo colectivo (falso, porque nada no Estado é verdadeiramente voluntário) a favor de causas de terceiros, sempre complexas e que a história prova que conduzem a custos e consequências inesperadas, resultando no fim, à perda das liberdades em casa.
Tendo em conta que aceitamos a ineficácia (os erros, o idealismo ingénuo, os actos a favor de grupos de interesse, a tendência a resolver as questões com maiores doses de intervencionismo) no domínio económico, não seria logo nas questões de guerra que poderíamos esperar uma "imaculada concepção" da actuação do Estado, seja este democrático ou não.
Tudo o que é dito sobre “unintended consequences” no domínio económico é ainda mais verdade quando o Estado pretende em escala desumana de milhões de pessoas, seja qual for a sua motivação (incluindo as melhores das intenções), implementar pela violência um qualquer programa de mudança para "melhor".
A história prova-nos isso, mas é preciso olhar para ela sem paixões ideológicas. A consequência dos princípios liberais é que tudo o que não resulta de actos individuais voluntários assentes no livre contrato e na propriedade privada pode ser considerado como “natural”, portanto, tudo o que obsta a este princípio poderá ser inevitável mas tenderá com toda a certeza a criar um desencadear de consequências difíceis ou impossíveis de prever e de dominar que só atrasarão uma mais rápida e serena caminhada civilizacional.
O mal das monarquias europeias foi crescerem para impérios que não souberam evitar a mais do que desnecessária Grande Guerra – todos combateram uma guerra a mais do que podiam. Esta acabou por destruir a velha civilização e deu lugar ao Estado Moderno, primeiro nas versões do fanatismo comunista e fascista, depois no racionalismo progressista das grandes democracias, esmagando o particularismo, localismo e dimensão limitada dos Estados na Europa no período do Liberalismo Clássico.
Pelo caminho, a grande nação americana que mais longe levou a quase ausência do Estado moderno, tal como hoje é concebido, foi precisamente nas diversas guerras em que se envolveu, que aos poucos, foi perdendo essa característica única. É isso que lamento, é isso que me leva a criticar a política externa intervencionista que despontou no carácter tradicionalmente neutral, consequência de todas as sociedades que desejem ter um verdadeiro governo limitado.
É uma entidade que colecta receitas sem contratos e impõe serviços sem contratos e tem o monopólio do uso da força e a capacidade de proclamar unilateralmente o que é legal ou não, num determinado espaço territorial.
Convenhamos que não é difícil chegar à conclusão de que se tem de existir deve ser limitado. Primeiro porque no Estado, seja qual for o seu regime, se reúne uma minoria de pessoas que com os recursos e vidas dos outros, tem a capacidade potencial de fazer "política" e onde se inclui a "política" da guerra.
A guerra é a ausência de lei, onde o monopolista e guardião dessa lei, dá licença para matar e o pratica em massa sem ser objecto do julgamento dentro da "rule of law".
A guerra, tal como o Estado, é inevitável e um mal necessário? Talvez o seja, mas tudo deve ser feito para que seja evitável, por isso temos os princípios da não ingerência em regimes, da legítima defesa, da contenção de conflitos locais pela neutralidade dos terceiros, etc.
Acima de tudo, cada Estado Nação, deve compreender a validade e mesmo a inevitabilidade de adoptar os princípios liberais, e sendo essa tarefa já bem difícil de se conseguir e manter internamente, tudo se perderá quando nos deixamos levar por um falso altruísmo colectivo (falso, porque nada no Estado é verdadeiramente voluntário) a favor de causas de terceiros, sempre complexas e que a história prova que conduzem a custos e consequências inesperadas, resultando no fim, à perda das liberdades em casa.
Tendo em conta que aceitamos a ineficácia (os erros, o idealismo ingénuo, os actos a favor de grupos de interesse, a tendência a resolver as questões com maiores doses de intervencionismo) no domínio económico, não seria logo nas questões de guerra que poderíamos esperar uma "imaculada concepção" da actuação do Estado, seja este democrático ou não.
Tudo o que é dito sobre “unintended consequences” no domínio económico é ainda mais verdade quando o Estado pretende em escala desumana de milhões de pessoas, seja qual for a sua motivação (incluindo as melhores das intenções), implementar pela violência um qualquer programa de mudança para "melhor".
A história prova-nos isso, mas é preciso olhar para ela sem paixões ideológicas. A consequência dos princípios liberais é que tudo o que não resulta de actos individuais voluntários assentes no livre contrato e na propriedade privada pode ser considerado como “natural”, portanto, tudo o que obsta a este princípio poderá ser inevitável mas tenderá com toda a certeza a criar um desencadear de consequências difíceis ou impossíveis de prever e de dominar que só atrasarão uma mais rápida e serena caminhada civilizacional.
O mal das monarquias europeias foi crescerem para impérios que não souberam evitar a mais do que desnecessária Grande Guerra – todos combateram uma guerra a mais do que podiam. Esta acabou por destruir a velha civilização e deu lugar ao Estado Moderno, primeiro nas versões do fanatismo comunista e fascista, depois no racionalismo progressista das grandes democracias, esmagando o particularismo, localismo e dimensão limitada dos Estados na Europa no período do Liberalismo Clássico.
Pelo caminho, a grande nação americana que mais longe levou a quase ausência do Estado moderno, tal como hoje é concebido, foi precisamente nas diversas guerras em que se envolveu, que aos poucos, foi perdendo essa característica única. É isso que lamento, é isso que me leva a criticar a política externa intervencionista que despontou no carácter tradicionalmente neutral, consequência de todas as sociedades que desejem ter um verdadeiro governo limitado.
Iraque e as Filipinas
George W. Bush tem estado péssimamente servido por quem escreve os seus discursos. Desta feita resolveram comparar a "libertação" do Iraque à "libertação" das Filipinas.
"Democracy always has skeptics. Some say the culture of the Middle East will not sustain the institutions of democracy. The same doubts were proven wrong nearly six decades ago, when the Republic of the Philippines became the first democracy in Asia."
Ora a história das Filipinas começou com a guerra contra a Coroa Espanhola pela "libertação" de Cuba (cujo motivo foi o incêndio do navio americano "Maine" no Porto de Cuba, hoje atribuído a um acidente) em 1898. Estando na altura os Espanhóis a combater os separatistas Filipinos, os americanos primeiro anexam as Filipinas e depois perdem vários anos e muitas mortes depois a combater os independentistas. A motivação:
"I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way … that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all and to educate the Filipinos and uplift them and civilize and Christianize them."
Sobre o assunto temos:
Na Slate: "From Baghdad to Manila, Another lousy analogy for the occupation of Iraq", By Fred Kaplan.
It is true, as Bush noted, that the Filipinos endured 300 years of Spanish rule and that they achieved independence in 1946. But Spain ended its rule in 1898.
What happened during the 48-year unmentioned interregnum? Nothing pleasant, if the point of the inquiry is to seek parallels with Iraq after Saddam.
The Spanish empire ceded the Philippines to U.S. control in 1898 after losing that "splendid little war" in the Caribbean. The American military then invaded the Philippines and took over the capital, Manila, in fairly short order.
Then, as now, the troubles began. Here's how Max Boot described the ensuing conflict in his book The Savage Wars of Peace: "[T]hough successive U.S. generals proclaimed victory at hand, American soldiers kept dying in ambushes, telegraph lines kept getting cut, and army convoys kept getting attacked."
Over the next three and a half years, until July 1902, when the Filipino guerrillas were finally subdued, the U.S. Army lost 4,234 soldiers. Another 2,818 were wounded. (By the Army's own estimate, 69,000 Filipino combatants were killed, along with nearly 200,000 civilians.)
The American war effort was marked by much burning, pillaging, and torturing, and the commanders finally achieved victory through a strategy of isolating the guerrillas. They did this by forcing the civilian population out of towns and into "protected zones"; able-bodied men found outside the zones without a pass were arrested or shot.
Even so, sporadic uprisings continued long after 1902. The American military occupation was forced to remain for 44 years. Surely Bush is not suggesting that victory in Iraq requires a similar strategy or timetable.
There is another unfortunate aspect to the Philippines parallel. Much of the resistance was led by "Moors"—i.e., Muslims. American politicians whipped up support for the war by painting it as a Christian crusade. President William McKinley's official proclamation ending the Spanish-American War of 1898 declared his goal in the Philippines as one of "benevolent assimilation." (The problem was that many Filipinos didn't want to be assimilated.) McKinley later told a group of Methodist missionaries how he formulated this goal:
I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way … that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all and to educate the Filipinos and uplift them and civilize and Christianize them.
Sen. Albert Beveridge reinforced the theme, saying:
God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration. … He has made us adepts in government that we may administer government among savages and senile people.
The notion spread through popular culture. Rudyard Kipling's famous poem "The White Man's Burden" was subtitled, "The United States and the Philippine Islands."
Shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks, Bush sent shudders through an otherwise still-sympathetic Europe by declaring a "crusade" against terrorism—invoking fears that the United States would pursue the coming campaign as a war of civilizations, Christian versus Muslim.
Now Bush is dancing around similar pitfalls by likening the occupation of Iraq to that of the Philippines, fanning the flames already sparking from the revelation that Gen. William Boykin commander of the units hunting down Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden—sees the war on terror and the war in Iraq explicitly as a titanic struggle between God and the Devil.
This is not to say that Bush agrees with Boykin or views the ongoing war in Iraq as a Christian burden.
But, as has been true for most of this war, his administration's words, declarations, and rationales have done more harm than good. At the very least, can't the White House hire a good historian?
"Democracy always has skeptics. Some say the culture of the Middle East will not sustain the institutions of democracy. The same doubts were proven wrong nearly six decades ago, when the Republic of the Philippines became the first democracy in Asia."
Ora a história das Filipinas começou com a guerra contra a Coroa Espanhola pela "libertação" de Cuba (cujo motivo foi o incêndio do navio americano "Maine" no Porto de Cuba, hoje atribuído a um acidente) em 1898. Estando na altura os Espanhóis a combater os separatistas Filipinos, os americanos primeiro anexam as Filipinas e depois perdem vários anos e muitas mortes depois a combater os independentistas. A motivação:
"I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way … that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all and to educate the Filipinos and uplift them and civilize and Christianize them."
Sobre o assunto temos:
Na Slate: "From Baghdad to Manila, Another lousy analogy for the occupation of Iraq", By Fred Kaplan.
It is true, as Bush noted, that the Filipinos endured 300 years of Spanish rule and that they achieved independence in 1946. But Spain ended its rule in 1898.
What happened during the 48-year unmentioned interregnum? Nothing pleasant, if the point of the inquiry is to seek parallels with Iraq after Saddam.
The Spanish empire ceded the Philippines to U.S. control in 1898 after losing that "splendid little war" in the Caribbean. The American military then invaded the Philippines and took over the capital, Manila, in fairly short order.
Then, as now, the troubles began. Here's how Max Boot described the ensuing conflict in his book The Savage Wars of Peace: "[T]hough successive U.S. generals proclaimed victory at hand, American soldiers kept dying in ambushes, telegraph lines kept getting cut, and army convoys kept getting attacked."
Over the next three and a half years, until July 1902, when the Filipino guerrillas were finally subdued, the U.S. Army lost 4,234 soldiers. Another 2,818 were wounded. (By the Army's own estimate, 69,000 Filipino combatants were killed, along with nearly 200,000 civilians.)
The American war effort was marked by much burning, pillaging, and torturing, and the commanders finally achieved victory through a strategy of isolating the guerrillas. They did this by forcing the civilian population out of towns and into "protected zones"; able-bodied men found outside the zones without a pass were arrested or shot.
Even so, sporadic uprisings continued long after 1902. The American military occupation was forced to remain for 44 years. Surely Bush is not suggesting that victory in Iraq requires a similar strategy or timetable.
There is another unfortunate aspect to the Philippines parallel. Much of the resistance was led by "Moors"—i.e., Muslims. American politicians whipped up support for the war by painting it as a Christian crusade. President William McKinley's official proclamation ending the Spanish-American War of 1898 declared his goal in the Philippines as one of "benevolent assimilation." (The problem was that many Filipinos didn't want to be assimilated.) McKinley later told a group of Methodist missionaries how he formulated this goal:
I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way … that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all and to educate the Filipinos and uplift them and civilize and Christianize them.
Sen. Albert Beveridge reinforced the theme, saying:
God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration. … He has made us adepts in government that we may administer government among savages and senile people.
The notion spread through popular culture. Rudyard Kipling's famous poem "The White Man's Burden" was subtitled, "The United States and the Philippine Islands."
Shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks, Bush sent shudders through an otherwise still-sympathetic Europe by declaring a "crusade" against terrorism—invoking fears that the United States would pursue the coming campaign as a war of civilizations, Christian versus Muslim.
Now Bush is dancing around similar pitfalls by likening the occupation of Iraq to that of the Philippines, fanning the flames already sparking from the revelation that Gen. William Boykin commander of the units hunting down Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden—sees the war on terror and the war in Iraq explicitly as a titanic struggle between God and the Devil.
This is not to say that Bush agrees with Boykin or views the ongoing war in Iraq as a Christian burden.
But, as has been true for most of this war, his administration's words, declarations, and rationales have done more harm than good. At the very least, can't the White House hire a good historian?
The Neo-Jacobins, Paul Craig Roberts
Dr. Paul Craig Roberts is John M. Olin Fellow at the Institute for Political Economy and Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of the Wall Street Journal and a former assistant secretary of the U.S. Treasury. He is the co-author of The Tyranny of Good Intentions.
"...Jacobins are seduced by power. The foundation of their abstract morality is their fantastic claim to a monopoly on virtue. Secure in their belief in their monopoly on virtue, Jacobins are prepared to use force to impose virtue on other societies and to reconstruct other societies in the Jacobin image.
Jacobin society is a centralized one that subordinates individuals and their liberties to abstract virtues. In short, it is an ideological society imbued with assurance of moral superiority that justifies its dominance over others, including its own citizens.
Virtue gives Jacobins a mandate to rule the world in order to improve it. Opposed to the American Republic that is based in traditional morality and limits on power, the Jacobin agenda is to remake America into an empire capable of imposing virtue on the world.
Jacobin morality is divorced from moral character, personal conduct, and treatment of others. Jacobin morality expresses itself in benevolent sentiments toward abstract entities. Human lives and cultural diversity mean nothing compared to “making the world safe for democracy” and “liberating women from the Muslim yoke.” Jacobin morality seeks to achieve a uniform unipolar world.
Possessed of an unrelenting will to power, the Jacobins in the Bush administration, together with their media allies, seized the opportunity afforded by September 11 to meld America’s nationalistic response to terrorism with the Jacobin ideological agenda. Once Americans associated invading foreign countries (Afghanistan) with the “war on terror,” Jacobins shifted the “terrorist threat” to Iraq. Now they are working to shift it to Syria, Iran, and Lebanon. Next will be Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
The Jacobin agenda requires large numbers of American troops and heavy taxation to support massive military budgets. It means the return of the draft.
It also explains why Jacobins are unconcerned with our own country’s porous borders while they seek to control Middle Eastern borders. The hordes of young Mexicans pouring into the US are a convenient source of cannon fodder, just as President Lincoln redirected the flow of Irish immigrants in his day into the Union Army.
Jacobins are dangerous because they lack historical understanding and rely on abstract righteousness to impose ideological unity. Their drive for like-mindedness implies coercion, the gulag and the Orwellian state. The Jacobin agenda means the end of Western civilization.
Professor Ryn shows that Jacobins are lost in abstractions and do not appreciate or understand Western civilization as a human achievement resulting from centuries of struggle to create moral character. Self-restraint, empathy, and mutual respect are necessary for pluralistic societies. However, such genuine virtues have no role in the uniform Jacobin state.
It is difficult to quibble when Professor Ryn writes that “monopolistic ideological universalism that scorns historically formed societies is a potential source of unending war and great disasters.”
...
Jacobins use their power and influence to suppress dissent. Jacobin ends justify Jacobin means. Thus, lies, deception, and manipulation cause Jacobins no shame.
As Professor Ryn observes, ambition unchecked by intellectual humility and moral self-control is the source of tyranny."
"...Jacobins are seduced by power. The foundation of their abstract morality is their fantastic claim to a monopoly on virtue. Secure in their belief in their monopoly on virtue, Jacobins are prepared to use force to impose virtue on other societies and to reconstruct other societies in the Jacobin image.
Jacobin society is a centralized one that subordinates individuals and their liberties to abstract virtues. In short, it is an ideological society imbued with assurance of moral superiority that justifies its dominance over others, including its own citizens.
Virtue gives Jacobins a mandate to rule the world in order to improve it. Opposed to the American Republic that is based in traditional morality and limits on power, the Jacobin agenda is to remake America into an empire capable of imposing virtue on the world.
Jacobin morality is divorced from moral character, personal conduct, and treatment of others. Jacobin morality expresses itself in benevolent sentiments toward abstract entities. Human lives and cultural diversity mean nothing compared to “making the world safe for democracy” and “liberating women from the Muslim yoke.” Jacobin morality seeks to achieve a uniform unipolar world.
Possessed of an unrelenting will to power, the Jacobins in the Bush administration, together with their media allies, seized the opportunity afforded by September 11 to meld America’s nationalistic response to terrorism with the Jacobin ideological agenda. Once Americans associated invading foreign countries (Afghanistan) with the “war on terror,” Jacobins shifted the “terrorist threat” to Iraq. Now they are working to shift it to Syria, Iran, and Lebanon. Next will be Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
The Jacobin agenda requires large numbers of American troops and heavy taxation to support massive military budgets. It means the return of the draft.
It also explains why Jacobins are unconcerned with our own country’s porous borders while they seek to control Middle Eastern borders. The hordes of young Mexicans pouring into the US are a convenient source of cannon fodder, just as President Lincoln redirected the flow of Irish immigrants in his day into the Union Army.
Jacobins are dangerous because they lack historical understanding and rely on abstract righteousness to impose ideological unity. Their drive for like-mindedness implies coercion, the gulag and the Orwellian state. The Jacobin agenda means the end of Western civilization.
Professor Ryn shows that Jacobins are lost in abstractions and do not appreciate or understand Western civilization as a human achievement resulting from centuries of struggle to create moral character. Self-restraint, empathy, and mutual respect are necessary for pluralistic societies. However, such genuine virtues have no role in the uniform Jacobin state.
It is difficult to quibble when Professor Ryn writes that “monopolistic ideological universalism that scorns historically formed societies is a potential source of unending war and great disasters.”
...
Jacobins use their power and influence to suppress dissent. Jacobin ends justify Jacobin means. Thus, lies, deception, and manipulation cause Jacobins no shame.
As Professor Ryn observes, ambition unchecked by intellectual humility and moral self-control is the source of tyranny."
Propriedade Intelectual
O interessante da discussão sobre a validade na propriedade intelectual é que vai directo à questão de porque somos liberais.
Cada um terá a sua resposta, a minha é porque acredito na propriedade privada como o único direito universal, a que todo o ser humano tem direito, e do qual emanam todos os outros, por exemplo, a liberdade de expressão (não temos o direito positivo a expressar-nos na propriedade dos outros, temos a liberdade inalienável de nos expressarmos na nossa propriedade ou estabelecer contratos voluntários para nos expressarmos na propriedade dos outros - jornais, fóruns, conferências, etc.).
Na propriedade intelectual, acontece algo engraçado. A esquerda e a direita social-democrata que põe em causa de todas as formas, do carácter absoluta do direito à propriedade privada - porque este deve submeter-se aos "interesses colectivos" (seja lá o que isso for), torna-se especialmente acérrima na defesa da propriedade intelectual.
Ora à propriedade intelectual falta-lhe algumas características da propriedade:
- não tem fronteira visível
- não é escassa (uma ideia após criada não se "gasta" pelo seu uso) nem pressupõe a exclusão (o seu uso por um não condiciona o uso por outro).
- pelo contrário, a propriedade intelectual para ser aplicada, necessita da existência de um Estado, que apenas pela força, pode tornar essa "ideia" escassa ao uso por terceiros (a sua escassez é assim artificial).
Ainda por cima, só com um Estado Mundial pode verdadeiramente existir, porque nada obriga ( a não ser a ameaça do uso da força pelo tal "proto-governo mundial") a que um Estado terceiro se disponha a aplicar leis sobre s propriedade intelectual. Na propriedade física, quando esta é violada, o seu dono tem provas reais e opõe-se à sua violação construindo cercas, protecções, cofres, etc. Na propriedade intelectual, um indivíduo sem o saber pode estar a violar a suposta propriedade intelectual de um desconhecido.
Ora, este conceito de que se pode cometer um crime (no sentido da violação da propriedade de alguém) sem o poder saber levanta em si muitas dúvidas, pelo menos no âmbito da filosofia direito natural.
Fica aqui um texto simples sobre o assunto de Roderick Long: "Thoughtcrime"
I’ve argued against intellectual property elsewhere. But here’s a short and sweet version of the argument:
Suppose I compose a poem and recite it to you. As a result, you learn the poem by heart. In effect, there is now a copy of the poem stored in your brain.
Who owns that copy?
The only answer must be: you do. You own yourself; you own your brain and the contents of your brain. If I owned the copy in your brain, then I would be a part owner of your brain, which would make you a partial slave – which is morally untenable.
Now in addition to owning your brain and the poem stored within, you also own, let’s suppose, a pen and some paper. You use your pen to transcribe onto the paper the poem that’s stored in your head. Now there are two copies of my poem in your possession: one in your brain and one on the paper. Who owns the second copy?
Once again, you do. You produced that second copy using nothing but factors that you owned: your paper, your pen, and your brain (with your neuron-encoded first copy of my poem). That second copy is yours – to keep, to burn, or to transfer.
Yes, to transfer. If you give or sell your copy to someone else, or if you use your copy to make a new copy to give or sell to someone else, or if you allow others to use your copy to make new copies, you are making a peaceful use of your own property. You are violating no rights.
“But,” I protest, “that’s my poem you’re selling!”
No, it isn’t. You’re not selling any concrete copies of the poem that are in my possession – I still own those and can control access to them as I please. Nor are you selling the abstract object of which all these copies are instances. You can’t sell an abstract object. Abstract objects can’t be transferred. They are not scarce resources; one person does not lose access to the abstract object just because someone else has gained access. All you’re selling is your copies of the poem. Which is your perfect right. They’re yours to do with as you please.
“But,” I protest once more, “I created that abstract object. That makes it my property!”
Well, what does it mean to own an abstract object? One thing it might mean is that I own all the instances of that abstract object. In which case I’m engaged in fraud if I claim to be selling copies of my work; if I still claim copyright in them, then I’m claiming to own the copies and so I’ve never really sold them.
But if owning an abstract object means owning all the instances, then it means my owning the copy of my poem in your brain. In that case, intellectual property is a form of slavery. If slavery is illegitimate, then so is intellectual property.
On the other hand, if owning an abstract object doesn’t mean owning its instances, then what does it mean? In selling your concrete copies of my poem, you don’t interfere in any way with my access to the abstract object. So what “ownership” of mine are you infringing?
Either intellectual property means slavery, or it means nothing at all.
Écrasez l’infâme.
September 15, 2003
Roderick T. Long is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Auburn University; President of the Molinari Institute; Editor of the Libertarian Nation Foundation newsletter Formulations; and an Adjunct Scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell in 1992. His last book was Reason and Value: Aristotle versus Rand; his next book will be Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action. He maintains a blog on his website, Praxeology.net.
Cada um terá a sua resposta, a minha é porque acredito na propriedade privada como o único direito universal, a que todo o ser humano tem direito, e do qual emanam todos os outros, por exemplo, a liberdade de expressão (não temos o direito positivo a expressar-nos na propriedade dos outros, temos a liberdade inalienável de nos expressarmos na nossa propriedade ou estabelecer contratos voluntários para nos expressarmos na propriedade dos outros - jornais, fóruns, conferências, etc.).
Na propriedade intelectual, acontece algo engraçado. A esquerda e a direita social-democrata que põe em causa de todas as formas, do carácter absoluta do direito à propriedade privada - porque este deve submeter-se aos "interesses colectivos" (seja lá o que isso for), torna-se especialmente acérrima na defesa da propriedade intelectual.
Ora à propriedade intelectual falta-lhe algumas características da propriedade:
- não tem fronteira visível
- não é escassa (uma ideia após criada não se "gasta" pelo seu uso) nem pressupõe a exclusão (o seu uso por um não condiciona o uso por outro).
- pelo contrário, a propriedade intelectual para ser aplicada, necessita da existência de um Estado, que apenas pela força, pode tornar essa "ideia" escassa ao uso por terceiros (a sua escassez é assim artificial).
Ainda por cima, só com um Estado Mundial pode verdadeiramente existir, porque nada obriga ( a não ser a ameaça do uso da força pelo tal "proto-governo mundial") a que um Estado terceiro se disponha a aplicar leis sobre s propriedade intelectual. Na propriedade física, quando esta é violada, o seu dono tem provas reais e opõe-se à sua violação construindo cercas, protecções, cofres, etc. Na propriedade intelectual, um indivíduo sem o saber pode estar a violar a suposta propriedade intelectual de um desconhecido.
Ora, este conceito de que se pode cometer um crime (no sentido da violação da propriedade de alguém) sem o poder saber levanta em si muitas dúvidas, pelo menos no âmbito da filosofia direito natural.
Fica aqui um texto simples sobre o assunto de Roderick Long: "Thoughtcrime"
I’ve argued against intellectual property elsewhere. But here’s a short and sweet version of the argument:
Suppose I compose a poem and recite it to you. As a result, you learn the poem by heart. In effect, there is now a copy of the poem stored in your brain.
Who owns that copy?
The only answer must be: you do. You own yourself; you own your brain and the contents of your brain. If I owned the copy in your brain, then I would be a part owner of your brain, which would make you a partial slave – which is morally untenable.
Now in addition to owning your brain and the poem stored within, you also own, let’s suppose, a pen and some paper. You use your pen to transcribe onto the paper the poem that’s stored in your head. Now there are two copies of my poem in your possession: one in your brain and one on the paper. Who owns the second copy?
Once again, you do. You produced that second copy using nothing but factors that you owned: your paper, your pen, and your brain (with your neuron-encoded first copy of my poem). That second copy is yours – to keep, to burn, or to transfer.
Yes, to transfer. If you give or sell your copy to someone else, or if you use your copy to make a new copy to give or sell to someone else, or if you allow others to use your copy to make new copies, you are making a peaceful use of your own property. You are violating no rights.
“But,” I protest, “that’s my poem you’re selling!”
No, it isn’t. You’re not selling any concrete copies of the poem that are in my possession – I still own those and can control access to them as I please. Nor are you selling the abstract object of which all these copies are instances. You can’t sell an abstract object. Abstract objects can’t be transferred. They are not scarce resources; one person does not lose access to the abstract object just because someone else has gained access. All you’re selling is your copies of the poem. Which is your perfect right. They’re yours to do with as you please.
“But,” I protest once more, “I created that abstract object. That makes it my property!”
Well, what does it mean to own an abstract object? One thing it might mean is that I own all the instances of that abstract object. In which case I’m engaged in fraud if I claim to be selling copies of my work; if I still claim copyright in them, then I’m claiming to own the copies and so I’ve never really sold them.
But if owning an abstract object means owning all the instances, then it means my owning the copy of my poem in your brain. In that case, intellectual property is a form of slavery. If slavery is illegitimate, then so is intellectual property.
On the other hand, if owning an abstract object doesn’t mean owning its instances, then what does it mean? In selling your concrete copies of my poem, you don’t interfere in any way with my access to the abstract object. So what “ownership” of mine are you infringing?
Either intellectual property means slavery, or it means nothing at all.
Écrasez l’infâme.
September 15, 2003
Roderick T. Long is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Auburn University; President of the Molinari Institute; Editor of the Libertarian Nation Foundation newsletter Formulations; and an Adjunct Scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell in 1992. His last book was Reason and Value: Aristotle versus Rand; his next book will be Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action. He maintains a blog on his website, Praxeology.net.
quarta-feira, 22 de outubro de 2003
Uma nota sobre eu e os NeoCons
Quem me conhece sabe que sendo um rothbardiano pelo anti-state conservatism, faço usualmente uma crítica sem tréguas ao Neo-Conservadorismo (erradamente conotada pela esquerda europeia como extrema-direita americana, na verdade resultaram de uma migração de intelectuais e políticos "Democratas", alguns com origem na extrema-esquerda, para a direita moderada americana).
Tenho de reconhecer contudo que de uma maneira ou outra, conseguiram trabalhar e produzir com qualidade de modo a influenciar a política americana.
O segredo do seu sucesso é, como em todas as ideias de sucesso, arranjar novas e maiores justificações para a existência do Estado e o seu crescimento, muitas delas de forma indirecta é certo, mas com os mesmos efeitos (exemplo: os cheques-educação, o warfare state, o internacionalismo, a "missão" de exportar valores universais, a "livre"-imigração, etc).
Como em todos os movimentos, o pensamento não é exactamente uniforme e a qualidade varia e certamente algumas das suas ideias têm valor e merecem ser discutidas num forum liberal.
Nota: eu é que ainda nas encontrei :) mas prometo continuar a tentar.
Tenho de reconhecer contudo que de uma maneira ou outra, conseguiram trabalhar e produzir com qualidade de modo a influenciar a política americana.
O segredo do seu sucesso é, como em todas as ideias de sucesso, arranjar novas e maiores justificações para a existência do Estado e o seu crescimento, muitas delas de forma indirecta é certo, mas com os mesmos efeitos (exemplo: os cheques-educação, o warfare state, o internacionalismo, a "missão" de exportar valores universais, a "livre"-imigração, etc).
Como em todos os movimentos, o pensamento não é exactamente uniforme e a qualidade varia e certamente algumas das suas ideias têm valor e merecem ser discutidas num forum liberal.
Nota: eu é que ainda nas encontrei :) mas prometo continuar a tentar.
Rich Lowry, Neocon
VIndo do blog.lewrockwell.com: "Stupid Neocon Quotes"
"Lots of sentiment for nuking Mecca. Moderates opt for something more along these lines: "Baghdad and Tehran would be the likeliest sites for a first strike. If we have clean enough bombs to assure a pinpoint damage area, Gaza City and Ramallah would also be on list. Damascus, Cairo, Algiers, Tripoli and Riyadh should be put on alert that any signs of support for the attacks in their cities will bring immediate annihilation."
"This is a tough one, and I don't know quite what to think. Mecca seems extreme, of course, but then again few people would die and it would send a signal. Religions have suffered such catastrophic setbacks before...And, as a general matter, the time for seriousness--including figuring out what we would do in retaliation, so maybe it can have some slight deterrent effect--is now rather than after thousands and thousands more American casualties."
Comentário: Tantas WMD perto das mãos de loucos...
"Lots of sentiment for nuking Mecca. Moderates opt for something more along these lines: "Baghdad and Tehran would be the likeliest sites for a first strike. If we have clean enough bombs to assure a pinpoint damage area, Gaza City and Ramallah would also be on list. Damascus, Cairo, Algiers, Tripoli and Riyadh should be put on alert that any signs of support for the attacks in their cities will bring immediate annihilation."
"This is a tough one, and I don't know quite what to think. Mecca seems extreme, of course, but then again few people would die and it would send a signal. Religions have suffered such catastrophic setbacks before...And, as a general matter, the time for seriousness--including figuring out what we would do in retaliation, so maybe it can have some slight deterrent effect--is now rather than after thousands and thousands more American casualties."
Comentário: Tantas WMD perto das mãos de loucos...
O Muro
Hoje, a ingerência de todos nos conflitos de todos tornou-se a regra universal.
E até os americanos que tradicionalmente gostam de lembrar a regra de boa educação mas também importante no contexto do princípio da liberdade e responsabilidade individual do "mind your own business", começam já a ser poucos.
O conflito entre Israel e palestinianos é em primeiro lugar um conflito territorial (muitos pretendem transformá-lo em conflito civilizacional, religiosos, entre o mundo democrático e o outro, bem e mal, etc., mas esses são os oportunistas do momento em ambos os lados) que só o tempo resolverá.
Mas esse tempo necessário será tanto maior quanto mais terceiros decidirem intervir com a boa intenção de o encurtar.
O Muro que Israel resolveu construir é uma decisão sua, um acto de defesa passivo, que poderá reduzir a violência produzida por ambos os lados. É imensamente mais eficaz que os constantes actos de mútua retaliação e no caso Israelita como ocupantes militares, produzindo imagens que a mim, pessoalmente, recordam (salvaguardando as devidas diferenças) os do infame Gueto de Varsóvia.
Também as restrições à cidadania israelita recentemente postas em prática, são as possíveis - Israel é um "Estado Judaico" - e até os seus habituais defensores parecem esquecer-se disso. A manutenção da homogeneidade cultural duma Nação é uma condição necessária à soberania dos povos - facto habitualmente esquecido pelos "global democrats" (estranhamente, muitos deles tomam a defesa de Israel como se israelitas tratassem, apesar de no cerne dos seus princípios estar a "livre imigração" e o "globalismo político" multi-étnico). E quanto mais adversa e difícil são as condições de defesa dessa soberania ainda mais é verdade essa proposição.
Nem os EUA, nem a EU, nem a ONU deviam meter-se no assunto.
E até os americanos que tradicionalmente gostam de lembrar a regra de boa educação mas também importante no contexto do princípio da liberdade e responsabilidade individual do "mind your own business", começam já a ser poucos.
O conflito entre Israel e palestinianos é em primeiro lugar um conflito territorial (muitos pretendem transformá-lo em conflito civilizacional, religiosos, entre o mundo democrático e o outro, bem e mal, etc., mas esses são os oportunistas do momento em ambos os lados) que só o tempo resolverá.
Mas esse tempo necessário será tanto maior quanto mais terceiros decidirem intervir com a boa intenção de o encurtar.
O Muro que Israel resolveu construir é uma decisão sua, um acto de defesa passivo, que poderá reduzir a violência produzida por ambos os lados. É imensamente mais eficaz que os constantes actos de mútua retaliação e no caso Israelita como ocupantes militares, produzindo imagens que a mim, pessoalmente, recordam (salvaguardando as devidas diferenças) os do infame Gueto de Varsóvia.
Também as restrições à cidadania israelita recentemente postas em prática, são as possíveis - Israel é um "Estado Judaico" - e até os seus habituais defensores parecem esquecer-se disso. A manutenção da homogeneidade cultural duma Nação é uma condição necessária à soberania dos povos - facto habitualmente esquecido pelos "global democrats" (estranhamente, muitos deles tomam a defesa de Israel como se israelitas tratassem, apesar de no cerne dos seus princípios estar a "livre imigração" e o "globalismo político" multi-étnico). E quanto mais adversa e difícil são as condições de defesa dessa soberania ainda mais é verdade essa proposição.
Nem os EUA, nem a EU, nem a ONU deviam meter-se no assunto.
Uma vez homem de partido...
O discurso de ontem do presidente da república deixou-me ainda mais preocupado do que já estava com o chamado "caso Casa Pia". O presidente estava visivelmente irritado com a revelação recente de novas partes das famosas escutas telefónicas feitas a dirigentes do PS (nas quais o seu nome aparecia) e sentiu-se obrigado a negar que nunca obstruiu a Justiça. Diz um ditado que quando a generosidade é muita o povo desconfia... Havia algum sentimento generalizado de que fosse necessário o presidente explicar-se? Não havia até algum consenso de que demasiada gente falava mais do que devia? Então, porque veio o presidente falar ao país sobre aquele assunto (basicamente passando um "raspanete" aos jornalistas, que supostamente nos impingem este caso, e à opinião pública, que se interessa morbidamente pelo mesmo caso)? Será que o presidente se irritou e não se conteve por ser referido nas conversas escutadas como alguém a quem os dirigentes do PS pensaram recorrer para travar a acusação de que um dos seus iria ser alvo? Mas, então, não deveria o presidente dar mostras de dignidade e recato e abster-se de se envolver (sobretudo com tanta rapidez) numa suspeição (de "favores políticos") que só envolvia e só poderia envolver até agora os dirigentes do PS? A propósito disto, vêm também as menções do presidente às violações do segredo de justiça, que rotulou de "criminosas" mas que ligou apenas aos jornalistas. O presidente "esqueceu-se", estranhamente, que as violações do segredo de justiça têm sido perpetradas também pelos advogados de defesa e pela direcção do PS (que é público que conhecia as intenções do ministério público contra Paulo Pedroso dois meses antes da prisão preventiva e propôs João Pedroso para o conselho superior de magistratura um mês antes da mesma prisão). Neste último caso, a violação do segredo de justiça parece-me bem mais grave, mas o presidente não se lhe referiu... O que concluo daqui é que dificilmente se pode eleger um homem de partido para a chefia do Estado e esperar que as solidariedades em que ele politicamente se fez desapareçam assim que entra no palácio de Belém; não é que a pessoa em causa não seja séria e até bem intencionada, é que a independência suprapartidária que nunca teve não lhe pode surgir do nada (é humano que assim seja, mesmo que só em discursos e sem actos condenáveis conhecidos ou não). Os liberais do século XIX, que em geral preferiram conservar a instituição dinástica na chefia do Estado, não andavam propriamente distraídos nem deixavam de imaginar os embaraços de um sistema como o actual...
A capacidade de autocrítica
As criticas a homens de Estado e aos Estados em si, mesmo que democráticos e mesmo em situações de guerra deve ser sempre feita. E se não forem os liberais a fazerem, vamos deixar a esquerda ou a extrema-direita e outros, usar as razões certas para prosseguirem oportunisticamente a sua "agenda"?
O que deve distinguir um liberal (no meu caso "libertarian")? a crença em que os princípios morais e éticos aplicados ao indivíduo são os mesmos que se aplicam aos Estados - por isso estes não podem violar o direito à "vida, liberdade e propriedade", seja porque razão for, muito menos por "razões de Estado" decididas por uma elite política.
Isto vem a propósito do conhecido massacre por bombardeamentos de áreas civis alemães no fim da WWII, que incluiu alemães em fuga do exército vermelho de Estaline.
Um dos grandes trunfos de Hitler foi ter tido na sua mão alguns argumentos certos quanto ao desenrolar e desfecho da Grande Guerra (essencialmente provocada pela Rússia e França e transformada numa guerra entre Impérios dos quais os vencedores distribuiriam as colónias dos vencidos entre si, provocando a derrocada das monarquias europeias e dando espaço ao crescimento do comunismo e fascismo), o que lhe permitiu reunir o apoio para prosseguir o seu fanatismo criminoso.
Essa deve ser a grande lição da História (e não o simplista argumento de Munique e Chamberlain, etc) nas relações entre Estados Nações, e não o acabar com o princípio da não ingerência em regimes, a intervenção militar sem legítima defesa, que diante dos nossos olhos, ameaça a prazo trazer o caos nas relações internacionais.
German historian provokes row over war photos
Luke Harding in Berlin
Tuesday October 21, 2003
The Guardian
A controversial German historian is at the centre of a row over his latest book which includes gruesome photos of German civilians killed by allied bombing during the second world war.
Jörg Friedrich defended the decision yesterday to publish the photographs showing the incinerated bodies of German women and children, most of them killed by British bombs. His book, Fire Sites, published at last week's Frankfurt Book Fair, argues that the RAF's relentless bombing campaign against German cities in the last months of the war served no military purpose. He claims that Winston Churchill's decision to bomb a shattered Germany between January and May 1945 was a war crime.
"The bombing left an entire generation traumatised. But it was never discussed," he told the Guardian.
Mr Friedrich, whose previous book Der Brand or The Fire prompted a storm of publicity and sold 186,000 copies, said that about 600,000 civilians died during the allied bombing of German cities, including 72,000 children. Some 45,000 people died on one night during the immense firestorms that engulfed Hamburg in July 1943. But the German victims were over shadowed by the far greater evil of the Holocaust.
Many Germans regarded the British destruction of their cities as retribution for Nazi crimes, Mr Friedrich said. "The second world war is traditionally portrayed as a struggle between good and evil. But it wasn't as simple as that," he said. The photos in Fire Sites are grim and reveal that many victims were asphyxiated in their cellars. In Dresden, SS workers from a nearby concentration camp were called in to dispose of heaps of bodies.
Policemen, architects and air protection officers took the photos. Most had lain in the archives of German towns for more than half a century, before Mr Friedrich found them. He said yesterday he had approached the National Archives in Kew, west London, for photos of British victims of German bombing but was told they could not be released. His book concedes that Germany started the air war in late 1940, when 14,000 British civilians died in German raids.
He acknowledged that he was a revisionist but said he was describing what happened. "During my public lectures Germans now in their 70s and 80s have stood up. They have described, with tears in their eyes, what happened to their families."
O que deve distinguir um liberal (no meu caso "libertarian")? a crença em que os princípios morais e éticos aplicados ao indivíduo são os mesmos que se aplicam aos Estados - por isso estes não podem violar o direito à "vida, liberdade e propriedade", seja porque razão for, muito menos por "razões de Estado" decididas por uma elite política.
Isto vem a propósito do conhecido massacre por bombardeamentos de áreas civis alemães no fim da WWII, que incluiu alemães em fuga do exército vermelho de Estaline.
Um dos grandes trunfos de Hitler foi ter tido na sua mão alguns argumentos certos quanto ao desenrolar e desfecho da Grande Guerra (essencialmente provocada pela Rússia e França e transformada numa guerra entre Impérios dos quais os vencedores distribuiriam as colónias dos vencidos entre si, provocando a derrocada das monarquias europeias e dando espaço ao crescimento do comunismo e fascismo), o que lhe permitiu reunir o apoio para prosseguir o seu fanatismo criminoso.
Essa deve ser a grande lição da História (e não o simplista argumento de Munique e Chamberlain, etc) nas relações entre Estados Nações, e não o acabar com o princípio da não ingerência em regimes, a intervenção militar sem legítima defesa, que diante dos nossos olhos, ameaça a prazo trazer o caos nas relações internacionais.
German historian provokes row over war photos
Luke Harding in Berlin
Tuesday October 21, 2003
The Guardian
A controversial German historian is at the centre of a row over his latest book which includes gruesome photos of German civilians killed by allied bombing during the second world war.
Jörg Friedrich defended the decision yesterday to publish the photographs showing the incinerated bodies of German women and children, most of them killed by British bombs. His book, Fire Sites, published at last week's Frankfurt Book Fair, argues that the RAF's relentless bombing campaign against German cities in the last months of the war served no military purpose. He claims that Winston Churchill's decision to bomb a shattered Germany between January and May 1945 was a war crime.
"The bombing left an entire generation traumatised. But it was never discussed," he told the Guardian.
Mr Friedrich, whose previous book Der Brand or The Fire prompted a storm of publicity and sold 186,000 copies, said that about 600,000 civilians died during the allied bombing of German cities, including 72,000 children. Some 45,000 people died on one night during the immense firestorms that engulfed Hamburg in July 1943. But the German victims were over shadowed by the far greater evil of the Holocaust.
Many Germans regarded the British destruction of their cities as retribution for Nazi crimes, Mr Friedrich said. "The second world war is traditionally portrayed as a struggle between good and evil. But it wasn't as simple as that," he said. The photos in Fire Sites are grim and reveal that many victims were asphyxiated in their cellars. In Dresden, SS workers from a nearby concentration camp were called in to dispose of heaps of bodies.
Policemen, architects and air protection officers took the photos. Most had lain in the archives of German towns for more than half a century, before Mr Friedrich found them. He said yesterday he had approached the National Archives in Kew, west London, for photos of British victims of German bombing but was told they could not be released. His book concedes that Germany started the air war in late 1940, when 14,000 British civilians died in German raids.
He acknowledged that he was a revisionist but said he was describing what happened. "During my public lectures Germans now in their 70s and 80s have stood up. They have described, with tears in their eyes, what happened to their families."
terça-feira, 21 de outubro de 2003
Robert E. Lee
Na altura em que se discute o tratado Constitucional Europeu, continuarei com a minha série de posts sobre a Guerra entre Estados Americana, que se deu apenas umas décadas depois da Constituição Americana (baseada numa União "voluntária")...depois foi o que se viu.
Sobre de quem Churchill disse: "one of the noblest Americans who ever lived", e que nascido na Virgínia chefiou as tropas da Confederação.
"Robert E. Lee’s father was a Revolutionary War hero, a three-time governor of Virginia and a congressman in the U.S. House of Representatives. Two members of the Lee family risked their lives by signing the Declaration of Independence. Lee married Mary Custis, great-granddaughter of George Washington and she inherited Arlington House, Washington’s antebellum estate in Virginia that eventually became home to Lee, Mary, and their seven children, before being confiscated by Lincoln. He turned it into a Union cemetary with an eye to making a return to its owners impossible.
After graduating from West Point, Lee became a member of the U.S. Army and began a long and remarkable military career. He distinguished himself in the Mexican War earning three honorary field promotions. His accomplishments were many including Assistant to the Chief of the Engineer Corps and Superintendent of West Point. In later years he was appointed president of a college in Lexington, Virginia that was later renamed Washington and Lee University in honor of his outstanding years of service.
Interestingly, when the Civil War started, Robert E. Lee was offered the command of the Union forces, but after his home state, Virginia, seceded, he resigned from the U.S. Army and joined with the Confederates. Many people wonder why Lee would turn down the command of the Union forces and support the Confederacy. But loyalty was one of Lee’s bedrock traits and he couldn’t wage war against Virginia and the South. Also, recent historians are presenting a more balanced view of the long festering and complex events leading to the Civil War. (An example being inequitable tariffs – the South paid 87% of the nation’s total tariffs in 1860 alone.) The new research contained in these books puts a new light on Lee’s decision to fight for the South.
I suspect that another reason Lee decided to support the South was President Lincoln’s refusal to meet with Southern representatives to try to reach a compromise to avoid war. Although members of Lincoln’s own cabinet as well as newspapers in America and Europe encouraged the President to attempt a negotiated settlement, he remained adamant. Lincoln rejected all requests for discussions that might have led to a peaceful resolution."
Sobre de quem Churchill disse: "one of the noblest Americans who ever lived", e que nascido na Virgínia chefiou as tropas da Confederação.
"Robert E. Lee’s father was a Revolutionary War hero, a three-time governor of Virginia and a congressman in the U.S. House of Representatives. Two members of the Lee family risked their lives by signing the Declaration of Independence. Lee married Mary Custis, great-granddaughter of George Washington and she inherited Arlington House, Washington’s antebellum estate in Virginia that eventually became home to Lee, Mary, and their seven children, before being confiscated by Lincoln. He turned it into a Union cemetary with an eye to making a return to its owners impossible.
After graduating from West Point, Lee became a member of the U.S. Army and began a long and remarkable military career. He distinguished himself in the Mexican War earning three honorary field promotions. His accomplishments were many including Assistant to the Chief of the Engineer Corps and Superintendent of West Point. In later years he was appointed president of a college in Lexington, Virginia that was later renamed Washington and Lee University in honor of his outstanding years of service.
Interestingly, when the Civil War started, Robert E. Lee was offered the command of the Union forces, but after his home state, Virginia, seceded, he resigned from the U.S. Army and joined with the Confederates. Many people wonder why Lee would turn down the command of the Union forces and support the Confederacy. But loyalty was one of Lee’s bedrock traits and he couldn’t wage war against Virginia and the South. Also, recent historians are presenting a more balanced view of the long festering and complex events leading to the Civil War. (An example being inequitable tariffs – the South paid 87% of the nation’s total tariffs in 1860 alone.) The new research contained in these books puts a new light on Lee’s decision to fight for the South.
I suspect that another reason Lee decided to support the South was President Lincoln’s refusal to meet with Southern representatives to try to reach a compromise to avoid war. Although members of Lincoln’s own cabinet as well as newspapers in America and Europe encouraged the President to attempt a negotiated settlement, he remained adamant. Lincoln rejected all requests for discussions that might have led to a peaceful resolution."
História recente do Irão
Nota: Se acharem estranha a animosidade do Irão contra os US, digam lá donde vem essa estranheza. Ainda assim, os sinais de abertura gradual no Irão já se faziam sentir antes da inútil operação no Iraque, existindo muitos sinais de que também poderá ser completamente inútil e até contraproducente a ingerência externa no regime do Irão para uma mudança forçada e apressada, que a acontecer apenas complicará uma possível futura transição interna pacífica (tal como no Iraque).
As desgraças que o mundo sofre na mão de burocratas e idealistas intervencionistas com boas intenções...
"Fewer people in the U.S. than in the Middle East are aware that the CIA, in a 1953 mission, code-named Operation Ajax, overthrew the first democratically elected leader of Iran. ("Iran coup mastermind Kermit Roosevelt dies," Honolulu Advertiser, 6/11/00, see also, Solberg, Carl, Oil Power, pp. 196-7)
In 1953, the elected, very popular, Md. Mossadegh had asked the British government's oil concessionaires for a 50/50 split of revenues, a split that American oil companies had already granted in Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. When the British government refused this split in revenues, Mossadegh did to Iranian oil what the British government had long before done to British oil: he nationalized it. In response, and worrying that Mossadegh would cozy up to the Soviets, western intelligence agencies engineered his overthrow and replaced Mossadegh with Shah Reza Pahlavi.
Iran's oil revenues were then evenly split between U.S. and British oil companies. Nice for US oil companies. Shah Pahlavi maintained his dictatorial rule for the next 25 years through the support of the CIA, which trained his own secret police, the SAVAK.
Throughout this time the CIA was well aware that the SAVAK was responsible for torturing and killing Iranian political dissidents, perhaps as many as 10,000. Not nice for US/Iran relations nor for the popularity of the Shah. And not nice for the dead.
...
After 25 years of US supported dictatorial rule, Shah Pahlavi was finally overthrown by a fundamentalist revolution in 1979. Understandably, suspicion and hostilities were then very great between the governments of the U.S. and Iran.
Soon thereafter, the U.S. government commenced its support of Saddam Hussein in his 8-year long Iraqi invasion of Iran that left a million people dead. The US usually condemns such invasions, but not this one.
On the contrary, the U.S. supplied at least a billion dollars of military support to Saddam Hussein, perhaps much more. This was supplemented by more than $20 billion of support from the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, rulers who also feared similar fundamentalist uprisings against their own despotic regimes.
All the while, Saddam Hussein's murderous tactics were known and excused. The Iranians tried to block the oil trafficking that was financing Saddam's war machine, poison gases and all.
The US sent a Naval fleet to guarantee "freedom of the seas," a policy that even resulted in an airborne Iraqi attack that killed 37 American sailors on the USS Stark. But the killing of American sailors was excused because, at that time, Saddam was the ally of US politicians and their desire to crush Iran. (Now American sailors are being sent to risk their lives to enforce a blockade against Iraq, the opposite cause for which the 37 American sailors died in the 1980's.)
Oh, yes, it was also then that the US was supplying the Iranians during the Iran-Contra affair. Together, the 5 permanent members of the Security Council of the UN supplied 95% of the weapons used in the region. The US even supplied Saddam Hussein with anthrax from public health facilities in the US and had the US taxpayer pay for it all with EX/IM loan guarantees. Nice for the weapons lobby.
Saddam Hussein was "America's ally," like Noriega, Mobutu, Suharto, Papa Doc, Samosa, Pinochet, Marcos, and others before.
I don't think that George Washington would have approved of any of these alliances. "
For a look at my philosophy of liberty, please see my book web site: http://jonathangullible.com/
As desgraças que o mundo sofre na mão de burocratas e idealistas intervencionistas com boas intenções...
"Fewer people in the U.S. than in the Middle East are aware that the CIA, in a 1953 mission, code-named Operation Ajax, overthrew the first democratically elected leader of Iran. ("Iran coup mastermind Kermit Roosevelt dies," Honolulu Advertiser, 6/11/00, see also, Solberg, Carl, Oil Power, pp. 196-7)
In 1953, the elected, very popular, Md. Mossadegh had asked the British government's oil concessionaires for a 50/50 split of revenues, a split that American oil companies had already granted in Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. When the British government refused this split in revenues, Mossadegh did to Iranian oil what the British government had long before done to British oil: he nationalized it. In response, and worrying that Mossadegh would cozy up to the Soviets, western intelligence agencies engineered his overthrow and replaced Mossadegh with Shah Reza Pahlavi.
Iran's oil revenues were then evenly split between U.S. and British oil companies. Nice for US oil companies. Shah Pahlavi maintained his dictatorial rule for the next 25 years through the support of the CIA, which trained his own secret police, the SAVAK.
Throughout this time the CIA was well aware that the SAVAK was responsible for torturing and killing Iranian political dissidents, perhaps as many as 10,000. Not nice for US/Iran relations nor for the popularity of the Shah. And not nice for the dead.
...
After 25 years of US supported dictatorial rule, Shah Pahlavi was finally overthrown by a fundamentalist revolution in 1979. Understandably, suspicion and hostilities were then very great between the governments of the U.S. and Iran.
Soon thereafter, the U.S. government commenced its support of Saddam Hussein in his 8-year long Iraqi invasion of Iran that left a million people dead. The US usually condemns such invasions, but not this one.
On the contrary, the U.S. supplied at least a billion dollars of military support to Saddam Hussein, perhaps much more. This was supplemented by more than $20 billion of support from the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, rulers who also feared similar fundamentalist uprisings against their own despotic regimes.
All the while, Saddam Hussein's murderous tactics were known and excused. The Iranians tried to block the oil trafficking that was financing Saddam's war machine, poison gases and all.
The US sent a Naval fleet to guarantee "freedom of the seas," a policy that even resulted in an airborne Iraqi attack that killed 37 American sailors on the USS Stark. But the killing of American sailors was excused because, at that time, Saddam was the ally of US politicians and their desire to crush Iran. (Now American sailors are being sent to risk their lives to enforce a blockade against Iraq, the opposite cause for which the 37 American sailors died in the 1980's.)
Oh, yes, it was also then that the US was supplying the Iranians during the Iran-Contra affair. Together, the 5 permanent members of the Security Council of the UN supplied 95% of the weapons used in the region. The US even supplied Saddam Hussein with anthrax from public health facilities in the US and had the US taxpayer pay for it all with EX/IM loan guarantees. Nice for the weapons lobby.
Saddam Hussein was "America's ally," like Noriega, Mobutu, Suharto, Papa Doc, Samosa, Pinochet, Marcos, and others before.
I don't think that George Washington would have approved of any of these alliances. "
For a look at my philosophy of liberty, please see my book web site: http://jonathangullible.com/
No Cato Institute sobre "Mystery of the Vanishing Weapons"
O Cato Institute, cujo baptismo se deve a um dos fundadores Murray N. Rothbard (ver a origem no nome em "Cato's Letters on Liberty and Property") e tem como lema:
"Individual Liberty, Limited Government, Free Markets and Peace" publica um artigo de Alan Reynolds, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a nationally syndicated columnist.
"The Iraq Survey Group, a team of 1,200 inspectors headed by David Kay, found none of the chemical or biological weapons that had been specifically named by top U.S. officials before the war, nor any of the equally specific equipment, such as mobile labs and unmanned aircraft. What they did find was a single vial of decade-old botulinum in some scientist's fridge, plans to build missiles that could exceed the allowed range and some research programs that were undisclosed in violation of the U.N. deal.
What they did not find was any sign of the biological, chemical or nuclear "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD) that U.S. and British governments claimed Iraq possessed in hugely lethal quantities. The group is confident "Iraq did not have a large, ongoing centrally controlled CW (chemical weapons) program after 1991." There is even less evidence of nukes and no evidence of biological agents, unless you count that one little vial.
The stark contrast between what was said about WMD before the war and what has since been found certainly appears to be a massive failure of intelligence, despite what CIA Director George Tenet says.
(...)
The president has clearly been badly served. At some point those who produced the shoddy intelligence about Iraqi WMD, and those who most grossly exaggerated its significance, are going to have to be held accountable. That means doing the honorable thing through a few graceful apologies and timely resignations."
"Individual Liberty, Limited Government, Free Markets and Peace" publica um artigo de Alan Reynolds, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a nationally syndicated columnist.
"The Iraq Survey Group, a team of 1,200 inspectors headed by David Kay, found none of the chemical or biological weapons that had been specifically named by top U.S. officials before the war, nor any of the equally specific equipment, such as mobile labs and unmanned aircraft. What they did find was a single vial of decade-old botulinum in some scientist's fridge, plans to build missiles that could exceed the allowed range and some research programs that were undisclosed in violation of the U.N. deal.
What they did not find was any sign of the biological, chemical or nuclear "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD) that U.S. and British governments claimed Iraq possessed in hugely lethal quantities. The group is confident "Iraq did not have a large, ongoing centrally controlled CW (chemical weapons) program after 1991." There is even less evidence of nukes and no evidence of biological agents, unless you count that one little vial.
The stark contrast between what was said about WMD before the war and what has since been found certainly appears to be a massive failure of intelligence, despite what CIA Director George Tenet says.
(...)
The president has clearly been badly served. At some point those who produced the shoddy intelligence about Iraqi WMD, and those who most grossly exaggerated its significance, are going to have to be held accountable. That means doing the honorable thing through a few graceful apologies and timely resignations."
JCE e Richard Perle e Michael 'Creative Destruction' Ledeen
No Expresso, JCE reporta o discurso calmo e sereno dos NeoCons Perle e Ledeen, como que a sugerir duas personagens próximas do conservadorismo Burkeano britanico. Vamos então ler uma passagem de Ledeen:
“[W]e are an awesome revolutionary force. Creative destruction is our middle name. We tear down the old order every day, in business and science, literature, art and cinema, politics and the law. Our present enemies hate this whirlwind of energy and creativity, which menaces their traditions and shames them for their inability to keep pace. Seeing America undo old conventions, they fear us, for they do not wish to be undone. They cannot feel secure so long as we are there, for our very existence – not our policies – threatens their legitimacy. They must attack us in order to survive, just as we must destroy them to advance our historic mission.” -- Michael Ledeen, WSJ, 11/14/01
Quem tiver um pingo de bom senso, reconhece nestas palavras o tipo de turculência revolucionária Jacobino e que faz juz às origens trotskistas dos NeoCons, para quem o mundo tem de corresponder à sua visão racionalista, se necessário (para não dizer preferencialmente) com o recurso à violência e uso da defesa nacional, como Napoleão, para a imposição de uma nova Ordem mais iluminada.
Como conservadores, os NeoCons (pelo menos a partir destas palavras) são uma fraude e quem quiser associar a sua forma de pensar a modos Burkeanos está a cometer um fraude intelectual grave.
Mas a verdade é que o respeito pela ordem natural das coisas e a mudanças graduais impulsionadas por dentro, pela necessidade e não pelas ideias, respeito pelas tradições e costumes, a cultura e história de outras Nações - capacidade que fez o Império Britanico - baseado na expansão do comércio e não de uma Nova Ordem Mundial, comum nos conservadores (e liberais) está a morrer.
Pegando numa posta anterior: Agatha Christie - radical conservative thinker":
"...She offers an eternal England, a natural order that will always act spontaneously against evil to restore its own rural sense of calm...Her work conforms to Burkean conservatism in every respect: justice rarely comes from the state. Rather, it arises from within civil society.
The novels are shot through with a Burkean fear of enlightenment rationalism...Christie’s greatest anxiety, she once explained, was of "idealists who want to make us happy by force.".
Any rational attempt to supersede the ‘natural’ order is terrifying for her.
...In ‘They Came to Baghdad’, a rational plan for a New World Order is revealed to be a veil for absolutist fascism.
Her protagonists stand, novel after novel, against those who seek to disrupt the natural order and interpret the world with a misleading ‘rationalism’.
The Burkean conservatism that Christie loved is now officially dead. "
Como já diziam outros: "Old England is dying".
“[W]e are an awesome revolutionary force. Creative destruction is our middle name. We tear down the old order every day, in business and science, literature, art and cinema, politics and the law. Our present enemies hate this whirlwind of energy and creativity, which menaces their traditions and shames them for their inability to keep pace. Seeing America undo old conventions, they fear us, for they do not wish to be undone. They cannot feel secure so long as we are there, for our very existence – not our policies – threatens their legitimacy. They must attack us in order to survive, just as we must destroy them to advance our historic mission.” -- Michael Ledeen, WSJ, 11/14/01
Quem tiver um pingo de bom senso, reconhece nestas palavras o tipo de turculência revolucionária Jacobino e que faz juz às origens trotskistas dos NeoCons, para quem o mundo tem de corresponder à sua visão racionalista, se necessário (para não dizer preferencialmente) com o recurso à violência e uso da defesa nacional, como Napoleão, para a imposição de uma nova Ordem mais iluminada.
Como conservadores, os NeoCons (pelo menos a partir destas palavras) são uma fraude e quem quiser associar a sua forma de pensar a modos Burkeanos está a cometer um fraude intelectual grave.
Mas a verdade é que o respeito pela ordem natural das coisas e a mudanças graduais impulsionadas por dentro, pela necessidade e não pelas ideias, respeito pelas tradições e costumes, a cultura e história de outras Nações - capacidade que fez o Império Britanico - baseado na expansão do comércio e não de uma Nova Ordem Mundial, comum nos conservadores (e liberais) está a morrer.
Pegando numa posta anterior: Agatha Christie - radical conservative thinker":
"...She offers an eternal England, a natural order that will always act spontaneously against evil to restore its own rural sense of calm...Her work conforms to Burkean conservatism in every respect: justice rarely comes from the state. Rather, it arises from within civil society.
The novels are shot through with a Burkean fear of enlightenment rationalism...Christie’s greatest anxiety, she once explained, was of "idealists who want to make us happy by force.".
Any rational attempt to supersede the ‘natural’ order is terrifying for her.
...In ‘They Came to Baghdad’, a rational plan for a New World Order is revealed to be a veil for absolutist fascism.
Her protagonists stand, novel after novel, against those who seek to disrupt the natural order and interpret the world with a misleading ‘rationalism’.
The Burkean conservatism that Christie loved is now officially dead. "
Como já diziam outros: "Old England is dying".
sexta-feira, 17 de outubro de 2003
"Looking Back at Reagan"
Nota: Não me podia identificar mais com Joseph Sobran, sobre Reagan, principalmente quando diz: "We’ll never feel that way about another politician. Maybe you can be pardoned for getting carried away like that once in your life, but in any case it can’t happen twice. If you’re really wise, it won’t even happen to you once."
Texto:
Reading Ronald Reagan’s newly published letters reminds me how much I’ve always liked him, even after I stopped admiring him as a president. He was always a modest, decent, good-humored man, with more common sense and a keener sense of proportion than most politicians. And he loved a good laugh.
....The superlatives his adulators heap on him seem as wide of the mark as the exaggerations of his detractors: he was really quite an ordinary man, and he never pretended to be anything else. He should never have had all that power, but who should? At least it should be in the hands of a man who didn’t take himself too seriously and wouldn’t abuse it as grossly as most.
...
By the time he ran for president in 1980 I had high hopes for him. I thought he would lead a repeal of all of liberalism’s gains since the New Deal. I didn’t stop to reflect that I was thinking like a liberal myself — hoping for a president who would be a messianic leader, a charismatic one-man show.
Well, there have been worse political messiahs. Whatever else he did, Reagan never lost his modest charm. I heard him speak at a few conservative gatherings, and he never failed to bring down the house with a great joke.
I was bound to be disappointed by his compromises. In time I was so disillusioned with him that I actually made a joke at his expense: “Let someone else be Reagan.” But that wasn’t until his second term.
Many principled conservatives saw through Reagan long before I did — if I ever did. He had a way of convincing sentimentalists like me that he shared our passions, despite any appearances to the contrary. I was a sucker for him, and maybe I still am. I think I know better now, but I’m not entirely sure.
Strange, the way some men can make you want to believe in them. Whatever that quality is, Reagan had it. At one time, about half my friends were Reagan speechwriters, and every one of them worshipped him. They’re still writing loving books about him.
That was my generation. We’ll never feel that way about another politician. Maybe you can be pardoned for getting carried away like that once in your life, but in any case it can’t happen twice.
If you’re really wise, it won’t even happen to you once. The U.S. Constitution defines the president’s duties very narrowly, and they don’t include running the economy, bombing villages, or even telling great jokes.
Reagan wasn’t a great president. “Great” presidents, as usually conceived, are unconstitutional. I like to think Reagan understood this. At least I’m pretty sure he was the last president who even glanced at the Constitution once in a while.
Texto:
Reading Ronald Reagan’s newly published letters reminds me how much I’ve always liked him, even after I stopped admiring him as a president. He was always a modest, decent, good-humored man, with more common sense and a keener sense of proportion than most politicians. And he loved a good laugh.
....The superlatives his adulators heap on him seem as wide of the mark as the exaggerations of his detractors: he was really quite an ordinary man, and he never pretended to be anything else. He should never have had all that power, but who should? At least it should be in the hands of a man who didn’t take himself too seriously and wouldn’t abuse it as grossly as most.
...
By the time he ran for president in 1980 I had high hopes for him. I thought he would lead a repeal of all of liberalism’s gains since the New Deal. I didn’t stop to reflect that I was thinking like a liberal myself — hoping for a president who would be a messianic leader, a charismatic one-man show.
Well, there have been worse political messiahs. Whatever else he did, Reagan never lost his modest charm. I heard him speak at a few conservative gatherings, and he never failed to bring down the house with a great joke.
I was bound to be disappointed by his compromises. In time I was so disillusioned with him that I actually made a joke at his expense: “Let someone else be Reagan.” But that wasn’t until his second term.
Many principled conservatives saw through Reagan long before I did — if I ever did. He had a way of convincing sentimentalists like me that he shared our passions, despite any appearances to the contrary. I was a sucker for him, and maybe I still am. I think I know better now, but I’m not entirely sure.
Strange, the way some men can make you want to believe in them. Whatever that quality is, Reagan had it. At one time, about half my friends were Reagan speechwriters, and every one of them worshipped him. They’re still writing loving books about him.
That was my generation. We’ll never feel that way about another politician. Maybe you can be pardoned for getting carried away like that once in your life, but in any case it can’t happen twice.
If you’re really wise, it won’t even happen to you once. The U.S. Constitution defines the president’s duties very narrowly, and they don’t include running the economy, bombing villages, or even telling great jokes.
Reagan wasn’t a great president. “Great” presidents, as usually conceived, are unconstitutional. I like to think Reagan understood this. At least I’m pretty sure he was the last president who even glanced at the Constitution once in a while.
Syria Sanctions Will Cut Trade and Peace, Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX)
Ron Paul is a Republican Congressman from Texas. He was the 1988 Libertarian Party candidate for President.
(...)
What troubles me greatly about this bill is that although the named, admittedly bad, terrorist organizations do not target the United States at present, we are basically declaring our intention to pick a fight with them. We are declaring that we will take pre-emptive actions against organizations that apparently have no quarrel with us.
(...)
Does anyone here care to guess how much assistance Syria will be providing us once this bill is passed? Can we afford to turn our back on Syria's assistance, even if it is not as complete as it could be?
That is the problem with this approach. Imposing sanctions and cutting off relations with a country is ineffective and counterproductive. It is only one-half step short of war and very often leads to war.
In a disturbing bit of déjà vu, the bill makes references to “Syria's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)” and threatens to “impede” Syrian weapons ambitions. This was the justification for our intervention in Iraq, yet after more than a thousand inspectors have spent months and some 300 million dollars none have been found. Will this bill's unproven claims that Syria has WMD be later used to demand military action against that country?
Mr. Chairman: history is replete with examples of the futility of sanctions and embargoes and travel bans. More than 40 years of embargo against Cuba have not produced the desired change there. Sadly, embargoes and sanctions most often hurt those least responsible. A trade embargo against Syria will hurt American businesses and will cost American jobs. It will make life more difficult for the average Syrian – with whom we have no quarrel. Making life painful for the population is not the best way to win over hearts and minds. I strongly urge my colleagues to reject this counterproductive bill.
E para animar:
WASHINGTON (AP) -- Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are defending a new deputy undersecretary of defense "who has reportedly cast the war on terror" in religious terms.
Appearing in dress uniform before a religious group in Oregon in June, Boykin said Islamic extremists hate the United States "because we're a Christian nation, because our foundation and our roots are Judeo-Christians. ... And the enemy is a guy named Satan."
(...)
What troubles me greatly about this bill is that although the named, admittedly bad, terrorist organizations do not target the United States at present, we are basically declaring our intention to pick a fight with them. We are declaring that we will take pre-emptive actions against organizations that apparently have no quarrel with us.
(...)
Does anyone here care to guess how much assistance Syria will be providing us once this bill is passed? Can we afford to turn our back on Syria's assistance, even if it is not as complete as it could be?
That is the problem with this approach. Imposing sanctions and cutting off relations with a country is ineffective and counterproductive. It is only one-half step short of war and very often leads to war.
In a disturbing bit of déjà vu, the bill makes references to “Syria's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)” and threatens to “impede” Syrian weapons ambitions. This was the justification for our intervention in Iraq, yet after more than a thousand inspectors have spent months and some 300 million dollars none have been found. Will this bill's unproven claims that Syria has WMD be later used to demand military action against that country?
Mr. Chairman: history is replete with examples of the futility of sanctions and embargoes and travel bans. More than 40 years of embargo against Cuba have not produced the desired change there. Sadly, embargoes and sanctions most often hurt those least responsible. A trade embargo against Syria will hurt American businesses and will cost American jobs. It will make life more difficult for the average Syrian – with whom we have no quarrel. Making life painful for the population is not the best way to win over hearts and minds. I strongly urge my colleagues to reject this counterproductive bill.
E para animar:
WASHINGTON (AP) -- Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are defending a new deputy undersecretary of defense "who has reportedly cast the war on terror" in religious terms.
Appearing in dress uniform before a religious group in Oregon in June, Boykin said Islamic extremists hate the United States "because we're a Christian nation, because our foundation and our roots are Judeo-Christians. ... And the enemy is a guy named Satan."
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