Hayek was indeed always, from his student years on, interested in psychology. He wrote an interesting book on it (Sensory Order). This may explain his special emphasis on knowledge and his relative neglect of property. For instance, Hayek wrote a famous article on the "Use of Knowledge in Society." Mises never would have written an article with that title. His title would have been the "Use of Property in Society."
In the famous socialist-calculation debate, Hayek often conveyed the impression that socialism's central problem was the 'impossibility' of centralizing in a single mind (the central planner's) all of the knowledge that existed dispersed in the heads of a multitude of separate individuals. What I pointed out instead, in agreement with Mises, is that socialism's central problem is that of centralizing (concentrating) a multitude of physically dispersed and individually owned properties into the property of one single agency (of the socialist state).
It is this concentration of all property in one hand that makes economic calculation impossible. Because where there is only one owner of all capital goods, there is no buying and selling of such goods; hence, no capital goods prices exist and monetary calculation is impossible.
And as for the special, individual knowledge of time and place, emphasized by Hayek, it is important to keep in mind that this knowledge is essentially the result—or the epiphenomenon—of an underlying diversity of private property. It is our property and the requirement of having to continuously act within the constraints of our property, that first influences what knowledge (out of an abundance of overall knowledge) is important for us to know and that further directs, shapes, and individualizes our interests and quest for knowledge.
An entrepreneur risks his own property in the attempt to satisfy some future, expected buyers' demand better than others do. If he succeeds, he will earn a profit, indicating that he has served consumers well. If he fails, he will make a loss, indicating that he has served consumers badly. Because they risk their own property, entrepreneurs are generally careful and circumspect in their investment and try to avoid any waste. 'Bad' (loss-making) entrepreneurs will sooner or later go bankrupt and become employees (instead of being an employer), and their mal-invested capital goods will be bought up (at appropriately lowered prices) by other or new entrepreneurs.
quarta-feira, 31 de março de 2004
The Socialist Calumny Against the Jews, by Ludwig von Mises, 1944
Nazism wants to combat the Jewish mind. But it has not succeeded so far in defining its characteristic features. The Jewish mind is no less mythical than the Jewish race.
The earlier German nationalists tried to oppose to the Jewish mind the "Christian-Teutonic" world-view. The combination of Christian and Teutonic is, however, untenable. No exegetical tricks can justify a German claim to a preferred position within the realm of Christianity. The Gospels do not mention the Germans. They consider all men equal under God. He who is anxious to discriminate not only against Jews but against the Christian descendants of Jews has no use for the Gospels. Consistent anti-Semites must reject Christianity.
We do not need to decide here whether or not Christianity itself can be called Jewish. At any rate Christianity developed out of the Jewish creed. It recognizes the Ten Commandments as eternal law and the Old Testament as Holy Writ. The Apostles and the members of the primitive community were Jews. It could be objected that Christ did not agree in his teachings with the rabbis. But the facts remain that God sent the Saviour to the Jews and not to the Vandals, and that the Holy Spirit inspired books in Hebrew and in Greek but not in German. If the Nazis were prepared to take their racial myths seriously and to see in them more than oratory for their party meetings, they would have to eradicate Christianity with the same brutality they use against liberalism and pacifism. They failed to embark upon such an enterprise, not because they regarded it as hopeless, but because their politics had nothing at all to do with racism.
Both Russia and Germany are right in calling their systems socialist.
It is strange indeed in a country in which the authorities officially outrage Jews and Judaism in filthy terms, which has outlawed the Jews on account of their Judaism, and in which mathematical theorems, physical hypotheses, and therapeutical procedures are boycotted, if their authors are suspected of being "non-Aryans," that priests continue in many thousands of churches of various creeds to praise the Ten Commandments, revealed to the Jew Moses, as the foundation of moral law. It is strange that in a country in which no word of a Jewish author must be printed or read, the Psalms and their German translations, adaptations, and imitations are sung. It is strange that the German armies, which exult in Eastern Europe in cowardly slaughtering thousands of defenseless Jewish women and children, are accompanied by army chaplains with Bibles in their hands. But the Third Reich is full of such contradictions.
Of course, the Nazis do not comply with the moral teachings of the Gospels. Neither do any other conquerors and warriors. Christianity is no more allowed to become an obstacle in the way of Nazi politics than it was in the way of other aggressors.
Nazism not only fails explicitly to reject Christianity; it solemnly declares itself a Christian party. The twenty‑fourth point of the "unalterable Party Program" proclaims that the party stands for positive Christianity, without linking itself with one of the various Christian churches and denominations. The term "positive" in this connection means neutrality in respect to the antagonisms between the various churches and sects.
Many Nazi writers, it is true, take pleasure in denouncing and deriding Christianity and in drafting plans for the establishment of a new German religion. The Nazi party as such, however, does not combat Christianity but the Christian churches as autonomous establishments and independent agencies. Its totalitarianism cannot tolerate the existence of any institution not completely subject to the Führer's sovereignty. No German is granted the privilege of defying an order issued by the state by referring to an independent authority. The separation of church and state is contrary to the principles of totalitarianism. Nazism must consequently aim at a return to the conditions prevailing in the German Lutheran churches and likewise in the Prussian Union Church before the Constitution of Weimar. Then the civil authority was supreme in the church too. The ruler of the country was the supreme bishop of the Lutheran Church of his territory. His was the jus circa sacra.
The conflict with the Catholic Church is of a similar character. The Nazis will not tolerate any link between German citizens and foreigners or foreign institutions. They dissolved even the German Rotary Clubs because they were tied up with the Rotary International, whose headquarters are located in Chicago. A German citizen owes allegiance to his Führer and nation only; any kind of internationalism is an evil. Hitler could tolerate Catholicism only if the Pope were a resident of Germany and a subordinate of the party machine.
(...)
Neither were liberalism, capitalism, or a market economy Jewish achievements. There are those who try to justify anti-Semitism by denouncing the Jews as capitalists and champions of laissez faire. Other anti-Semites—and often the same ones—blame the Jews for being communists. These contradictory charges cancel each other.(...)"
The earlier German nationalists tried to oppose to the Jewish mind the "Christian-Teutonic" world-view. The combination of Christian and Teutonic is, however, untenable. No exegetical tricks can justify a German claim to a preferred position within the realm of Christianity. The Gospels do not mention the Germans. They consider all men equal under God. He who is anxious to discriminate not only against Jews but against the Christian descendants of Jews has no use for the Gospels. Consistent anti-Semites must reject Christianity.
We do not need to decide here whether or not Christianity itself can be called Jewish. At any rate Christianity developed out of the Jewish creed. It recognizes the Ten Commandments as eternal law and the Old Testament as Holy Writ. The Apostles and the members of the primitive community were Jews. It could be objected that Christ did not agree in his teachings with the rabbis. But the facts remain that God sent the Saviour to the Jews and not to the Vandals, and that the Holy Spirit inspired books in Hebrew and in Greek but not in German. If the Nazis were prepared to take their racial myths seriously and to see in them more than oratory for their party meetings, they would have to eradicate Christianity with the same brutality they use against liberalism and pacifism. They failed to embark upon such an enterprise, not because they regarded it as hopeless, but because their politics had nothing at all to do with racism.
Both Russia and Germany are right in calling their systems socialist.
It is strange indeed in a country in which the authorities officially outrage Jews and Judaism in filthy terms, which has outlawed the Jews on account of their Judaism, and in which mathematical theorems, physical hypotheses, and therapeutical procedures are boycotted, if their authors are suspected of being "non-Aryans," that priests continue in many thousands of churches of various creeds to praise the Ten Commandments, revealed to the Jew Moses, as the foundation of moral law. It is strange that in a country in which no word of a Jewish author must be printed or read, the Psalms and their German translations, adaptations, and imitations are sung. It is strange that the German armies, which exult in Eastern Europe in cowardly slaughtering thousands of defenseless Jewish women and children, are accompanied by army chaplains with Bibles in their hands. But the Third Reich is full of such contradictions.
Of course, the Nazis do not comply with the moral teachings of the Gospels. Neither do any other conquerors and warriors. Christianity is no more allowed to become an obstacle in the way of Nazi politics than it was in the way of other aggressors.
Nazism not only fails explicitly to reject Christianity; it solemnly declares itself a Christian party. The twenty‑fourth point of the "unalterable Party Program" proclaims that the party stands for positive Christianity, without linking itself with one of the various Christian churches and denominations. The term "positive" in this connection means neutrality in respect to the antagonisms between the various churches and sects.
Many Nazi writers, it is true, take pleasure in denouncing and deriding Christianity and in drafting plans for the establishment of a new German religion. The Nazi party as such, however, does not combat Christianity but the Christian churches as autonomous establishments and independent agencies. Its totalitarianism cannot tolerate the existence of any institution not completely subject to the Führer's sovereignty. No German is granted the privilege of defying an order issued by the state by referring to an independent authority. The separation of church and state is contrary to the principles of totalitarianism. Nazism must consequently aim at a return to the conditions prevailing in the German Lutheran churches and likewise in the Prussian Union Church before the Constitution of Weimar. Then the civil authority was supreme in the church too. The ruler of the country was the supreme bishop of the Lutheran Church of his territory. His was the jus circa sacra.
The conflict with the Catholic Church is of a similar character. The Nazis will not tolerate any link between German citizens and foreigners or foreign institutions. They dissolved even the German Rotary Clubs because they were tied up with the Rotary International, whose headquarters are located in Chicago. A German citizen owes allegiance to his Führer and nation only; any kind of internationalism is an evil. Hitler could tolerate Catholicism only if the Pope were a resident of Germany and a subordinate of the party machine.
(...)
Neither were liberalism, capitalism, or a market economy Jewish achievements. There are those who try to justify anti-Semitism by denouncing the Jews as capitalists and champions of laissez faire. Other anti-Semites—and often the same ones—blame the Jews for being communists. These contradictory charges cancel each other.(...)"
Paquistão
Pakistan says dead man not major Al Qaeda figure
"ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (AP) — Pakistani officials today again backed off claims that they killed or captured a major Al Qaeda fugitive, saying a man they believed had been an intelligence chief for Osama bin Laden's organization was in fact a much less senior local figure.
...
Tribesmen in the Kaloosha area of South Waziristan found the bodies of Mati Ullah and Ameer Nawaz late Monday, bringing the government and military death toll in the operation to at least 48.
...
The military declared the operation a success, claiming it had killed 63 foreign and local militants. Hundreds of militants remain at large.
...
Sultan and Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayyat briefed parliamentarians on the operation Tuesday, reiterating a government offer to grant amnesty to any terrorists who surrender. None have taken up the offer."
"ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (AP) — Pakistani officials today again backed off claims that they killed or captured a major Al Qaeda fugitive, saying a man they believed had been an intelligence chief for Osama bin Laden's organization was in fact a much less senior local figure.
...
Tribesmen in the Kaloosha area of South Waziristan found the bodies of Mati Ullah and Ameer Nawaz late Monday, bringing the government and military death toll in the operation to at least 48.
...
The military declared the operation a success, claiming it had killed 63 foreign and local militants. Hundreds of militants remain at large.
...
Sultan and Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayyat briefed parliamentarians on the operation Tuesday, reiterating a government offer to grant amnesty to any terrorists who surrender. None have taken up the offer."
terça-feira, 30 de março de 2004
União de comércio, depois União monetária, depois Federação imposta (the same old story)
"...money was nationalized under Lincoln. Senator John Sherman said of the National Currency Acts and the Legal Tender Acts: "These will nationalize as much as possible, even the currency, so as to make men love their country before their states. All private interests, all local interests, all banking interests, the interest of individuals, everything should be subordinate now to the interest of the [central] government." MAO AND LINCOLN Part 1: Demon and deity By Henry C K Liu
Nos EUA, bastaram 70 anos para que uma união de Estados se transformasse numa Federação imposta, na Europa serão precisos esperar 70 anos para que a Federação reivindique que a vontade duma Europa "unida" é maior que a vontade de uma Nação idividualmente considerada?
Nos EUA, bastaram 70 anos para que uma união de Estados se transformasse numa Federação imposta, na Europa serão precisos esperar 70 anos para que a Federação reivindique que a vontade duma Europa "unida" é maior que a vontade de uma Nação idividualmente considerada?
A entrevista de HH Hoppe (2): Austrian versus Chicago
= Right versus Wrong :) ou como os ataques à propriedade têm caras (e teorias) insuspeitas
"...In any case: I believe the similarity between the Austrian and the Chicago view of law and economics to be merely superficial. In reality, both intellectual traditions are fundamentally opposed to each other. It is a common but serious error to think of the Chicago school as a defender of property rights. In fact, Coase and his followers are the most dangerous enemies of property rights. I know, this may sound unbelievable to some people. Thus let me explain, using one of Coase's examples from his famous article on "Social Cost."
A railroad runs beside a farm. The engine emits sparks, damaging the farmer's crop. What is to be done? From the Austrian (and the classic as well as the commonsensical) viewpoint, what needs to be answered is who established property first, the farmer or the railroad? If the farmer was there first, he could force the railroad to stop emitting sparks or demand compensation. On the other hand, if the railroad was there first, then it may continue emitting sparks and the farmer would have to pay the railroad to be spark-free.
Coase's and Posner's answer is entirely different. According to them, it is a mistake to think of the farmer and the railroad as either 'right' or 'wrong' (liable), as 'aggressor' or 'victim.' Let me quote Coase from the very beginning of his famous article. There he says "the question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is, How should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would be to inflict harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is, Should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm." Or put differently, the problem is to maximize the value of production or 'wealth.' According to Posner, whatever increases social wealth is just and whatever doesn't is unjust. The task of the law-courts, then, is to assign property rights (and liability) to contesting parties in such a way that 'wealth' is maximized.
Applied to our case this means: if the cost of preventing sparks is less than the crop loss, then the court should side with the farmer and hold the railroad liable. Otherwise, if the cost of preventing sparks is higher than the loss in crops, then the court should side with the railroad and hold the farmer liable. But more importantly, this means also that property rights (and liability) are no longer something stable, constant and fixed but instead become 'variables.' Courts assign property rights depending on market data. And if these data change, courts may re-assign such rights. That is, different circumstances may lead to a re-distribution of property titles. No one can ever be sure of his property. Legal uncertainty is made permanent.
This seems neither just nor economical. In particular, this 'variable' way of assigning property rights will certainly not lead to long-run wealth maximization.
"...In any case: I believe the similarity between the Austrian and the Chicago view of law and economics to be merely superficial. In reality, both intellectual traditions are fundamentally opposed to each other. It is a common but serious error to think of the Chicago school as a defender of property rights. In fact, Coase and his followers are the most dangerous enemies of property rights. I know, this may sound unbelievable to some people. Thus let me explain, using one of Coase's examples from his famous article on "Social Cost."
A railroad runs beside a farm. The engine emits sparks, damaging the farmer's crop. What is to be done? From the Austrian (and the classic as well as the commonsensical) viewpoint, what needs to be answered is who established property first, the farmer or the railroad? If the farmer was there first, he could force the railroad to stop emitting sparks or demand compensation. On the other hand, if the railroad was there first, then it may continue emitting sparks and the farmer would have to pay the railroad to be spark-free.
Coase's and Posner's answer is entirely different. According to them, it is a mistake to think of the farmer and the railroad as either 'right' or 'wrong' (liable), as 'aggressor' or 'victim.' Let me quote Coase from the very beginning of his famous article. There he says "the question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is, How should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would be to inflict harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is, Should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm." Or put differently, the problem is to maximize the value of production or 'wealth.' According to Posner, whatever increases social wealth is just and whatever doesn't is unjust. The task of the law-courts, then, is to assign property rights (and liability) to contesting parties in such a way that 'wealth' is maximized.
Applied to our case this means: if the cost of preventing sparks is less than the crop loss, then the court should side with the farmer and hold the railroad liable. Otherwise, if the cost of preventing sparks is higher than the loss in crops, then the court should side with the railroad and hold the farmer liable. But more importantly, this means also that property rights (and liability) are no longer something stable, constant and fixed but instead become 'variables.' Courts assign property rights depending on market data. And if these data change, courts may re-assign such rights. That is, different circumstances may lead to a re-distribution of property titles. No one can ever be sure of his property. Legal uncertainty is made permanent.
This seems neither just nor economical. In particular, this 'variable' way of assigning property rights will certainly not lead to long-run wealth maximization.
Re: Fogo amigo
Os princípios de não ingerência e neutralidade existem para acomodar a existência pacífica entre vários Estados (ou minimizar a probabilidade de conflitos), e para delimitar os conflitos que surjam internamente ou entre diferentes Estados (a palavra “Estado” aqui não é um pormenor, mais do que as nações ou as comunidades, são os “Estados” que lutam pela sua sobrevivência do seu aparato sobre outro “Estado”, fazendo tudo para envolver toda a população nessa sua luta pela sua própria sobrevivência).
Todos os Estados e regimes (incluindo os que consideramos piores) têm algum grau de acomodação por parte das populações, a quem cabe a responsabilidade de proceder a mudanças. Veja-se como o regime soviético caiu sem que tenham existido purgas e perseguições vingativas. Em qualquer outro regime não democrático assim sucede e sucedia. Pensemos nas monarquias de outrora, pelo facto de a não serem democracias universais, quer isso dizer que não existia identificação, legitimidade no poder instituído e assim percepcionado pela população?
Não existem princípios absolutos nas relações com os Estados e ainda menos entre Estados. O Estado em si é a maior fonte de ingerência e de legitimidade duvidosa. Mas partimos do princípio que é a quem ele se submete, que deve, em primeira análise, recair o ónus de tolerar ou mudar o que quer que assim entenda.
Nas tensões e guerras entre Estados, que surgem pela história fora, podemos observar que se
1) debate um qualquer “status quo” estabelecido algures sobre uma particular fronteira, zona de influência, etc.
2) tensões internas, porque uma parte da população (grupo homogéneo) não se identifica com o Estado
3) uma parte da população deseja mudar o regime
3) o nascimento de Estados, que é sempre um acto de força, quer interno quer externo (Israel por exemplo), principalmente quando se estabelece no meio de população não homogénea, onde parte dela (um grupo étnico, religioso, etc.) não se identifica e não lhe confere legitimidade
A não ingerência e a neutralidade é uma regra de prudência que reconhece que (lista não exaustiva):
- Escolher uma parte com absoluta razão é difícil (na Primeira Guerra Mundial, por exemplo)
- Que mesmo em guerras justas de terceiros, envolver meios militares e financeiros numa qualquer causa, em si, põe em perigo a sobrevivência e a posição estratégica da “sua” população
- Que a função puramente defensiva é consensual entre a população, mas a decisão de intervir nos problemas de terceiros raramente o é, causando divisões internas e ferindo a estabilidade interna
Quanto às questões específicas colocadas:
1) Sim, em última análise, devemos ser neutros em relação ao conflito. A minha crítica é muito feita do ponto de vista americano, nomeadamente dos seus conservatives e libertarians americanos (e no seu ethos de excepcionalidade em que a sua Nação se fundou) pela “republic not na empire”, mas também por acreditar na validade geral da não ingerência em regimes terceiros e no pessimismo quanto às “unintended consequences” no intervencionismo social em geral. A outra parte da crítica deve-se à constatação objectiva de que as guerras que não são feitas em legítima defesa, abrem precedente muito perigosos. E ainda outra deve-se à consciência que estamos perante um ideologia essencialmente de esquerda e até jacobina e napoleónica (a exportação de valores na ponta da baioneta) a reivindicar-se como de conservadora (claro que uma parte da esquerda, mais anti-americana por princípio não o reconhece só porque é americana, outra, mais moderna, abraça o princípio do intervencionismo como um corolário da sua própria crença na mudança social).
Todos os sinais estão presentes. Fala-se na democracia como um fim último a ser conseguido não só cá mas lá e em todo o universo (não importam as subtilezas de como as ordens sociais têm de evoluir de forma endógena e natural – é a revolução já e agora) – recomenda-se até que todos os Estados democráticos financiem todas as oposições em todas Nações – um bom princípio para a revolução (e conflito) permanente. É um optimismo ideológico delirante, ingénuo e perigoso, como o foi a intervenção de Woodrow Wilson na Grande Guerra com a bandeira da “guerra para acabar com todas as guerras”, para fazer o “mundo mais seguro para a democracia” (em primeiro lugar, era coisa que não estava de todo em causa sequer – mas sabemos que era anti-monárquico e em especial não percebia, como bom americano, o Império Austro-Húngaro, o que deu jeito à França e aliados), para assegurar os direitos a autonomia dos povos (esquecendo-se da sua própria guerra “civil” que esmagou o direito de secessão dos Estados do Sul)
2) Quanto à questão de uma parte da população que reivindica os serviços de um Estado terceiro para conseguir o seu objectivo político interno. Esta hipótese parece-me de tal forma subversiva e com tais consequências em termos de destabilização que a aceitação da tal provocaria um estado de Guerra permanente. Todos os Estados passariam ainda mais a combater aquilo que percepcionam como perigo interno com muito mais violência que actualmente e a probabilidade de existirem conflitos, sanções económicas mutuas, e mesmo guerras, aumentariam exponencialmente.
Todos os Estados e regimes (incluindo os que consideramos piores) têm algum grau de acomodação por parte das populações, a quem cabe a responsabilidade de proceder a mudanças. Veja-se como o regime soviético caiu sem que tenham existido purgas e perseguições vingativas. Em qualquer outro regime não democrático assim sucede e sucedia. Pensemos nas monarquias de outrora, pelo facto de a não serem democracias universais, quer isso dizer que não existia identificação, legitimidade no poder instituído e assim percepcionado pela população?
Não existem princípios absolutos nas relações com os Estados e ainda menos entre Estados. O Estado em si é a maior fonte de ingerência e de legitimidade duvidosa. Mas partimos do princípio que é a quem ele se submete, que deve, em primeira análise, recair o ónus de tolerar ou mudar o que quer que assim entenda.
Nas tensões e guerras entre Estados, que surgem pela história fora, podemos observar que se
1) debate um qualquer “status quo” estabelecido algures sobre uma particular fronteira, zona de influência, etc.
2) tensões internas, porque uma parte da população (grupo homogéneo) não se identifica com o Estado
3) uma parte da população deseja mudar o regime
3) o nascimento de Estados, que é sempre um acto de força, quer interno quer externo (Israel por exemplo), principalmente quando se estabelece no meio de população não homogénea, onde parte dela (um grupo étnico, religioso, etc.) não se identifica e não lhe confere legitimidade
A não ingerência e a neutralidade é uma regra de prudência que reconhece que (lista não exaustiva):
- Escolher uma parte com absoluta razão é difícil (na Primeira Guerra Mundial, por exemplo)
- Que mesmo em guerras justas de terceiros, envolver meios militares e financeiros numa qualquer causa, em si, põe em perigo a sobrevivência e a posição estratégica da “sua” população
- Que a função puramente defensiva é consensual entre a população, mas a decisão de intervir nos problemas de terceiros raramente o é, causando divisões internas e ferindo a estabilidade interna
Quanto às questões específicas colocadas:
1) Sim, em última análise, devemos ser neutros em relação ao conflito. A minha crítica é muito feita do ponto de vista americano, nomeadamente dos seus conservatives e libertarians americanos (e no seu ethos de excepcionalidade em que a sua Nação se fundou) pela “republic not na empire”, mas também por acreditar na validade geral da não ingerência em regimes terceiros e no pessimismo quanto às “unintended consequences” no intervencionismo social em geral. A outra parte da crítica deve-se à constatação objectiva de que as guerras que não são feitas em legítima defesa, abrem precedente muito perigosos. E ainda outra deve-se à consciência que estamos perante um ideologia essencialmente de esquerda e até jacobina e napoleónica (a exportação de valores na ponta da baioneta) a reivindicar-se como de conservadora (claro que uma parte da esquerda, mais anti-americana por princípio não o reconhece só porque é americana, outra, mais moderna, abraça o princípio do intervencionismo como um corolário da sua própria crença na mudança social).
Todos os sinais estão presentes. Fala-se na democracia como um fim último a ser conseguido não só cá mas lá e em todo o universo (não importam as subtilezas de como as ordens sociais têm de evoluir de forma endógena e natural – é a revolução já e agora) – recomenda-se até que todos os Estados democráticos financiem todas as oposições em todas Nações – um bom princípio para a revolução (e conflito) permanente. É um optimismo ideológico delirante, ingénuo e perigoso, como o foi a intervenção de Woodrow Wilson na Grande Guerra com a bandeira da “guerra para acabar com todas as guerras”, para fazer o “mundo mais seguro para a democracia” (em primeiro lugar, era coisa que não estava de todo em causa sequer – mas sabemos que era anti-monárquico e em especial não percebia, como bom americano, o Império Austro-Húngaro, o que deu jeito à França e aliados), para assegurar os direitos a autonomia dos povos (esquecendo-se da sua própria guerra “civil” que esmagou o direito de secessão dos Estados do Sul)
2) Quanto à questão de uma parte da população que reivindica os serviços de um Estado terceiro para conseguir o seu objectivo político interno. Esta hipótese parece-me de tal forma subversiva e com tais consequências em termos de destabilização que a aceitação da tal provocaria um estado de Guerra permanente. Todos os Estados passariam ainda mais a combater aquilo que percepcionam como perigo interno com muito mais violência que actualmente e a probabilidade de existirem conflitos, sanções económicas mutuas, e mesmo guerras, aumentariam exponencialmente.
Pakistan: The Battle That Wasn't
E mais um passo em direcção a um provável desastre
William Lind is Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation. He is a former Congressional Aide and the author of many books and articles on military strategy and war.
"(...)Then the whole thing evaporated into thin air. First, Zawahiri wasn't there. Then no other "high-value target" was there either. The Pakistani Army invited local tribal elders to mediate, declaring a cease-fire while they did so – not the sort of thing you do when you are winning. Pakistani Army units elsewhere in the tribal territories came under attack. Finally the whole business just dropped out of sight, ending not with a bang but a whimper.
(...)Pakistani Army used both artillery and attack helicopters. But it did not win. If it had won, you can be certain Islamabad would be trumpeting the victory. The fact that the battle became a non-event says that the forces of the state of Pakistan did not win.
What does this failure mean? The Washington Post quoted a retired Pakistani Army general as saying, "The state has to win this battle or its credibility will be destroyed."
I suspect the general is correct. In fact, I will go further: I think the failure of the Pakistani Army to win this battle marks the beginning of the end for Pakistan's current President, General Musharraf. The defensive victory of the tribal fighters will turn into an offensive victory, giving courage and a sense of inevitable victory to Musharraf's enemies while causing near-revolt in Musharraf's base, the army itself. Before the year is out, I suspect we will see General Musharraf's head impaled on a pike and surging Pashtun crowds proclaiming Osama as their leader.
At that point the American strategic failures that are the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will have transformed themselves into an American strategic disaster.
(...)
Am I the only one who can see where this is all going? But perhaps it helps to be a German military historian…"
William Lind is Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation. He is a former Congressional Aide and the author of many books and articles on military strategy and war.
"(...)Then the whole thing evaporated into thin air. First, Zawahiri wasn't there. Then no other "high-value target" was there either. The Pakistani Army invited local tribal elders to mediate, declaring a cease-fire while they did so – not the sort of thing you do when you are winning. Pakistani Army units elsewhere in the tribal territories came under attack. Finally the whole business just dropped out of sight, ending not with a bang but a whimper.
(...)Pakistani Army used both artillery and attack helicopters. But it did not win. If it had won, you can be certain Islamabad would be trumpeting the victory. The fact that the battle became a non-event says that the forces of the state of Pakistan did not win.
What does this failure mean? The Washington Post quoted a retired Pakistani Army general as saying, "The state has to win this battle or its credibility will be destroyed."
I suspect the general is correct. In fact, I will go further: I think the failure of the Pakistani Army to win this battle marks the beginning of the end for Pakistan's current President, General Musharraf. The defensive victory of the tribal fighters will turn into an offensive victory, giving courage and a sense of inevitable victory to Musharraf's enemies while causing near-revolt in Musharraf's base, the army itself. Before the year is out, I suspect we will see General Musharraf's head impaled on a pike and surging Pashtun crowds proclaiming Osama as their leader.
At that point the American strategic failures that are the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will have transformed themselves into an American strategic disaster.
(...)
Am I the only one who can see where this is all going? But perhaps it helps to be a German military historian…"
A entrevista de HH Hoppe (1): descentralização política
Economics, Philosophy, and Politics
To the contrary, the greatest hope for liberty comes from the small countries: from Monaco, Andorra, Liechtenstein, even Switzerland, Hong Kong, Singapore, Bermuda, etc.; and as a liberal one should hope for a world of tens of thousands of such small independent entities. Why not a free independent city of Istanbul and Izmir, which maintain friendly relations with the central Turkish government, but which no longer make tax payments to the latter nor receive any payments from it, and which no longer recognize central government law but have their own Istanbul law or Izmir law.
The apologists of the central state (and of superstates such as the EU) claim that such a proliferation of independent political units would lead to economic disintegration and impoverishment. However, not only does empirical evidence speak sharply against this claim: the above-mentioned small countries are all wealthier than their surroundings. Moreover, theoretical reflection also shows that this claim is just another statist myth.
Small governments have many close competitors. If they tax and regulate their own subjects visibly more than their competitors, they are bound to suffer from the emigration of labor and capital. Moreover, the smaller the country, the greater will be the pressure to opt for free trade rather than protectionism. Every government interference with foreign trade leads to relative impoverishment, at home as well as abroad. But the smaller a territory and its internal markets, the more dramatic this effect will be. If the U.S. engaged in protectionism, U.S. average living standards would fall, but no one would starve. If a single city, say Monaco, did the same, there would be almost immediate starvation. Consider a single household as the conceivably smallest secessionist unit. By engaging in unrestricted free trade, even the smallest territory can be fully integrated in the world market and partake of every advantage of the division of labor. Indeed, its owners may become the wealthiest people on earth. On the other hand, if the same household owners decided to forego all inter-territorial trade, abject poverty or death would result. Accordingly, the smaller the territory and its internal market, the more likely it is that it will opt for free trade.
Moreover, as I can only indicate but not explain here, secession also promotes monetary integration and would lead to the replacement of the present monetary system of fluctuating national paper currencies with a commodity money standard entirely outside of government control. In sum, the world would be one of small liberal governments economically integrated through free trade and an international commodity money such as gold. It would be a world of unheard of prosperity, economic growth, and cultural advancement.
To the contrary, the greatest hope for liberty comes from the small countries: from Monaco, Andorra, Liechtenstein, even Switzerland, Hong Kong, Singapore, Bermuda, etc.; and as a liberal one should hope for a world of tens of thousands of such small independent entities. Why not a free independent city of Istanbul and Izmir, which maintain friendly relations with the central Turkish government, but which no longer make tax payments to the latter nor receive any payments from it, and which no longer recognize central government law but have their own Istanbul law or Izmir law.
The apologists of the central state (and of superstates such as the EU) claim that such a proliferation of independent political units would lead to economic disintegration and impoverishment. However, not only does empirical evidence speak sharply against this claim: the above-mentioned small countries are all wealthier than their surroundings. Moreover, theoretical reflection also shows that this claim is just another statist myth.
Small governments have many close competitors. If they tax and regulate their own subjects visibly more than their competitors, they are bound to suffer from the emigration of labor and capital. Moreover, the smaller the country, the greater will be the pressure to opt for free trade rather than protectionism. Every government interference with foreign trade leads to relative impoverishment, at home as well as abroad. But the smaller a territory and its internal markets, the more dramatic this effect will be. If the U.S. engaged in protectionism, U.S. average living standards would fall, but no one would starve. If a single city, say Monaco, did the same, there would be almost immediate starvation. Consider a single household as the conceivably smallest secessionist unit. By engaging in unrestricted free trade, even the smallest territory can be fully integrated in the world market and partake of every advantage of the division of labor. Indeed, its owners may become the wealthiest people on earth. On the other hand, if the same household owners decided to forego all inter-territorial trade, abject poverty or death would result. Accordingly, the smaller the territory and its internal market, the more likely it is that it will opt for free trade.
Moreover, as I can only indicate but not explain here, secession also promotes monetary integration and would lead to the replacement of the present monetary system of fluctuating national paper currencies with a commodity money standard entirely outside of government control. In sum, the world would be one of small liberal governments economically integrated through free trade and an international commodity money such as gold. It would be a world of unheard of prosperity, economic growth, and cultural advancement.
H. L. Mencken
O grande Henry Louis Mencken (1880 - 1956)
"The most prominent newspaperman, book reviewer, and political commentator of his day, Henry Louis Mencken was a libertarian before the word came into usage. His prose is as clear as an azure sky, and his rhetoric as deadly as a rifle shot. Frequent targets of his lance were Franklin Roosevelt and New Deal politics, Comstocks, hygenists, "uplifters", social reformers of any stripe, boobs & quacks, and the insatiable American appetite for nonsense and gaudy sham. But his life was not defined by negativity. He was positively enthusiastic about to the writings of Twain and Conrad, the music of Brahms, Beethoven and Bach, and the victuals offered up by Chesapeake Bay. "
E a sua curiosa obra: In Defense of Women
"(...)Women, in truth, are not only intelligent; they have almost a monopoly of certain of the subtler and more utile forms of intelligence. The thing itself, indeed, might be reasonably described as a special feminine character; there is in it, in more than one of its manifestations, a femaleness as palpable as the femaleness of cruelty, masochism or rouge. Men are strong. Men are brave in physical combat. Men have sentiment. Men are romantic, and love what they conceive to be virtue and beauty. Men incline to faith, hope and charity. Men know how to sweat and endure. Men are amiable and fond. But in so far as they show the true fundamentals of intelligence--in so far as they reveal a capacity for discovering the kernel of eternal verity in the husk of delusion and hallucination and a passion for bringing it forth--to that extent, at least, they are feminine, and still nourished by the milk of their mothers.
(...)
Intuition? With all respect, bosh! Then it was intuition that led Darwin to work out the hypothesis of natural selection. Then it was intuition that fabricated the gigantically complex score of "Die Walkure." Then it was intuition that convinced Columbus of the existence of land to the west of the Azores. All this intuition of which so much transcendental rubbish is merchanted is no more and no less than intelligence--intelligence so keen that it can penetrate to the hidden truth through the most formidable wrappings of false semblance and demeanour, and so little corrupted by sentimental prudery that it is equal to the even more difficult task of hauling that truth out into the light, in all its naked hideousness. Women decide the larger questions of life correctly and quickly, not because they are lucky guessers, not because they are divinely inspired, not because they practise a magic inherited from savagery, but simply and solely because they have sense.
(...)
My experience of the world has taught me that the average wine-bibber is a far better fellow than the, average prohibitionist, and that the average rogue is better company than the average poor drudge, and that the worst white, slave trader of my acquaintance is a decenter man than the best vice crusader. In the same way I am convinced that the average woman, whatever her deficiencies, is greatly superior to the average man. The very ease with which she defies and swindles him in several capital situations of life is the clearest of proofs of her general superiority
(...)
The latest and greatest fruit of this feminine talent for combat is the extension of the suffrage, now universal in the Protestant countries, and even advancing in those of the Greek and Latin rites. This fruit was garnered, not by an, attack en masse, but by a mere foray. I believe that the majority of women, for reasons that I shall presently expose, were not eager for the extension, and regard it as of small value today. They know that they can get what they want without going to the actual polls for it; moreover, they are out of sympathy with most of the brummagem reforms advocated by the professional suffragists, male and female.
(...)
Once the women of Christendom become at ease in the use of the ballot, and get rid of the preposterous harridans who got it for them and who now seek to tell them what to do with it, they will proceed to a scotching of many of the sentimentalities which currently corrupt politics. For one thing, I believe that they will initiate measures against democracy--the worst evil of the present-day world. When they come to the matter, they will certainly not ordain the extension of the suffrage to children, criminals and the insane in brief, to those ever more inflammable and knavish than the male hinds who have enjoyed it for so long; they will try to bring about its restriction, bit by bit, to the small minority that is intelligent, agnostic and self-possessed--say six women to one man. Thus, out of their greater instinct for reality, they will make democracy safe for a democracy.
"The most prominent newspaperman, book reviewer, and political commentator of his day, Henry Louis Mencken was a libertarian before the word came into usage. His prose is as clear as an azure sky, and his rhetoric as deadly as a rifle shot. Frequent targets of his lance were Franklin Roosevelt and New Deal politics, Comstocks, hygenists, "uplifters", social reformers of any stripe, boobs & quacks, and the insatiable American appetite for nonsense and gaudy sham. But his life was not defined by negativity. He was positively enthusiastic about to the writings of Twain and Conrad, the music of Brahms, Beethoven and Bach, and the victuals offered up by Chesapeake Bay. "
E a sua curiosa obra: In Defense of Women
"(...)Women, in truth, are not only intelligent; they have almost a monopoly of certain of the subtler and more utile forms of intelligence. The thing itself, indeed, might be reasonably described as a special feminine character; there is in it, in more than one of its manifestations, a femaleness as palpable as the femaleness of cruelty, masochism or rouge. Men are strong. Men are brave in physical combat. Men have sentiment. Men are romantic, and love what they conceive to be virtue and beauty. Men incline to faith, hope and charity. Men know how to sweat and endure. Men are amiable and fond. But in so far as they show the true fundamentals of intelligence--in so far as they reveal a capacity for discovering the kernel of eternal verity in the husk of delusion and hallucination and a passion for bringing it forth--to that extent, at least, they are feminine, and still nourished by the milk of their mothers.
(...)
Intuition? With all respect, bosh! Then it was intuition that led Darwin to work out the hypothesis of natural selection. Then it was intuition that fabricated the gigantically complex score of "Die Walkure." Then it was intuition that convinced Columbus of the existence of land to the west of the Azores. All this intuition of which so much transcendental rubbish is merchanted is no more and no less than intelligence--intelligence so keen that it can penetrate to the hidden truth through the most formidable wrappings of false semblance and demeanour, and so little corrupted by sentimental prudery that it is equal to the even more difficult task of hauling that truth out into the light, in all its naked hideousness. Women decide the larger questions of life correctly and quickly, not because they are lucky guessers, not because they are divinely inspired, not because they practise a magic inherited from savagery, but simply and solely because they have sense.
(...)
My experience of the world has taught me that the average wine-bibber is a far better fellow than the, average prohibitionist, and that the average rogue is better company than the average poor drudge, and that the worst white, slave trader of my acquaintance is a decenter man than the best vice crusader. In the same way I am convinced that the average woman, whatever her deficiencies, is greatly superior to the average man. The very ease with which she defies and swindles him in several capital situations of life is the clearest of proofs of her general superiority
(...)
The latest and greatest fruit of this feminine talent for combat is the extension of the suffrage, now universal in the Protestant countries, and even advancing in those of the Greek and Latin rites. This fruit was garnered, not by an, attack en masse, but by a mere foray. I believe that the majority of women, for reasons that I shall presently expose, were not eager for the extension, and regard it as of small value today. They know that they can get what they want without going to the actual polls for it; moreover, they are out of sympathy with most of the brummagem reforms advocated by the professional suffragists, male and female.
(...)
Once the women of Christendom become at ease in the use of the ballot, and get rid of the preposterous harridans who got it for them and who now seek to tell them what to do with it, they will proceed to a scotching of many of the sentimentalities which currently corrupt politics. For one thing, I believe that they will initiate measures against democracy--the worst evil of the present-day world. When they come to the matter, they will certainly not ordain the extension of the suffrage to children, criminals and the insane in brief, to those ever more inflammable and knavish than the male hinds who have enjoyed it for so long; they will try to bring about its restriction, bit by bit, to the small minority that is intelligent, agnostic and self-possessed--say six women to one man. Thus, out of their greater instinct for reality, they will make democracy safe for a democracy.
segunda-feira, 29 de março de 2004
Liberalismo e Democracia
1. O optimismo democrático
"Não vejo em que é que a democracia seja incompatível com a "propriedade e o contrato". Pelo contrário, não conheço melhor forma de salvaguardar a integridade da propriedade e o respeito dos contratos do que a democracia e o consequente respeito pela lei. " Diz Gabriel.
Mas então como é que é possível pagar mais de 50% de impostos sem que qualquer contrato de prestação de serviços seja celebrado. Como é que temos de nos submeter e submergir a um monopólio de inflação legislativa, à oferta de serviços públicos universais que não funcionam (incluindo a de segurança e justiça), à imposição de direitos positivos a serem satisfeitos contra os meus direitos negativos,
Por outro lado, as monarquias absolutas do médio oriente, são "business oriented", desenvolvidas, os impostos são baixos, e cerca de metade da população é imigrante - isso parece ser um sinal evidente de respeito por uma boa parte de direitos individuais, não?
A questão é que os benefícios da democracia ou os defeitos da não democracia, têm de ser pesados com as alternativas (que podem não ser animadoras em muitos casos) possíveis.
2. A revolução
Qualquer entidade que queira fomentar a democracia num qualquer ponto do mundo pode fazê-lo a suas expensas. Não estou a ver que tenha de financiar as revoluções ou mudanças que cabem a terceiros pôr em prática, correr o risco, financiar, etc.
Não cabe aos Estados (nem cabe no Direito Internacional) fomentar mudanças sociais em países terceiros. A ingerência externa é em muito incompatível com relações de Estado pacíficas. Isso parece-me claro.
Também não acho que me cabe a mim (para além de poder comentar, apoiar ou criticar) actuar sobre o que Pinochet teve ou não de fazer para evitar males maiores (no seu julgamento). E certamente não me cabe a mim, ou a alguém com recursos financeiros de terceiros (impostos) ir "libertar" nações que funcionam bem e cuja responsabilidade última de manter ou mudar depende das próprias populações. E mesmo (para não dizer, especialmente) quando funcionam mal, a revolução (pacífica ou violenta) é para ser de iniciativa dos próprios.
3. A macro-democracia
E se este é "o" sistema, porque não ter uma "democracia europeia" e depois "mundial"? Será que Portugal vai ser mais "livre" se integrarmos uma democracia mundial de "um homem um voto" planetário? Não me parece que individualmente isso me torne mais "livre", e acho que a resposta nem merece desenvolvimento.
4. A mini-democracia
Em que situação a democracia é mesmo legitima? Um grupo de amigos vai ao cinema e decidem votar pelo filme a que vão. A decisão não é consensual mas todos aceitam apriori o resultado da votação, sabendo que no extremo até podem simplesmente recusar-se acompanhar o resto do grupo.
Daí até aceitar a legitimidade de uma votação maioritária que decreta coisas sobre os meus direitos de propriedade e livre contrato vai um grande passo.
Estamos no domínio do ausente mas sempre evocado "contrato social", uma relação contratual "mítica" com a qual temos de viver, mas que cabe aos liberais minimizar a todo o custo, porque ser liberal é acreditar na propriedade privada e no livre contrato.
5. O paradoxo liberal: quanto mais “liberal” menor é a necessidade de democracia
Quanto mais uma comunidade ou nação respeitar o princípio da propriedade privada e livre contrato menor é a necessidade da democracia.
Vejam assim: quanto mais numa determinada comunidade toda a propriedade for privada e os contratos livre entre as partes, menor é (ou no extremo até ausente) a necessidade de existirem decisões democráticas porque…não existe nada para ser decidido “politicamente” e qualquer grupo que se arrogue de impor decisões a uma minoria tem de enfrentar os tribunais como criminosos.
Neste estado de coisas, as decisões comunitárias aproximam-se cada vez mais de relações de propriedade, como em associações, empresas, clubes, condomínios. Aí sim , existe espaço pra decisões colectivas, mas estas estão hiper-reguladas para não sairem do âmbito restrito da posse da propriedade em questão (accionistas e a sua empresa, ou quotas imobiliárias e as partes comuns do condomínio, etc).
6. E o caminho liberal
...é a privatização de cada vez mais recursos públicos, a descentralização da posse e administração daqueles que permanecem públicos, e menos intromissão no domíno contratual (incluindo o que advém da decisões maioritárias).
7. E a democracia tem de reconhecer o direito de secessão
Apesar do que tem sido o esforço das elites políticas pela crescente integração política, a verdade é que o custo de independência é cada vez menor por um lado, e por outro, a "democracia" não tem meios racionais para recusar que uma comunidade queira formar o seu próprio espaço democrático para por exemplo, mudar o sistema fiscal e melhorar a protecção da propriedade (ou antes, reduzir os ataques da inflação legislativa a esta).
Embora nenhum país se atreva a instituir mecanismos constitucionais de separação política, eles vão ter que aparecer mais tarde ou mais cedo. A verdade é que parecem achar que 51% possa decidir a integração política. Portanto o mesmo tem de funcionar em sentido inverso (não o recomendo, eu diria uns bons 66% deviam ser necessários).
Talvez exista quem queira instituir localmente uma Monarquia (convidando antigos monarcas). Ou constituir uma Cidade Estado (porque não o Porto? Repelir o IRS e IRC e apenas ter um imposto sobre vendas e sobre o património para financiar o Município).
E com a diversidade e concorrência entre sistemas políticos, económicos e legais, temos sim maior liberdade individual e uma ordem social liberal.
8. Os direitos de propriedade e o comércio livre
As causas da pobreza estão relacionadas com a falta de direitos de propriedade, não com a falta de democracia. O contacto entre culturas diferentes sempre foi pacífico quando a tónica é mais no comércio do que no domínio (e essa foi a razão de ser e virtualidade do Império Britânico - não a "democracia" localizada numa pequena ilha - centro do Império).
Se queremos induzir mudanças em culturas estranhas à nossa o melhor que temos a fazer é deixarmos o comércio livre produzir os seus efeitos pondo as populações, consumidores, negociantes a contactarem por interesse próprio, o pior que podemos fazer é precisamente querer mudar aquilo que não nos diz respeito arrogando-nos de um princípio ideológico e de uma moral que tem de ser imposta.
9. Ser liberal e conservador
É reconhecer a complexidade das relações sociais e como estas necessitam de hierarquias naturais (não impostas mas digamos, "espontâneas"), podendo estas subsistir e conviver com o respeito pela propriedade e contrato. A propriedade é até um direito de exclusão e discriminação. Não fossem as imposições democráticas de igualdade à "força" e muitos dos actuais problemas sociais/morais como a droga, a prostituição, o aborto, seriam auto-regulados pela capacidade de discriminação (as empresas fariam testes de consumo de droga e recusariam - ou não! - pessoas com historial de consumo, as comunidades locais, tal como fazem já os condomínios privados, rejeitariam/expulsariam a prostituição dos seus bairros - uma das razões é porque fazem baixar o preço/valor da sua posse imobiliária, etc).
Na medida em que acreditamos na limitação do conhecimento (Hayek), em direitos naturais, no poder civilizacional (e até de pacíficação das relações humanas e entre culturas) dos direitos de propriedade e comércio livre, não é a democracia que deve ser a nossa obsessão (na medida em que é um meio a que se recorre), muito menos a sua imposição a terceiros.
"Não vejo em que é que a democracia seja incompatível com a "propriedade e o contrato". Pelo contrário, não conheço melhor forma de salvaguardar a integridade da propriedade e o respeito dos contratos do que a democracia e o consequente respeito pela lei. " Diz Gabriel.
Mas então como é que é possível pagar mais de 50% de impostos sem que qualquer contrato de prestação de serviços seja celebrado. Como é que temos de nos submeter e submergir a um monopólio de inflação legislativa, à oferta de serviços públicos universais que não funcionam (incluindo a de segurança e justiça), à imposição de direitos positivos a serem satisfeitos contra os meus direitos negativos,
Por outro lado, as monarquias absolutas do médio oriente, são "business oriented", desenvolvidas, os impostos são baixos, e cerca de metade da população é imigrante - isso parece ser um sinal evidente de respeito por uma boa parte de direitos individuais, não?
A questão é que os benefícios da democracia ou os defeitos da não democracia, têm de ser pesados com as alternativas (que podem não ser animadoras em muitos casos) possíveis.
2. A revolução
Qualquer entidade que queira fomentar a democracia num qualquer ponto do mundo pode fazê-lo a suas expensas. Não estou a ver que tenha de financiar as revoluções ou mudanças que cabem a terceiros pôr em prática, correr o risco, financiar, etc.
Não cabe aos Estados (nem cabe no Direito Internacional) fomentar mudanças sociais em países terceiros. A ingerência externa é em muito incompatível com relações de Estado pacíficas. Isso parece-me claro.
Também não acho que me cabe a mim (para além de poder comentar, apoiar ou criticar) actuar sobre o que Pinochet teve ou não de fazer para evitar males maiores (no seu julgamento). E certamente não me cabe a mim, ou a alguém com recursos financeiros de terceiros (impostos) ir "libertar" nações que funcionam bem e cuja responsabilidade última de manter ou mudar depende das próprias populações. E mesmo (para não dizer, especialmente) quando funcionam mal, a revolução (pacífica ou violenta) é para ser de iniciativa dos próprios.
3. A macro-democracia
E se este é "o" sistema, porque não ter uma "democracia europeia" e depois "mundial"? Será que Portugal vai ser mais "livre" se integrarmos uma democracia mundial de "um homem um voto" planetário? Não me parece que individualmente isso me torne mais "livre", e acho que a resposta nem merece desenvolvimento.
4. A mini-democracia
Em que situação a democracia é mesmo legitima? Um grupo de amigos vai ao cinema e decidem votar pelo filme a que vão. A decisão não é consensual mas todos aceitam apriori o resultado da votação, sabendo que no extremo até podem simplesmente recusar-se acompanhar o resto do grupo.
Daí até aceitar a legitimidade de uma votação maioritária que decreta coisas sobre os meus direitos de propriedade e livre contrato vai um grande passo.
Estamos no domínio do ausente mas sempre evocado "contrato social", uma relação contratual "mítica" com a qual temos de viver, mas que cabe aos liberais minimizar a todo o custo, porque ser liberal é acreditar na propriedade privada e no livre contrato.
5. O paradoxo liberal: quanto mais “liberal” menor é a necessidade de democracia
Quanto mais uma comunidade ou nação respeitar o princípio da propriedade privada e livre contrato menor é a necessidade da democracia.
Vejam assim: quanto mais numa determinada comunidade toda a propriedade for privada e os contratos livre entre as partes, menor é (ou no extremo até ausente) a necessidade de existirem decisões democráticas porque…não existe nada para ser decidido “politicamente” e qualquer grupo que se arrogue de impor decisões a uma minoria tem de enfrentar os tribunais como criminosos.
Neste estado de coisas, as decisões comunitárias aproximam-se cada vez mais de relações de propriedade, como em associações, empresas, clubes, condomínios. Aí sim , existe espaço pra decisões colectivas, mas estas estão hiper-reguladas para não sairem do âmbito restrito da posse da propriedade em questão (accionistas e a sua empresa, ou quotas imobiliárias e as partes comuns do condomínio, etc).
6. E o caminho liberal
...é a privatização de cada vez mais recursos públicos, a descentralização da posse e administração daqueles que permanecem públicos, e menos intromissão no domíno contratual (incluindo o que advém da decisões maioritárias).
7. E a democracia tem de reconhecer o direito de secessão
Apesar do que tem sido o esforço das elites políticas pela crescente integração política, a verdade é que o custo de independência é cada vez menor por um lado, e por outro, a "democracia" não tem meios racionais para recusar que uma comunidade queira formar o seu próprio espaço democrático para por exemplo, mudar o sistema fiscal e melhorar a protecção da propriedade (ou antes, reduzir os ataques da inflação legislativa a esta).
Embora nenhum país se atreva a instituir mecanismos constitucionais de separação política, eles vão ter que aparecer mais tarde ou mais cedo. A verdade é que parecem achar que 51% possa decidir a integração política. Portanto o mesmo tem de funcionar em sentido inverso (não o recomendo, eu diria uns bons 66% deviam ser necessários).
Talvez exista quem queira instituir localmente uma Monarquia (convidando antigos monarcas). Ou constituir uma Cidade Estado (porque não o Porto? Repelir o IRS e IRC e apenas ter um imposto sobre vendas e sobre o património para financiar o Município).
E com a diversidade e concorrência entre sistemas políticos, económicos e legais, temos sim maior liberdade individual e uma ordem social liberal.
8. Os direitos de propriedade e o comércio livre
As causas da pobreza estão relacionadas com a falta de direitos de propriedade, não com a falta de democracia. O contacto entre culturas diferentes sempre foi pacífico quando a tónica é mais no comércio do que no domínio (e essa foi a razão de ser e virtualidade do Império Britânico - não a "democracia" localizada numa pequena ilha - centro do Império).
Se queremos induzir mudanças em culturas estranhas à nossa o melhor que temos a fazer é deixarmos o comércio livre produzir os seus efeitos pondo as populações, consumidores, negociantes a contactarem por interesse próprio, o pior que podemos fazer é precisamente querer mudar aquilo que não nos diz respeito arrogando-nos de um princípio ideológico e de uma moral que tem de ser imposta.
9. Ser liberal e conservador
É reconhecer a complexidade das relações sociais e como estas necessitam de hierarquias naturais (não impostas mas digamos, "espontâneas"), podendo estas subsistir e conviver com o respeito pela propriedade e contrato. A propriedade é até um direito de exclusão e discriminação. Não fossem as imposições democráticas de igualdade à "força" e muitos dos actuais problemas sociais/morais como a droga, a prostituição, o aborto, seriam auto-regulados pela capacidade de discriminação (as empresas fariam testes de consumo de droga e recusariam - ou não! - pessoas com historial de consumo, as comunidades locais, tal como fazem já os condomínios privados, rejeitariam/expulsariam a prostituição dos seus bairros - uma das razões é porque fazem baixar o preço/valor da sua posse imobiliária, etc).
Na medida em que acreditamos na limitação do conhecimento (Hayek), em direitos naturais, no poder civilizacional (e até de pacíficação das relações humanas e entre culturas) dos direitos de propriedade e comércio livre, não é a democracia que deve ser a nossa obsessão (na medida em que é um meio a que se recorre), muito menos a sua imposição a terceiros.
Re: Serviço Nacional de Saúde
Percebo onde AAA quer chegar, mas continuo na minha: a não ser que concebamos estratégias de desobediência civil (eg. não pagar impostos), teremos de continuar a pagar o SNS. Mas, como isso não nos vai impedir de sermos mal tratados (em todas as acepções do termo), mais vale, mesmo assim, pagar mais um pouco e ir ao privado - o que qualquer pessoa num aperto sério faz de qualquer maneira. Acredito mais na descridibilização do sistema por abandono dos utentes do que numa reforma "iluminada". Julgo, por exemplo, que deveríamos recusar a inscrição nos centros de saúde, furando o cerco que nos estão a montar, por exemplo, quando nas farmácias pedem o cartão desse centro "de matrícula" (o que tem de ser inconstitucional). Diz o CN, e com muita razão, que esta será também a única via de se mudar de sistema de ensino (ou de acabar com a ideia de "sistema" no ensino...).
A Direita(?) pela revolução internacional. Trotsky is alive!
E a direita conservadora já não existe. Gabriel Silva no Blasfémias em DITADURAS, DEMOCRACIAS E OS AMIGOS
"Os regimes democráticos deveriam, em qualquer caso, apoiar politica e financeiramente os grupos internos ou externos de opositores de qualquer regime não-democrático. Sempre."
Por exemplo, no Vaticano? Por exemplo, no Chile, uns anos atrás? Quem sabe em Portugal, antecipando o 25 de Abril. Talvez fomentar a democracia nas tribos da selva da Amazónia. Como poderão existir relações internacionais quando uma das partes fomenta uam revolução? Quantas guerras/convulsões civis não resultariam (na verdade já o existem por causa disso mesmo) e como os resultados não serão os inversos por causa da ingerência externa (a parte apoiada pode ser sempre acusada de servir interesses estrangeiros, por exemplo)?
O pessimismo de Rui A. em "A quem serve o Estado?" fazia-lhe bem:
"...o problema, porém, é que este último desenvolveu uma máquina coerciva que lhe permite impor todas as arbitrariedades que entenda, legitimado pelo uso quase formal do voto universal e democrático (...) Encontrar no voto um fundamento legitimador para o uso do poder é, hoje em dia, com a quase absoluta ausência de limites para o exercício desse poder, um excesso."
A democracia não é um fim em si mesmo, o mercado nem precisa de democracia, as empresas não são democráticas (para o serem, nas Assembleias Gerais todos os trabalhadores votariam na lógica de um homem um voto e assim teríamos o fim da economia). Liberdade significa (ou devia significar) respeito pela propriedade e contrato. E este respeito é em muito incompatível com a democracia. Não quer dizer que esta seja deve ser rejeitada, mas devemos conhecer os seus limites. A democracia mundial por exemplo seria a tirania contra todas as comunidades.
Imagine uma democracia pan-árabe (mesmo partindo do princípio que seria estável e sem fundamentalismos) que incluiria Israel. Seriam os Israelitas mias livres por estarem incluidos numa grande democracia? Olhe que no Médio Oriente as nações mais desenvolvidas são monarquias absolutas: Também se devia fomentar a revolução no Qatar, Kowet, Emirados Unidos, ou mesmo Arábia Saudita (Bin Laden bem o quer...)?
"Os regimes democráticos deveriam, em qualquer caso, apoiar politica e financeiramente os grupos internos ou externos de opositores de qualquer regime não-democrático. Sempre."
Por exemplo, no Vaticano? Por exemplo, no Chile, uns anos atrás? Quem sabe em Portugal, antecipando o 25 de Abril. Talvez fomentar a democracia nas tribos da selva da Amazónia. Como poderão existir relações internacionais quando uma das partes fomenta uam revolução? Quantas guerras/convulsões civis não resultariam (na verdade já o existem por causa disso mesmo) e como os resultados não serão os inversos por causa da ingerência externa (a parte apoiada pode ser sempre acusada de servir interesses estrangeiros, por exemplo)?
O pessimismo de Rui A. em "A quem serve o Estado?" fazia-lhe bem:
"...o problema, porém, é que este último desenvolveu uma máquina coerciva que lhe permite impor todas as arbitrariedades que entenda, legitimado pelo uso quase formal do voto universal e democrático (...) Encontrar no voto um fundamento legitimador para o uso do poder é, hoje em dia, com a quase absoluta ausência de limites para o exercício desse poder, um excesso."
A democracia não é um fim em si mesmo, o mercado nem precisa de democracia, as empresas não são democráticas (para o serem, nas Assembleias Gerais todos os trabalhadores votariam na lógica de um homem um voto e assim teríamos o fim da economia). Liberdade significa (ou devia significar) respeito pela propriedade e contrato. E este respeito é em muito incompatível com a democracia. Não quer dizer que esta seja deve ser rejeitada, mas devemos conhecer os seus limites. A democracia mundial por exemplo seria a tirania contra todas as comunidades.
Imagine uma democracia pan-árabe (mesmo partindo do princípio que seria estável e sem fundamentalismos) que incluiria Israel. Seriam os Israelitas mias livres por estarem incluidos numa grande democracia? Olhe que no Médio Oriente as nações mais desenvolvidas são monarquias absolutas: Também se devia fomentar a revolução no Qatar, Kowet, Emirados Unidos, ou mesmo Arábia Saudita (Bin Laden bem o quer...)?
Re: Serviço Nacional de Saúde
As pessoas que defendem um sistema como o SNS e depois se surpreendem com histórias destas, andam muito distraídas... Descontadas as boas intenções de que o inferno está cheio e com as quais nenhuma organização humana se aguenta, o SNS é uma burocracia e as burocracias funcionam de um modo igual em todo o mundo: o sistema é tudo, o indivíduo não é nada (a não ser que fure o sistema ou tenha poder dentro dele). O que é necessário é que as pessoas se abstenham de participar nesse sistema; por mais uns patacos, recorram aos serviços privados, vão abandonando o sistema "público", não peçam o cartão do "seu" centro de saúde...!
Guterres Propõe "Nova Ordem Mundial"
A esquerda rejeita a capacidade unilateral americana de gerir os assuntos do mundo, mas quer a ONU como proto-governo mundial. Para isso querem racionalizar as instituições usando a grande arma: Racionalizar, que significa óbviamente democratizar.
A direita que passou a eleger a democracia como um fim último em si mesmo tem poucos argumentos contra. A direita que passou a acreditar na engenharia social em massa, caiu numa armadilha. Muitos porque a abraçaram totalmente influenciados pela ideologia neoconservadora, que apesar de ser unilateralista nos métodos, é internacionalista nos seus fins.
A Europa é para federalizar. O mundo também. Federalizar é o caminho para eleições gerais e a democratização universal. E o fim do "self-rule" transformado num pesadelo de "macro mob rule". Quem quiser ter a veleidade de criar alternativas liberais localizadas, perca-as, porque a submissão à regra da maioria impede-o.
"Nas reformas preconizadas pelo ex-primeiro-ministro uma das ideias centrais era permitir um maior peso do Hemisfério Sul. Gueterres defendeu a inclusão do "Brasil, Indía e África do Sul como membros permanentes no Conselho de Seguranças das Nações Unidas". Sobre essa instituição, o presidente da IS propôs também, "reconsiderar o direito de vetos dos membros permanentes", por exemplo, limitando o veto em situações de risco de genocídio. (...)Deu como exemplo o ridículo que representa, na sua opinião, o facto de nestas organizações "a Bélgica ainda ter mais votos que um país como o Brasil". Considerou ainda importante que estas instituições passassem a ter "uma ligação à componente parlamentar dos Estados" para as forçar a uma maior "responsabilização" sobre as suas decisões. "
A direita que passou a eleger a democracia como um fim último em si mesmo tem poucos argumentos contra. A direita que passou a acreditar na engenharia social em massa, caiu numa armadilha. Muitos porque a abraçaram totalmente influenciados pela ideologia neoconservadora, que apesar de ser unilateralista nos métodos, é internacionalista nos seus fins.
A Europa é para federalizar. O mundo também. Federalizar é o caminho para eleições gerais e a democratização universal. E o fim do "self-rule" transformado num pesadelo de "macro mob rule". Quem quiser ter a veleidade de criar alternativas liberais localizadas, perca-as, porque a submissão à regra da maioria impede-o.
"Nas reformas preconizadas pelo ex-primeiro-ministro uma das ideias centrais era permitir um maior peso do Hemisfério Sul. Gueterres defendeu a inclusão do "Brasil, Indía e África do Sul como membros permanentes no Conselho de Seguranças das Nações Unidas". Sobre essa instituição, o presidente da IS propôs também, "reconsiderar o direito de vetos dos membros permanentes", por exemplo, limitando o veto em situações de risco de genocídio. (...)Deu como exemplo o ridículo que representa, na sua opinião, o facto de nestas organizações "a Bélgica ainda ter mais votos que um país como o Brasil". Considerou ainda importante que estas instituições passassem a ter "uma ligação à componente parlamentar dos Estados" para as forçar a uma maior "responsabilização" sobre as suas decisões. "
O testemunho definitivo? Richard A. Clarke, counter-terror "czar"
Against All Enemies, Read it, and weep, Justin Raimundo
This administration, says Clarke, is fighting the wrong war, the wrong way, for the wrong reasons: even the Afghan war was "treated as a regime-change rather than a search-and-destroy against terrorists." The pinpoint strategy – pin down and destroy the Al Qaeda network – favored by Clarke, versus the broad "drain-the-swamp" social engineering scheme envisioned by the neocons, is what the debate engendered by this book is really all about.
(...)
It is shocking to read that, before 9/11, the counter-terrorist chief had never been allowed to brief President George W. Bush on the threat posed by Bin Laden. His proposed presidential directive to "eliminate" Al Qaeda had been stuck in the labyrinthine halls of the national security bureaucracy, disdained by neocons so focused on Iraq that even in the wake of 9/11 they complained, as Paul Wolfowitz put it to Clarke, "I just don't understand why we're beginning by talking about this one man bin Laden."
(...)
To Clarke's incredulous horror, Wolfowitz gave a spiel touting the crackpot theories of Laurie Mylroie. A writer, Ms. Mylroie maintains that Saddam Hussein was responsible for the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, as well as the Oklahoma City bombing, and – who knows? – maybe even global warming. 9/11 couldn't have occurred without a state sponsor, averred Deputy Defense Secretary with his usual air of smug certitude, and that would have to be Iraq.
(...)
By the morning of 9/12 Wolfowitz was arguing that Iraq, and not Al Qaeda, was the main enemy and the probable perpetrator of the terrorist attacks, while all credible intelligence pointed to Bin Laden.. "By the afternoon on Wednesday, Secretary Rumsfeld was talking about broadening the objectives of our response and 'getting Iraq.'" Shoot, Rummy bawled, "there's no decent targets in Afghanistan!"
(...)
He illustrates the unintended consequences of blocking with Iraq against Iran, tilting toward Israel, and, most fatally of all, creating and supporting the Mujahideen "freedom fighters" in Afghanistan, who would later evolve into Al Qaeda.
(...)
When Bin Laden is expelled from Saudi Arabia and takes up residence in Sudan, the Balkans become the worldwide rallying point of a burgeoning Islamo- terrorist movement: "What we saw unfold in Bosnia," reveals Clarke, "was a guidebook to the Bin Laden network, though we didn't recognize it as such at the time." With the complicity of Bosnia's Muslim government, Iranian arms and Osama bin Laden's legions poured into the Euro-Muslim sanctuary.
This administration, says Clarke, is fighting the wrong war, the wrong way, for the wrong reasons: even the Afghan war was "treated as a regime-change rather than a search-and-destroy against terrorists." The pinpoint strategy – pin down and destroy the Al Qaeda network – favored by Clarke, versus the broad "drain-the-swamp" social engineering scheme envisioned by the neocons, is what the debate engendered by this book is really all about.
(...)
It is shocking to read that, before 9/11, the counter-terrorist chief had never been allowed to brief President George W. Bush on the threat posed by Bin Laden. His proposed presidential directive to "eliminate" Al Qaeda had been stuck in the labyrinthine halls of the national security bureaucracy, disdained by neocons so focused on Iraq that even in the wake of 9/11 they complained, as Paul Wolfowitz put it to Clarke, "I just don't understand why we're beginning by talking about this one man bin Laden."
(...)
To Clarke's incredulous horror, Wolfowitz gave a spiel touting the crackpot theories of Laurie Mylroie. A writer, Ms. Mylroie maintains that Saddam Hussein was responsible for the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, as well as the Oklahoma City bombing, and – who knows? – maybe even global warming. 9/11 couldn't have occurred without a state sponsor, averred Deputy Defense Secretary with his usual air of smug certitude, and that would have to be Iraq.
(...)
By the morning of 9/12 Wolfowitz was arguing that Iraq, and not Al Qaeda, was the main enemy and the probable perpetrator of the terrorist attacks, while all credible intelligence pointed to Bin Laden.. "By the afternoon on Wednesday, Secretary Rumsfeld was talking about broadening the objectives of our response and 'getting Iraq.'" Shoot, Rummy bawled, "there's no decent targets in Afghanistan!"
(...)
He illustrates the unintended consequences of blocking with Iraq against Iran, tilting toward Israel, and, most fatally of all, creating and supporting the Mujahideen "freedom fighters" in Afghanistan, who would later evolve into Al Qaeda.
(...)
When Bin Laden is expelled from Saudi Arabia and takes up residence in Sudan, the Balkans become the worldwide rallying point of a burgeoning Islamo- terrorist movement: "What we saw unfold in Bosnia," reveals Clarke, "was a guidebook to the Bin Laden network, though we didn't recognize it as such at the time." With the complicity of Bosnia's Muslim government, Iranian arms and Osama bin Laden's legions poured into the Euro-Muslim sanctuary.
sexta-feira, 26 de março de 2004
Gentlemen’s War
31 "Aviators in the West, who frequently engaged in personal duels in the sky, were still fighting a gentlemen’s war. Fritz Reck-Malleczewen (who died in the Dachau concentration camp) described the despair of a German uhlan piercing to death a Russian horseman with his lance. Weeping, he knelt before the dying man, who forgave him.
Solzhenitsyn, on the other hand, mentioned cossacks who happened to venture upon a car with German generals without molesting them. “This was just an accident. It was not planned!” they explained afterward. When the Austrians reconquered Lemberg (Lwow), they found in an apartment deserted by the Russian occupants a list of damaged objects and the money to cover the repair.
This was different in World War II. By that time, the majority of the Soviet soldiers were literate, had “progressed,” were “enlightened,” and behaved worse than gorillas—more than 2 million cases of rape, also in liberated areas!"
Em Monarchies and War, Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn incluido em
THE MYTH OF NATIONAL DEFENSE: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF SECURITY PRODUCTION, EDITED BY HANS-HERMANN HOPPE
Solzhenitsyn, on the other hand, mentioned cossacks who happened to venture upon a car with German generals without molesting them. “This was just an accident. It was not planned!” they explained afterward. When the Austrians reconquered Lemberg (Lwow), they found in an apartment deserted by the Russian occupants a list of damaged objects and the money to cover the repair.
This was different in World War II. By that time, the majority of the Soviet soldiers were literate, had “progressed,” were “enlightened,” and behaved worse than gorillas—more than 2 million cases of rape, also in liberated areas!"
Em Monarchies and War, Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn incluido em
THE MYTH OF NATIONAL DEFENSE: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF SECURITY PRODUCTION, EDITED BY HANS-HERMANN HOPPE
Desenvolvimentos geo-estratégicos para a Última Guerra Mundial
Hipótese: Em todas as guerras todos têm razão mas a guerra faz-se na mesma, estabelecendo-se em cada uma, as condições para que uma ainda maior e mais devastadora, tenha lugar passados alguns anos ou décadas, despoletado sempre por um qualquer acontecimento que parece inesperado e aparentemente não ligado a acontecimentos anteriores - mas é só aparentemente.
Hip 1. Estados Unidos Prontos para Retirar Metade das Forças da Alemanha
"Os planos do Pentágono para um "realinhamento global" das suas forças estacionadas no estrangeiro prevê retiradas maciças da Europa e da Ásia, incluindo metade do contingente de 71 mil soldados na Alemanha, escreveu ontem o "Washington Post", citando fontes da Administração.
Em vez de grandes concentrações de tropas, os Estados Unidos vão preferir bases mais pequenas e menos sofisticadas. No continente europeu, os planos apontam para a Roménia e talvez a Bulgária; mais para leste, manterão as instalações no Uzbequistão, no Tajiquistão e na Quirguízia, estabelecidas para apoiar a intervenção no Afeganistão, em 2001."
Mas estes passos trazem problemas:
Hip 2. Russia warns NATO with nuclear option
"Russia's defense minister Thursday repeated an earlier warning to NATO that he may order a build-up of the country's nuclear defenses should the US-led alliance continue to expand and take an unfriendly view of Moscow.
Sergei Ivanov said the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was following an aggressive strategy and treating Russia as a threat rather than a partner.
"If NATO continues to keep to its offensive military doctrine, then Russia's military planning and the principles of Russia's military procurement -- including in the nuclear sphere -- will be adequately reevaluated," the Interfax new agency quoted Ivanov as saying.
"Russia is carefully observing the process of NATO's transformation," said Ivanov, who is seen as one of President Vladimir Putin's closest political allies in government.
He said that some new NATO members both "directly and indirectly" display anti-Russian policies.
Russia and NATO have recently come to blows over the alliance's plans to station warplanes in the three Baltic states and former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.(...)"
E como já é habitual, é Pat Buchanan que vê e recorda a história com mais clareza:
Hip 3. What Are We Doing in Russia's Neighborhood?
Napoleon III, Emperor of France, saw his opportunity.
With the United States sundered and convulsed in civil war, he would seize Mexico, impose a Catholic monarchy and block further expansion of the American republic. In 1863, a French army marched into Mexico City. In 1864, Maximilian, the brother of Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph, was crowned Emperor of Mexico. The French empire had returned to North America a century after its expulsion in 1763.
Secretary of State Seward did nothing until the Union armies had defeated the Confederacy. Then, he called in Gen. John Schofield, who had wanted to lead an army of volunteers into Mexico to drive the French out, and instructed him instead to go to Paris. "I want you to get your legs under Napoleon's mahogany and tell him he must get out of Mexico," Seward told Schofield. To impress upon Napoleon that the Union was in earnest, President Johnson, at the urging of Grant and Sherman, sent Gen. Sheridan with 40,000 troops to the Rio Grande.
Napoleon got the message. The French army headed for the boats, and Maximilian went before a Mexican firing squad.
Lesson: Nations are unwise to seize upon the temporary weakness of a great power to put military forces inside its sphere of influence.
Which brings us to this headline in last week's Washington Post: "U.S. May Set Up Bases in Former Soviet Republics."
(...)
Query: What are we doing there? What is the strategic interest in Georgia? Tbilisi is about as far away as one can get. Why are we rubbing Russia's nose in her Cold War defeat by putting U.S. imperial troops into nations that only yesterday were a part of that country? Powell anticipated the question: "Are we pointing a dagger in the soft underbelly of Russia? Of course not. What we're doing is working together against terrorism."
But after Iraq, where we invaded an oil-rich country on what the world believes were false pretenses and forged evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, why should Russians not suspect our motives?
After all, the neoconservatives who beat the drums loudest for war, and cherry-picked the intelligence sent to Bush that got us into war, have been braying for years that we intend to create an American empire and impose our "benevolent global hegemony" on all mankind.
Why should Russians, Chinese and Iranians not believe America's crusader castles in Central Asia and the Caucasus are not part of a grand scheme for a Pax Americana?
(...)Have we considered the consequences of planting military bases in countries afflicted by Islamic fundamentalism and ruled by autocrats who, only 15 years ago, were apparatchiks of Moscow?
A U.S. imperial presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus resented by Russia, Iran and China and detested by Islamists is less likely to contain terrorism than to invite it.
(...)
But if we are entitled to our own Monroe Doctrine – i.e., no foreign colonies or bases in our backyard – are not other great nations like China and Russia equally entitled? Why should they not feel as we do, and one day act as we did with Napoleon, and tell us to get out of Central Asia and to get out of the Caucasus?
But, again, why are we going in? Other than empire, what is the vital interest here?"
Hip 4. O que nos leva a outra guerra para acabar com todas as guerras: A Guerra na Crimeia
"In October of the same year, the Ottoman Turks declared war on Russia. War between Russia and Turkey was nothing new, as the Russo-Turkish Wars (1768–74, 1787–92, 1828–29) evidence. They had first clashed over Astrakhan in 1569. Although Constantinople had fallen to the Turks in 1453, the Ottoman Empire was in decline, and Russia, since the time of Peter the Great (1672–1725), had wanted to secure a warm-water outlet to the Mediterranean – at the expense of Ottoman territory. This naturally upset France and Great Britain, which saw Russian ambitions as a threat to the balance of power in the Mediterranean. Russia was given an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of its forces from the principalities. When Russia refused, France and Great Britain, having already dispatched fleets to the Black Sea, declared war on Russia on March 28, 1854. The Anglo-Franco alliance was a precarious one. France and Great Britain had historically been enemies, but, like Herod and Pilate, who "were made friends together" when they allied to condemn Christ (Luke 23:1–12), they united to check the ambitions of Russia, under the guise of defending Turkey.
(...)
For political or commercial reasons, or both, the war was portrayed in the best possible light. A positive report was needed to counter negative press reports and to encourage the British nation to support the war effort. For this reason, Fenton’s photographs can be considered the first instance of photographic propaganda.
The Crimean War destroyed the lives of over 200,000 men(...)The Crimean War could have and should have been the war to end all wars. Instead, as A. N. Wilson remarks in The Victorians, it was the greatest blunder of the nineteenth century, setting up animosities and alliances that led to World War I and the continuing turmoil of Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia."
E a WWI leva a Versailles, a queda das monarquias ao fascismo e comunismo. A crise de 1929 (ele próprio com raízes no fim do padrão ouro provocado pela colapso financeiro na WWI), o perigo comunista (reforçado pelos eventos) e o sentimento de injustiça que alimenta o fanatismo, a Hitler. A WWII leva à vitoria de Estaline e do comunismo. Os Estados Ocidentais não cessam o seu intervencionismo no médio oriente (desde a queda do Império Otomano). O comunismo cai, a Russia está enfraquecida, surgem novos países no seu domínio natural. O conflito territorial na Palestina continua. o Irão é o inimigo. Saddam é apoiado contra este inimigo. Depois o Golfo I e bases na Arábia Saudita, Sanções no Iraque, apoio acritico a todas as acções e ocupações de Israel. Bosnia, Servia e Kosovo tornam a NATO numa organização política abandonando o caracter defenssivo. Depois 11/9, Afeganistão e Golfo II. Ameaça aos regimes da Siria, Irão e Arábia Saudita. Israel tem um arsenal desconhecido e não declarado de armas nucleares. Nato envolvida no Afeganistão. EUA instalam-se na vizinhança da Rússia, e a Nato também. A Rússia e a China começam a acordar economicamente e com capacidade de suportar um maior protagonismo político e militar. EUA enfraquecidos estratégicamente, orçamentalmente, e militarmente. EUA e aliados tornam-se objecto directo de todos as tensões na península árabe e de muçulmanos (não o eram antes) e já não tem volta. E o resto logo se verá...
Hipótese: Em todas as guerras todos têm razão mas a guerra faz-se na mesma, estabelecendo-se em cada uma, as condições para que uma ainda maior e mais devastadora, tenha lugar passados alguns anos ou décadas, despoletado sempre por um qualquer acontecimento que parece inesperado e aparentemente não ligado a acontecimentos anteriores - mas é só aparentemente.
Hip 1. Estados Unidos Prontos para Retirar Metade das Forças da Alemanha
"Os planos do Pentágono para um "realinhamento global" das suas forças estacionadas no estrangeiro prevê retiradas maciças da Europa e da Ásia, incluindo metade do contingente de 71 mil soldados na Alemanha, escreveu ontem o "Washington Post", citando fontes da Administração.
Em vez de grandes concentrações de tropas, os Estados Unidos vão preferir bases mais pequenas e menos sofisticadas. No continente europeu, os planos apontam para a Roménia e talvez a Bulgária; mais para leste, manterão as instalações no Uzbequistão, no Tajiquistão e na Quirguízia, estabelecidas para apoiar a intervenção no Afeganistão, em 2001."
Mas estes passos trazem problemas:
Hip 2. Russia warns NATO with nuclear option
"Russia's defense minister Thursday repeated an earlier warning to NATO that he may order a build-up of the country's nuclear defenses should the US-led alliance continue to expand and take an unfriendly view of Moscow.
Sergei Ivanov said the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was following an aggressive strategy and treating Russia as a threat rather than a partner.
"If NATO continues to keep to its offensive military doctrine, then Russia's military planning and the principles of Russia's military procurement -- including in the nuclear sphere -- will be adequately reevaluated," the Interfax new agency quoted Ivanov as saying.
"Russia is carefully observing the process of NATO's transformation," said Ivanov, who is seen as one of President Vladimir Putin's closest political allies in government.
He said that some new NATO members both "directly and indirectly" display anti-Russian policies.
Russia and NATO have recently come to blows over the alliance's plans to station warplanes in the three Baltic states and former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.(...)"
E como já é habitual, é Pat Buchanan que vê e recorda a história com mais clareza:
Hip 3. What Are We Doing in Russia's Neighborhood?
Napoleon III, Emperor of France, saw his opportunity.
With the United States sundered and convulsed in civil war, he would seize Mexico, impose a Catholic monarchy and block further expansion of the American republic. In 1863, a French army marched into Mexico City. In 1864, Maximilian, the brother of Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph, was crowned Emperor of Mexico. The French empire had returned to North America a century after its expulsion in 1763.
Secretary of State Seward did nothing until the Union armies had defeated the Confederacy. Then, he called in Gen. John Schofield, who had wanted to lead an army of volunteers into Mexico to drive the French out, and instructed him instead to go to Paris. "I want you to get your legs under Napoleon's mahogany and tell him he must get out of Mexico," Seward told Schofield. To impress upon Napoleon that the Union was in earnest, President Johnson, at the urging of Grant and Sherman, sent Gen. Sheridan with 40,000 troops to the Rio Grande.
Napoleon got the message. The French army headed for the boats, and Maximilian went before a Mexican firing squad.
Lesson: Nations are unwise to seize upon the temporary weakness of a great power to put military forces inside its sphere of influence.
Which brings us to this headline in last week's Washington Post: "U.S. May Set Up Bases in Former Soviet Republics."
(...)
Query: What are we doing there? What is the strategic interest in Georgia? Tbilisi is about as far away as one can get. Why are we rubbing Russia's nose in her Cold War defeat by putting U.S. imperial troops into nations that only yesterday were a part of that country? Powell anticipated the question: "Are we pointing a dagger in the soft underbelly of Russia? Of course not. What we're doing is working together against terrorism."
But after Iraq, where we invaded an oil-rich country on what the world believes were false pretenses and forged evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, why should Russians not suspect our motives?
After all, the neoconservatives who beat the drums loudest for war, and cherry-picked the intelligence sent to Bush that got us into war, have been braying for years that we intend to create an American empire and impose our "benevolent global hegemony" on all mankind.
Why should Russians, Chinese and Iranians not believe America's crusader castles in Central Asia and the Caucasus are not part of a grand scheme for a Pax Americana?
(...)Have we considered the consequences of planting military bases in countries afflicted by Islamic fundamentalism and ruled by autocrats who, only 15 years ago, were apparatchiks of Moscow?
A U.S. imperial presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus resented by Russia, Iran and China and detested by Islamists is less likely to contain terrorism than to invite it.
(...)
But if we are entitled to our own Monroe Doctrine – i.e., no foreign colonies or bases in our backyard – are not other great nations like China and Russia equally entitled? Why should they not feel as we do, and one day act as we did with Napoleon, and tell us to get out of Central Asia and to get out of the Caucasus?
But, again, why are we going in? Other than empire, what is the vital interest here?"
Hip 4. O que nos leva a outra guerra para acabar com todas as guerras: A Guerra na Crimeia
"In October of the same year, the Ottoman Turks declared war on Russia. War between Russia and Turkey was nothing new, as the Russo-Turkish Wars (1768–74, 1787–92, 1828–29) evidence. They had first clashed over Astrakhan in 1569. Although Constantinople had fallen to the Turks in 1453, the Ottoman Empire was in decline, and Russia, since the time of Peter the Great (1672–1725), had wanted to secure a warm-water outlet to the Mediterranean – at the expense of Ottoman territory. This naturally upset France and Great Britain, which saw Russian ambitions as a threat to the balance of power in the Mediterranean. Russia was given an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of its forces from the principalities. When Russia refused, France and Great Britain, having already dispatched fleets to the Black Sea, declared war on Russia on March 28, 1854. The Anglo-Franco alliance was a precarious one. France and Great Britain had historically been enemies, but, like Herod and Pilate, who "were made friends together" when they allied to condemn Christ (Luke 23:1–12), they united to check the ambitions of Russia, under the guise of defending Turkey.
(...)
For political or commercial reasons, or both, the war was portrayed in the best possible light. A positive report was needed to counter negative press reports and to encourage the British nation to support the war effort. For this reason, Fenton’s photographs can be considered the first instance of photographic propaganda.
The Crimean War destroyed the lives of over 200,000 men(...)The Crimean War could have and should have been the war to end all wars. Instead, as A. N. Wilson remarks in The Victorians, it was the greatest blunder of the nineteenth century, setting up animosities and alliances that led to World War I and the continuing turmoil of Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia."
E a WWI leva a Versailles, a queda das monarquias ao fascismo e comunismo. A crise de 1929 (ele próprio com raízes no fim do padrão ouro provocado pela colapso financeiro na WWI), o perigo comunista (reforçado pelos eventos) e o sentimento de injustiça que alimenta o fanatismo, a Hitler. A WWII leva à vitoria de Estaline e do comunismo. Os Estados Ocidentais não cessam o seu intervencionismo no médio oriente (desde a queda do Império Otomano). O comunismo cai, a Russia está enfraquecida, surgem novos países no seu domínio natural. O conflito territorial na Palestina continua. o Irão é o inimigo. Saddam é apoiado contra este inimigo. Depois o Golfo I e bases na Arábia Saudita, Sanções no Iraque, apoio acritico a todas as acções e ocupações de Israel. Bosnia, Servia e Kosovo tornam a NATO numa organização política abandonando o caracter defenssivo. Depois 11/9, Afeganistão e Golfo II. Ameaça aos regimes da Siria, Irão e Arábia Saudita. Israel tem um arsenal desconhecido e não declarado de armas nucleares. Nato envolvida no Afeganistão. EUA instalam-se na vizinhança da Rússia, e a Nato também. A Rússia e a China começam a acordar economicamente e com capacidade de suportar um maior protagonismo político e militar. EUA enfraquecidos estratégicamente, orçamentalmente, e militarmente. EUA e aliados tornam-se objecto directo de todos as tensões na península árabe e de muçulmanos (não o eram antes) e já não tem volta. E o resto logo se verá...
Hipótese: Em todas as guerras todos têm razão mas a guerra faz-se na mesma, estabelecendo-se em cada uma, as condições para que uma ainda maior e mais devastadora, tenha lugar passados alguns anos ou décadas, despoletado sempre por um qualquer acontecimento que parece inesperado e aparentemente não ligado a acontecimentos anteriores - mas é só aparentemente.
A Abstenção não era adequada
E assim sabemos que estamos perante o primeiro Império ("da liberdade", já sei) by proxy da história. Suponho que votará também contra quando numa resolução em tudo igual for substituido "Sheikh Ahmed Yassin along with six other Palestinians" por "Ariel Sharon e seis israelitas".
"The Security Council, recalling its resolutions 242 (1967); 338 (1973), 1397 (2002), 1435 (2002), 1515 (2003),
"Expressing its grave concern at the continued deterioration of the situation on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as a result of the escalation of violence and attacks,
"1. Condemns the most recent extrajudicial execution committed by Israel, the occupying Power, that killed Sheikh Ahmed Yassin along with six other Palestinians outside a mosque in Gaza City and calls for a complete cessation of extrajudicial executions;
"2. Condemns also all terrorist attacks against any civilians as well as all acts of violence and destruction;
"3. Calls on all sides to immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of acts of violence, including all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement and destruction;
"4. Calls for the cessation of all illegal measures and practices and for respect for and adherence to international humanitarian law;
"5. Calls on both parties to fulfill their obligations under the road map endorsed by Security Council resolution 1515 (2003) and to work with the Quartet to implement it in order to achieve the vision of the two states living side by side in peace and security;
"6. Decides to remain seized of the matter."
"The Security Council, recalling its resolutions 242 (1967); 338 (1973), 1397 (2002), 1435 (2002), 1515 (2003),
"Expressing its grave concern at the continued deterioration of the situation on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as a result of the escalation of violence and attacks,
"1. Condemns the most recent extrajudicial execution committed by Israel, the occupying Power, that killed Sheikh Ahmed Yassin along with six other Palestinians outside a mosque in Gaza City and calls for a complete cessation of extrajudicial executions;
"2. Condemns also all terrorist attacks against any civilians as well as all acts of violence and destruction;
"3. Calls on all sides to immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of acts of violence, including all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement and destruction;
"4. Calls for the cessation of all illegal measures and practices and for respect for and adherence to international humanitarian law;
"5. Calls on both parties to fulfill their obligations under the road map endorsed by Security Council resolution 1515 (2003) and to work with the Quartet to implement it in order to achieve the vision of the two states living side by side in peace and security;
"6. Decides to remain seized of the matter."
Re: As encíclicas papais, liberais?!
Meus caros, se querem fazer campeonatos de purismo liberal, verdadeiramente, só quem, como eu, defende a propriedade privada (e o homesteading principle) e o contrato livre em toda a sua extensão o pode reclamar, reconhecendo no anarco-capitalismo "a" Teoria Geral da Propriedade e Contrato e na "Natural Order" o fim último da filosofia política (acabando com a necessidade da política em si, definida como o domínio extra-contratual de uns sobre os outros, seja pela "mob rule" ou pela ditadura unilateral).
As encíclicas contêm muito da fundamentação moral para o capitalismo, o reconhecimento da necessidade do governo do "bem comum" existe não só na Igreja Católica como no protestantismo ou em qualquer outra religião. Em todas elas, existem autores mais sensíveis ao direito natural e recusando o papel do governo centralizado, outros que não. O "virus" redistribucionista é comum a todos. Nas encíclicas transparecem as várias sensibilidades mas sem colocar como tronco central uma justificação do socialismo como método económico em si, mas sim na responsabilidade pela ajuda a quem precisa pelo qual o Estado é dado como um meio possível.
Até Hayek falava no safety-net e na educação pública. (Churchill instituiu o socialismo em Inglaterra, tal como Roosevelt nos EUA e ambos são colocados em altares por muitos liberais - ou será pela morte e destruição?)
Mises: "It is noteworthy to remember that British socialism was not an achievement of Mr. Atlee's Labor Government, but of the war cabinet of Mr. Winston Churchill. What the Labor Party did was not the establishment of socialism in a free country, but retaining socialism as it had developed during the war and in the post-war period."
Tendo em conta o tom dos comentários que li, só me posso lembrar do que diz Pat Buchanan (Católico): o anti-catolicismo é o anti-semitismo dos intelectuais. E foi a propriedade da Igreja que foi violentada inúmeras vezes por liberais.
Os ataques à Igreja, uma das últimas instituições não racionalistas (e não democráticas), são constantes e de todo o lado, ultimamente também da direita, especialmente da nova direita. São um alvo fácil, como o foi a instituição da monarquia pelos republicanos, em que usou os affairs pessoais dos actores como pedra de arremesso contra as suas qualidades como instituição social espontânea e não coerciva. Na verdade a Igreja Católica é mais velha organização estruturado do mundo, com mais "funcionários", mais extensa geograficamente, melhor organizada. Hierarquizada, com um direito próprio, mas com a capacidade de circulação de informação mais horizontal, como nos Concílios.
Quanto aos comentários que vi sobre o aborto, porque não existir quem na Igreja pense que quem mata seja sujeito a excomunhão? o Aborto é o assassínio de um ser vivo, seja qual for a nossa opinião sobre as consequências penais. Já que a maioria democrática quer impor a todas as comunidades, a liberdade de abortar, será que querem impor também com que princípios é que a Igreja se auto-regula? Por acaso a excomunhão é um pena de prisão?
PS: E já agora, não posso deixar de me lembrar também da tentativa em fazer o Vaticano mudar, reinterpretar a sua doutrina de Guerra Justa, para acomodar a consciência de estatismo militaristo-racionalista de muitos. Pois o Vaticano e o Papa estavam certos, e a violência vai gerar violência.
As encíclicas contêm muito da fundamentação moral para o capitalismo, o reconhecimento da necessidade do governo do "bem comum" existe não só na Igreja Católica como no protestantismo ou em qualquer outra religião. Em todas elas, existem autores mais sensíveis ao direito natural e recusando o papel do governo centralizado, outros que não. O "virus" redistribucionista é comum a todos. Nas encíclicas transparecem as várias sensibilidades mas sem colocar como tronco central uma justificação do socialismo como método económico em si, mas sim na responsabilidade pela ajuda a quem precisa pelo qual o Estado é dado como um meio possível.
Até Hayek falava no safety-net e na educação pública. (Churchill instituiu o socialismo em Inglaterra, tal como Roosevelt nos EUA e ambos são colocados em altares por muitos liberais - ou será pela morte e destruição?)
Mises: "It is noteworthy to remember that British socialism was not an achievement of Mr. Atlee's Labor Government, but of the war cabinet of Mr. Winston Churchill. What the Labor Party did was not the establishment of socialism in a free country, but retaining socialism as it had developed during the war and in the post-war period."
Tendo em conta o tom dos comentários que li, só me posso lembrar do que diz Pat Buchanan (Católico): o anti-catolicismo é o anti-semitismo dos intelectuais. E foi a propriedade da Igreja que foi violentada inúmeras vezes por liberais.
Os ataques à Igreja, uma das últimas instituições não racionalistas (e não democráticas), são constantes e de todo o lado, ultimamente também da direita, especialmente da nova direita. São um alvo fácil, como o foi a instituição da monarquia pelos republicanos, em que usou os affairs pessoais dos actores como pedra de arremesso contra as suas qualidades como instituição social espontânea e não coerciva. Na verdade a Igreja Católica é mais velha organização estruturado do mundo, com mais "funcionários", mais extensa geograficamente, melhor organizada. Hierarquizada, com um direito próprio, mas com a capacidade de circulação de informação mais horizontal, como nos Concílios.
Quanto aos comentários que vi sobre o aborto, porque não existir quem na Igreja pense que quem mata seja sujeito a excomunhão? o Aborto é o assassínio de um ser vivo, seja qual for a nossa opinião sobre as consequências penais. Já que a maioria democrática quer impor a todas as comunidades, a liberdade de abortar, será que querem impor também com que princípios é que a Igreja se auto-regula? Por acaso a excomunhão é um pena de prisão?
PS: E já agora, não posso deixar de me lembrar também da tentativa em fazer o Vaticano mudar, reinterpretar a sua doutrina de Guerra Justa, para acomodar a consciência de estatismo militaristo-racionalista de muitos. Pois o Vaticano e o Papa estavam certos, e a violência vai gerar violência.
quinta-feira, 25 de março de 2004
As encíclicas papais, liberais?!
Se as encíclicas papais apoiam o sistema da economia de mercado, então também as soluções social-democratas as "apoiam". É a mesma ilusão óptica que permite a alguns dizer que Keynes, arranjando uma terceira via entre o mercado e o socialismo, "salvou o capitalismo". O que os papas vêm dizendo desde o século XIX é que o liberalismo e o socialismo estão ambos errados e são "excessos", extremos, em relação aos quais pretendem definir um ponto de suposto equilíbrio que atribui ao Estado muitas das funções que os socialistas que desistiram da revolução (Bernstein e companhia) lhe atribuíram também. Essa tem sido a história do magistério papal e episcopal da Igreja Católica, que nenhuma conversão de Lew Rockwell ou outro libertário ilustre pode obscurecer. O Acton Institute? Bom, nem tudo é impecavelmente liberal nessas paragens, precisamente pela influência esmagadora do "pensamento social(ista) católico". De qualquer modo, que influência tem esse instituto junto da hierarquia ou das estruturas de leigos que fazem a opinião e o magistério católicos? Absolutamente nenhuma! Vejam-se os documentos redigidos pelas comissões Justiça e Paz, autênticos cozinhados de socialismo e sacristia... Quem conhece a história do catolicismo nos dois últimos séculos não consegue vislumbrar, da parte de papas e bispos (que detêm o magistério) nenhum rasgo de liberalismo. Não basta defendermos a propriedade privada para não sermos socialistas - se assim fosse, hoje dificilmente encontraríamos socialistas...
Mais referências
Via LRCBlog
1. Edward A. Keller, C.S.C. (1903–1989)
“The encyclicals do not condemn our economic system of free enterprise, but instead give a strong moral foundation for such a system.”
"With these words, written in 1947, Father Edward Keller voiced an opinion at odds with the way many American Catholic social thinkers viewed the relationship between the social teaching of the Church and the market economy. Keller, while not given much attention by historians, Catholics, or free market advocates, was in fact one of the most articulate and forceful Catholic defenders of the market system in the twentieth century.
Keller was born in Cincinnati on June 27, 1903. After joining the religious order of the Holy Cross (the congregation that founded and administers the University of Notre Dame), he went to the University of Minnesota to study economics. As was often the case in the early twentieth century, the needs of Catholic schools and colleges for teachers outstripped the resources of the religious orders that ran them, and Keller was sent to teach at Notre Dame before finishing his dissertation.(...)"
2. The Late-Scholastic and Austrian Link to Modern Catholic Economic ThoughtRev. Robert A. Sirico, President Acton Institute for the Study of Religion and Liberty
The reliance of the modern Catholic view of economics on Late-Scholastic thought has been more pronounced than ever. Both place enterprise, human initiative, the price system, exchange, private property, the division of labor, and the liberty of contract at the center of economic life. Unlike more positivist schools of economic thought, the modern Catholic approach never loses sight of the centrality of the acting person; the subjective will, and all that this implies, is the driving force behind economic life. That appreciation of the acting person is combined with a skepticism toward unnecessary uses of governmental power. We see in the Church’s social teaching, especially as expressed by Pope John Paul II, a blending of personalism with a proper understanding of economic reality.
(...)
Finally, we can then more clearly understand the meaning of these ideas’ reappearance in modern Catholic economics. My intention is to sketch a picture of an intellectual tradition tracing from scholasticism (and its influences in Christian and ancient traditions), to the economic thought of the Late Scholastics, to the recovery of this tradition in late-nineteenth-century Vienna (in the writings of Carl Menger and Franz Brentano), and finally to its reintegration into modern Catholic social teaching under the guidance of Karol Wojtyla’s papacy. In particular, I want to pay special attention to the proto-personalist aspects present within the work of the Late Scholastics. This proto-personalism also provides a theoretical bridge with the work of the later Austrian School.
The goal of scholasticism, in the tradition forged by Saint Thomas Aquinas, was to develop a body of logic and philosophic thought built on a Catholic understanding of the world, including an emphasis on natural law. This body of thought sought to address a wide number of scientific and social problems. This ambitious project provided an opportunity for Scholastic theorists to explore areas now classified as economic, including property, trade, money, interest, prices, and wealth creation. The Scholastics agreed, in line with Catholic social teaching, generally, that the way to understand economics was by reflecting on the preferences, purposes, outlook, and intentions of economic actors themselves and observing how they impress themselves on a physical world of limited resources. (...)"
1. Edward A. Keller, C.S.C. (1903–1989)
“The encyclicals do not condemn our economic system of free enterprise, but instead give a strong moral foundation for such a system.”
"With these words, written in 1947, Father Edward Keller voiced an opinion at odds with the way many American Catholic social thinkers viewed the relationship between the social teaching of the Church and the market economy. Keller, while not given much attention by historians, Catholics, or free market advocates, was in fact one of the most articulate and forceful Catholic defenders of the market system in the twentieth century.
Keller was born in Cincinnati on June 27, 1903. After joining the religious order of the Holy Cross (the congregation that founded and administers the University of Notre Dame), he went to the University of Minnesota to study economics. As was often the case in the early twentieth century, the needs of Catholic schools and colleges for teachers outstripped the resources of the religious orders that ran them, and Keller was sent to teach at Notre Dame before finishing his dissertation.(...)"
2. The Late-Scholastic and Austrian Link to Modern Catholic Economic ThoughtRev. Robert A. Sirico, President Acton Institute for the Study of Religion and Liberty
The reliance of the modern Catholic view of economics on Late-Scholastic thought has been more pronounced than ever. Both place enterprise, human initiative, the price system, exchange, private property, the division of labor, and the liberty of contract at the center of economic life. Unlike more positivist schools of economic thought, the modern Catholic approach never loses sight of the centrality of the acting person; the subjective will, and all that this implies, is the driving force behind economic life. That appreciation of the acting person is combined with a skepticism toward unnecessary uses of governmental power. We see in the Church’s social teaching, especially as expressed by Pope John Paul II, a blending of personalism with a proper understanding of economic reality.
(...)
Finally, we can then more clearly understand the meaning of these ideas’ reappearance in modern Catholic economics. My intention is to sketch a picture of an intellectual tradition tracing from scholasticism (and its influences in Christian and ancient traditions), to the economic thought of the Late Scholastics, to the recovery of this tradition in late-nineteenth-century Vienna (in the writings of Carl Menger and Franz Brentano), and finally to its reintegration into modern Catholic social teaching under the guidance of Karol Wojtyla’s papacy. In particular, I want to pay special attention to the proto-personalist aspects present within the work of the Late Scholastics. This proto-personalism also provides a theoretical bridge with the work of the later Austrian School.
The goal of scholasticism, in the tradition forged by Saint Thomas Aquinas, was to develop a body of logic and philosophic thought built on a Catholic understanding of the world, including an emphasis on natural law. This body of thought sought to address a wide number of scientific and social problems. This ambitious project provided an opportunity for Scholastic theorists to explore areas now classified as economic, including property, trade, money, interest, prices, and wealth creation. The Scholastics agreed, in line with Catholic social teaching, generally, that the way to understand economics was by reflecting on the preferences, purposes, outlook, and intentions of economic actors themselves and observing how they impress themselves on a physical world of limited resources. (...)"
Contribuições de Murray N. Rothbard - Economia (3):
o Tratado "Man, Economy and The State - Power and Markets"
Está presentemente, a ser colocado online em HTML no Mises Institute. Tem 1544 páginas. No prefácio, afirma como objectivo fazer um verdadeiro Tratado (completo e desenvolvido em cada tema), na velha tradição da Economia.
Ludwig von Mises: "As the result of many years of sagacious and discerning meditation, [Rothbard] joins the ranks of the eminent economists by publishing a voluminous work, a systematic treatise on economics.... An epochal contribution to the general science of human action, praxeology, and its practically most important and up-to-now best elaborated part, economics. Henceforth all essential studies in in these branches of knowlege will have to take full account of the theories and criticisms expounded by Dr. Rothbard."
Justin Raimundo resume o seu trabalho: "The author of 20 books and more than 1,000 articles, Murray N. Rothbard has been a mentor and an inspiration to the partisans of liberty since the early 1950's. If he had written only Man, Economy, and State, it would have been enough to secure him a permanent place among the luminaries of libertarian thought. As it is, the astonishing range of his writings, from economics to ethics to history to political journalism, reveals the mind of a polymath, so unlike the modern intellectual's narrowness of vision that the two seem representative of different species. He is comfortable everywhere, and just as capable of turning out a knock 'em-sock 'em political polemic as of writing the magisterial Man, Economy, and State."
No prefácio de Rothbard:
One of the unhappy casualties of World War I, it seems, was the old-fashioned treatise on economic “principles.” Before World War I, the standard method, both of presenting and advancing economic thought, was to write a disquisition setting forth one’s vision of the corpus of economic science.
(...)
Since the brilliant burst that gave us the works of Wicksteed (1910), Taussig (1911), and Fetter (1915), this type of treatise has disappeared from economic thought, and economics has become appallingly fragmented, dissociated to such a degree that there hardly is an economics any more; instead, we find myriad bits and pieces of uncoordinated analysis.
Economics has, first, been fragmented into “applied” fields—“urban land economics,” “agricultural economics,” “labor economics,” “public finance economics,” etc., each division largely heedless of the others. More grievous still has been the disintegration of what has been confined to the category of “economic theory.” Utility theory, monopoly theory, international trade theory, etc., down to linear programming and games theory—each moves in its sharply isolated compartment, with its own hyperrefined literature.
(...)
I think it fair to say that, with only a single exception (Ludwig von Mises’ Human Action), not one general treatise on economic principles has appeared since World War I. Perhaps the closest approach was Frank H. Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, and that was published far back in 1921. Since then, there has been no book of remotely as broad a scope.
(...)
This book, then, is an attempt to fill part of the enormous gap of 40 years’ time. Since the last treatise on economic “principles,” economics has proceeded a long way in many areas, and its methodology has been immeasurably improved and strengthened by those continuing to work in the praxeological tradition. Furthermore, there are still great gaps in the praxeological corpus, since so few economists have worked at shaping it. Hence, the attempt in this book to develop the edifice of economic science in the manner of the old-fashioned works on its “principles”—slowly and logically to build on the basic axioms an integrated and coherent edifice of economic truth.
(...)
Human Action is a general treatise, but not an old-style Principles. Instead, it assumes considerable previous economic knowledge and includes within its spacious confines numerous philosophic and historical insights. In one sense, the present work attempts to isolate the economic, fill in the interstices, and spell out the detailed implications, as I see them, of the Misesian structure. It must not be thought, however, that Professor Mises is in any way responsible for these pages. Indeed, he may well differ strongly with many sections of this volume. Yet it is my hope that this work may succeed in adding a few bricks to the noble structure of economic science that has reached its most modern and developed form in the pages of Human Action.
The present work deduces the entire corpus of economics from a few simple and apodictically true axioms: the Fundamental Axiom of action—that men employ means to achieve ends, and two subsidiary postulates: that there is a variety of human and natural resources, and that leisure is a consumers’ good.
Está presentemente, a ser colocado online em HTML no Mises Institute. Tem 1544 páginas. No prefácio, afirma como objectivo fazer um verdadeiro Tratado (completo e desenvolvido em cada tema), na velha tradição da Economia.
Ludwig von Mises: "As the result of many years of sagacious and discerning meditation, [Rothbard] joins the ranks of the eminent economists by publishing a voluminous work, a systematic treatise on economics.... An epochal contribution to the general science of human action, praxeology, and its practically most important and up-to-now best elaborated part, economics. Henceforth all essential studies in in these branches of knowlege will have to take full account of the theories and criticisms expounded by Dr. Rothbard."
Justin Raimundo resume o seu trabalho: "The author of 20 books and more than 1,000 articles, Murray N. Rothbard has been a mentor and an inspiration to the partisans of liberty since the early 1950's. If he had written only Man, Economy, and State, it would have been enough to secure him a permanent place among the luminaries of libertarian thought. As it is, the astonishing range of his writings, from economics to ethics to history to political journalism, reveals the mind of a polymath, so unlike the modern intellectual's narrowness of vision that the two seem representative of different species. He is comfortable everywhere, and just as capable of turning out a knock 'em-sock 'em political polemic as of writing the magisterial Man, Economy, and State."
No prefácio de Rothbard:
One of the unhappy casualties of World War I, it seems, was the old-fashioned treatise on economic “principles.” Before World War I, the standard method, both of presenting and advancing economic thought, was to write a disquisition setting forth one’s vision of the corpus of economic science.
(...)
Since the brilliant burst that gave us the works of Wicksteed (1910), Taussig (1911), and Fetter (1915), this type of treatise has disappeared from economic thought, and economics has become appallingly fragmented, dissociated to such a degree that there hardly is an economics any more; instead, we find myriad bits and pieces of uncoordinated analysis.
Economics has, first, been fragmented into “applied” fields—“urban land economics,” “agricultural economics,” “labor economics,” “public finance economics,” etc., each division largely heedless of the others. More grievous still has been the disintegration of what has been confined to the category of “economic theory.” Utility theory, monopoly theory, international trade theory, etc., down to linear programming and games theory—each moves in its sharply isolated compartment, with its own hyperrefined literature.
(...)
I think it fair to say that, with only a single exception (Ludwig von Mises’ Human Action), not one general treatise on economic principles has appeared since World War I. Perhaps the closest approach was Frank H. Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, and that was published far back in 1921. Since then, there has been no book of remotely as broad a scope.
(...)
This book, then, is an attempt to fill part of the enormous gap of 40 years’ time. Since the last treatise on economic “principles,” economics has proceeded a long way in many areas, and its methodology has been immeasurably improved and strengthened by those continuing to work in the praxeological tradition. Furthermore, there are still great gaps in the praxeological corpus, since so few economists have worked at shaping it. Hence, the attempt in this book to develop the edifice of economic science in the manner of the old-fashioned works on its “principles”—slowly and logically to build on the basic axioms an integrated and coherent edifice of economic truth.
(...)
Human Action is a general treatise, but not an old-style Principles. Instead, it assumes considerable previous economic knowledge and includes within its spacious confines numerous philosophic and historical insights. In one sense, the present work attempts to isolate the economic, fill in the interstices, and spell out the detailed implications, as I see them, of the Misesian structure. It must not be thought, however, that Professor Mises is in any way responsible for these pages. Indeed, he may well differ strongly with many sections of this volume. Yet it is my hope that this work may succeed in adding a few bricks to the noble structure of economic science that has reached its most modern and developed form in the pages of Human Action.
The present work deduces the entire corpus of economics from a few simple and apodictically true axioms: the Fundamental Axiom of action—that men employ means to achieve ends, and two subsidiary postulates: that there is a variety of human and natural resources, and that leisure is a consumers’ good.
Para um perspectiva histórica da Sérvia e Kosovo
No Chronicles Magazine
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SERBIAN REVOLUTION, by Srdja Trifkovic
A paper presented at The Rockford Institute’s conference to mark
the bicentennial of the First Serbian Uprising, Chicago, February 21, 2004
"The First Serbian Uprising is a misleading term, because (1) there had been many Serbian uprisings against the Turks before 1804; and (2) what happened between 1804 and 1813 may have begun as an “uprising” but soon evolved into a revolutionary war of national liberation, of social and political emancipation of the Serbian nation. In that sense, Ranke’s term revolution is more appropriate.
When Eugene of Savoy marched into Serbia in the aftermath of the Turkish collapse at the gates of Vienna, tens of thousands of Serbs rose in arms and flocked to his banner. The uprising—for that’s what it was—cleared the way for Eugene’s advance in Serbia itself and provided the recruits for his army as it headed east into Bulgaria. But when the French stabbed the Habsburgs in the back on the Rhine, the Austrians retreated back to the Sava and the great Serbian exodus of 1690 began. Forty thousand families—mostly from Kosovo, Metohija, and Rashka—headed north, fearful of Ottoman retribution. Their homes and their lands were taken over by Muslims, mostly from the barren hills of northern Albania.
A pattern was thus established that would be repeated, in one form or another, for the ensuing three centuries: A great power uses the Serbs for its ends and then discards them, or else, worse still, supports their enemies for reasons geopolitical. (...)"
KOSOVO: FIVE CENTURIES OF STRIFE AND ETHNIC CLEANSING, by Srdja Trifkovic
"Since March 17 over thirty Serbs were killed in Kosovo by rioting Albanians, hundreds were wounded, and thousands expelled from their homes. In many cases their homes were set on fire, their livestock killed, and their property looted. Two-dozen Christian churches and monasteries were also gutted or dynamited, thus nearly completing the work started in the immediate aftermath of NATO’s occupation in 1999 when over a hundred shrines were destroyed.
“Kristallnacht is under way in Kosovo,” an official of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK) says, “a pogrom against Serbs: churches are on fire and people are being attacked for no other reason than their ethnic background.” Things must be out of control if even UN administrators and NATO officers, who usually deny or minimize Albanian crimes, now admit that we are witnessing a coordinated, premeditated campaign of ethnic cleansing.
The campaign has a simple objective: to expel the remaining Serbs from the province, in addition to a quarter of a million already expelled since the end of the war five years ago. It was no longer possible for the “international community” to remain in denial because its own personnel have been attacked by Albanian mobs forcing their way through UNMIK checkpoints into enclaves inhabited by the few remaining Serbs. (...)"
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SERBIAN REVOLUTION, by Srdja Trifkovic
A paper presented at The Rockford Institute’s conference to mark
the bicentennial of the First Serbian Uprising, Chicago, February 21, 2004
"The First Serbian Uprising is a misleading term, because (1) there had been many Serbian uprisings against the Turks before 1804; and (2) what happened between 1804 and 1813 may have begun as an “uprising” but soon evolved into a revolutionary war of national liberation, of social and political emancipation of the Serbian nation. In that sense, Ranke’s term revolution is more appropriate.
When Eugene of Savoy marched into Serbia in the aftermath of the Turkish collapse at the gates of Vienna, tens of thousands of Serbs rose in arms and flocked to his banner. The uprising—for that’s what it was—cleared the way for Eugene’s advance in Serbia itself and provided the recruits for his army as it headed east into Bulgaria. But when the French stabbed the Habsburgs in the back on the Rhine, the Austrians retreated back to the Sava and the great Serbian exodus of 1690 began. Forty thousand families—mostly from Kosovo, Metohija, and Rashka—headed north, fearful of Ottoman retribution. Their homes and their lands were taken over by Muslims, mostly from the barren hills of northern Albania.
A pattern was thus established that would be repeated, in one form or another, for the ensuing three centuries: A great power uses the Serbs for its ends and then discards them, or else, worse still, supports their enemies for reasons geopolitical. (...)"
KOSOVO: FIVE CENTURIES OF STRIFE AND ETHNIC CLEANSING, by Srdja Trifkovic
"Since March 17 over thirty Serbs were killed in Kosovo by rioting Albanians, hundreds were wounded, and thousands expelled from their homes. In many cases their homes were set on fire, their livestock killed, and their property looted. Two-dozen Christian churches and monasteries were also gutted or dynamited, thus nearly completing the work started in the immediate aftermath of NATO’s occupation in 1999 when over a hundred shrines were destroyed.
“Kristallnacht is under way in Kosovo,” an official of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK) says, “a pogrom against Serbs: churches are on fire and people are being attacked for no other reason than their ethnic background.” Things must be out of control if even UN administrators and NATO officers, who usually deny or minimize Albanian crimes, now admit that we are witnessing a coordinated, premeditated campaign of ethnic cleansing.
The campaign has a simple objective: to expel the remaining Serbs from the province, in addition to a quarter of a million already expelled since the end of the war five years ago. It was no longer possible for the “international community” to remain in denial because its own personnel have been attacked by Albanian mobs forcing their way through UNMIK checkpoints into enclaves inhabited by the few remaining Serbs. (...)"
Mas ainda assim, o "Império da Liberdade" continua em expansão
US to increase African military presence
"The US military interest in Africa has been transformed by its determination to win what it calls the war on terrorism in the wake of 11 September.
General Charles Wald, the US general who is in charge for African operations, told the BBC that the US plans to increase the number of facilities across the continent.
He said the facilities are vital if the US is to intervene in Africa's many conflicts."
E assim parece adequado: "An empire founded by war has to maintain itself by war". – Montesquieu
Já agora, só faltava aparecer o terrorismo na América e seus aliados por causa de um qualquer conflito tribal no meio de África. Imagino já, escolhe-se uma das partes (talvez um ex-ditador convertido à imposição da democracia multi-étnica-cultural em nações tribais não homogéneas), defende-se essa escolha porque é defender os valores universais das "democracias liberais ocidentais", passa-se por cima dos métodos usados por esses freedom fighters, dá-se apoio financeiro e logístico, e quando passarmos a ser objectos de ódio da outra parte chamamos de terroristas e de que como querem destruir o Ocidente. Devo dizer que tal plano é tanto brilhante como idiota, mas hoje tudo é fácil de vender, até que uma guerra eterna é necessária para conseguir a paz eterna.
"The US military interest in Africa has been transformed by its determination to win what it calls the war on terrorism in the wake of 11 September.
General Charles Wald, the US general who is in charge for African operations, told the BBC that the US plans to increase the number of facilities across the continent.
He said the facilities are vital if the US is to intervene in Africa's many conflicts."
E assim parece adequado: "An empire founded by war has to maintain itself by war". – Montesquieu
Já agora, só faltava aparecer o terrorismo na América e seus aliados por causa de um qualquer conflito tribal no meio de África. Imagino já, escolhe-se uma das partes (talvez um ex-ditador convertido à imposição da democracia multi-étnica-cultural em nações tribais não homogéneas), defende-se essa escolha porque é defender os valores universais das "democracias liberais ocidentais", passa-se por cima dos métodos usados por esses freedom fighters, dá-se apoio financeiro e logístico, e quando passarmos a ser objectos de ódio da outra parte chamamos de terroristas e de que como querem destruir o Ocidente. Devo dizer que tal plano é tanto brilhante como idiota, mas hoje tudo é fácil de vender, até que uma guerra eterna é necessária para conseguir a paz eterna.
Re: Kosovo
Era bom pensar que esta opinião possa constituir um indicio de um maior pessimismo (penso mesmo que constitua uma novidade num certo tipo de blogs) quanto às virtualidades do intervencionismo humanitário e ideológico (a que podemos chamar de militarismo ao centro) que hoje domina o pensamento ao centro-esquerda-direita-liberais e cujas raizes estão no neo-conservadorismo, cuja tese de nation-building e de democratização à força e por ingerência externa (já ponho de lado o simples e insignificante direito internacional tradicional), é facil de refutar quer à priori quer empiricamente, mas cujo apelo permanente (e distorcido) a "Muniche" e "Chamberlain" a todos parece paralizar qualquer hipótese de reflexão ponderada.
quarta-feira, 24 de março de 2004
Contribuições de Murray N. Rothbard - Epistemologia (2)
In Defense of “Extreme Apriorism”
"He assumes nothing about the wisdom of man’s ends or about the correctness of his means. He “assumes” only that men act, that is, that they have some ends, and use some means to try to attain them. This is Mises’s Fundamental Axiom, and it is this axiom that gives the whole praxeological structure of economic theory built upon it its absolute and apodictic certainty.
Now the crucial question arises: how have we obtained the truth of this axiom? Is our knowledge a priori or empirical, “synthetic” or “analytic”? In a sense, such questions are a waste of time, because the all-important fact is that the axiom is self-evidently true, self-evident to a far greater and broader extent than the other postulates. For this Axiom is true for all human beings, everywhere, at any time, and could not even conceivably be violated.
In short, we may conceive of a world where resources are not varied, but not of one where human beings exist but do not act. We have seen that the other postulates, while “empirical,” are so obvious and acceptable that they can hardly be called “falsifiable” in the usual empiricist sense. How much more is this true of the Axiom, which is not even conceivably falsifiable! Postivists of all shades boggle at self-evident propositions. And yet, what is the vaunted “evidence” of the empiricists but the bringing of a hitherto obscure proposition into evident view? But some propositions need only to be stated to become at once evident to the self, and the action axiom is just such a proposition. 6 Hutchison, “Professor Machlup on Verification in Economics,” p. 483.
Whether we consider the Action Axiom “a priori” or “empirical” depends on our ultimate philosophical position. Professor Mises, in the neo- Kantian tradition, considers this axiom a law of thought and therefore a categorical truth a priori to all experience.
My own epistemological position rests on Aristotle and St. Thomas rather than Kant, and hence I would interpret the proposition differently. I would consider the axiom a law of reality rather than a law of thought, and hence “empirical” rather than “a priori.” But it should be obvious that this type of “empiricism” is so out of step with modern empiricism that I may just as well continue to call it a priori for present purposes.
For
(1) it is a law of reality that is not conceivably falsifiable, and yet is empirically meaningful and true;
(2) it rests on universal inner experience, and not simply on external experience, that is, its evidence is reflective rather than physical7; and
(3) it is clearly a priori to complex historical events."
"He assumes nothing about the wisdom of man’s ends or about the correctness of his means. He “assumes” only that men act, that is, that they have some ends, and use some means to try to attain them. This is Mises’s Fundamental Axiom, and it is this axiom that gives the whole praxeological structure of economic theory built upon it its absolute and apodictic certainty.
Now the crucial question arises: how have we obtained the truth of this axiom? Is our knowledge a priori or empirical, “synthetic” or “analytic”? In a sense, such questions are a waste of time, because the all-important fact is that the axiom is self-evidently true, self-evident to a far greater and broader extent than the other postulates. For this Axiom is true for all human beings, everywhere, at any time, and could not even conceivably be violated.
In short, we may conceive of a world where resources are not varied, but not of one where human beings exist but do not act. We have seen that the other postulates, while “empirical,” are so obvious and acceptable that they can hardly be called “falsifiable” in the usual empiricist sense. How much more is this true of the Axiom, which is not even conceivably falsifiable! Postivists of all shades boggle at self-evident propositions. And yet, what is the vaunted “evidence” of the empiricists but the bringing of a hitherto obscure proposition into evident view? But some propositions need only to be stated to become at once evident to the self, and the action axiom is just such a proposition. 6 Hutchison, “Professor Machlup on Verification in Economics,” p. 483.
Whether we consider the Action Axiom “a priori” or “empirical” depends on our ultimate philosophical position. Professor Mises, in the neo- Kantian tradition, considers this axiom a law of thought and therefore a categorical truth a priori to all experience.
My own epistemological position rests on Aristotle and St. Thomas rather than Kant, and hence I would interpret the proposition differently. I would consider the axiom a law of reality rather than a law of thought, and hence “empirical” rather than “a priori.” But it should be obvious that this type of “empiricism” is so out of step with modern empiricism that I may just as well continue to call it a priori for present purposes.
For
(1) it is a law of reality that is not conceivably falsifiable, and yet is empirically meaningful and true;
(2) it rests on universal inner experience, and not simply on external experience, that is, its evidence is reflective rather than physical7; and
(3) it is clearly a priori to complex historical events."
JMF realista?
Mais Um Crime, Por JOSÉ MANUEL FERNANDES
"A maioria dos israelitas apoiou o assassinato do xeque Ahmed Yassin - mesmo quando a maioria dos israelitas assume na mesma sondagem que essa morte pode conduzir a um aumento dos atentados suicidas contra Israel. Este é apenas um aspecto da irracionalidade que alimenta a espiral de violência no Médio Oriente. Ela também é alimentada pela política de terra queimada de Ariel Sharon e pela cobardia de grande parte da oposição de esquerda (o próprio Barak, anterior primeiro-ministro trabalhista, também apoiou a execução do líder do Hamas). Assim como era alimentada pela pregação extremista de Ahmed Yassin, pelo recrutamento dos exércitos de suicidas, pela vulgarização de uma cultura de morte pelo martírio nos territórios e pela impotência, senão cumplicidade, de Arafat face aos sectores mais extremistas da sociedade palestiniana.
O acto decidido pelo governo de Israel é um crime: chamem-se as coisas pelos nomes. E é um crime estúpido: a longa experiência anterior de assassinatos selectivos mostra que estes não são solução para a violência nem travam os atentados suicidas. Pior: trata-se de uma estupidez perigosa, explosiva mesmo, porque o xeque Yassin não era apenas mais um líder de uma organização terrorista, era também um líder religioso e espiritual com prestígio muito para além das fronteiras da Palestina. A forma bárbara como foi morto não tocou apenas os palestinianos dos territórios, levando-os a saírem para a rua e a clamarem vingança, não incentivou apenas os fanáticos do Hamas a prometerem sangue e mais sangue: como ondas de choque, a revolta propagou-se a grande parte do mundo árabe e tornou muito mais complicados os esforços para estabilizar a região. Desde segunda-feira que não é apenas o "caminho para a paz" que passou de moribundo a morto: também a iniciativa pela democracia que os Estados Unidos pretendiam promover, designadamente na cimeira árabe de Tunes marcada para esta semana, entrou em estado comatoso."
Nota: Outras leituras estratégicas passam por uma tentativa de fazerem os grupos palestinianos, a quente, passarem a atacar outros objectivos que não os israelitas, fazer com que o resto da população árabe noutros países se envolva também (já se viram reacções no Iraque), e mais cedo ou mais tarde se envolva os EUA e outros directamente "aliados" no combate directo nos territórios ocupados, depois o Libano, a Siria, etc. Ou seja, conseguir que todo o mundo esteja em guerra contra árabes e muçulmanos por causa de uns quantos m2. De qualquer forma, já não falta muito.
"A maioria dos israelitas apoiou o assassinato do xeque Ahmed Yassin - mesmo quando a maioria dos israelitas assume na mesma sondagem que essa morte pode conduzir a um aumento dos atentados suicidas contra Israel. Este é apenas um aspecto da irracionalidade que alimenta a espiral de violência no Médio Oriente. Ela também é alimentada pela política de terra queimada de Ariel Sharon e pela cobardia de grande parte da oposição de esquerda (o próprio Barak, anterior primeiro-ministro trabalhista, também apoiou a execução do líder do Hamas). Assim como era alimentada pela pregação extremista de Ahmed Yassin, pelo recrutamento dos exércitos de suicidas, pela vulgarização de uma cultura de morte pelo martírio nos territórios e pela impotência, senão cumplicidade, de Arafat face aos sectores mais extremistas da sociedade palestiniana.
O acto decidido pelo governo de Israel é um crime: chamem-se as coisas pelos nomes. E é um crime estúpido: a longa experiência anterior de assassinatos selectivos mostra que estes não são solução para a violência nem travam os atentados suicidas. Pior: trata-se de uma estupidez perigosa, explosiva mesmo, porque o xeque Yassin não era apenas mais um líder de uma organização terrorista, era também um líder religioso e espiritual com prestígio muito para além das fronteiras da Palestina. A forma bárbara como foi morto não tocou apenas os palestinianos dos territórios, levando-os a saírem para a rua e a clamarem vingança, não incentivou apenas os fanáticos do Hamas a prometerem sangue e mais sangue: como ondas de choque, a revolta propagou-se a grande parte do mundo árabe e tornou muito mais complicados os esforços para estabilizar a região. Desde segunda-feira que não é apenas o "caminho para a paz" que passou de moribundo a morto: também a iniciativa pela democracia que os Estados Unidos pretendiam promover, designadamente na cimeira árabe de Tunes marcada para esta semana, entrou em estado comatoso."
Nota: Outras leituras estratégicas passam por uma tentativa de fazerem os grupos palestinianos, a quente, passarem a atacar outros objectivos que não os israelitas, fazer com que o resto da população árabe noutros países se envolva também (já se viram reacções no Iraque), e mais cedo ou mais tarde se envolva os EUA e outros directamente "aliados" no combate directo nos territórios ocupados, depois o Libano, a Siria, etc. Ou seja, conseguir que todo o mundo esteja em guerra contra árabes e muçulmanos por causa de uns quantos m2. De qualquer forma, já não falta muito.
o Estado não se senta com terroristas?
Claro que sim, umas vezes porque lhe chama freddom fighters outras porque serve os seus interesses, outras porque felizmente, é possível concretizar mudanças.
U.S. envoy, Gadhafi hold first meeting since '80s. Report: Blair to visit Libya this week.
U.S. envoy, Gadhafi hold first meeting since '80s. Report: Blair to visit Libya this week.
30 Serbian churches, monasteries destroyed or damaged in Kosovo
Uma boa parte delas do século 14 e 15:
Os resultados do "global interventionism" (que o devemos quer à esquerda quer à nova direita) que transformou a função de defesa da soberania (self-government duma população num determinado espaço geográfico em relação ao resto da população mundial) num instrumento dos políticos é termos cada vez mais regiões destabilizadas. Qualquer intervencionismo alimenta a justificação para mais intervencionismo. Se é assim na economia, porque não o seria em tudo o resto?
"Belgrade, March 23, 2004 - The Eparchy of Raska and Prizren has released a list of 30 Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries that were destroyed or severely damaged in the latest outbreak of violence in Kosovo-Metohija.
The list is not final and will be updated as the Eparchy continues to assess the damage to other churches and monasteries, particularly in the municipality of Urosevac, the Coordinating Centre for Kosovo-Metohija said in a statement."
Os resultados do "global interventionism" (que o devemos quer à esquerda quer à nova direita) que transformou a função de defesa da soberania (self-government duma população num determinado espaço geográfico em relação ao resto da população mundial) num instrumento dos políticos é termos cada vez mais regiões destabilizadas. Qualquer intervencionismo alimenta a justificação para mais intervencionismo. Se é assim na economia, porque não o seria em tudo o resto?
"Belgrade, March 23, 2004 - The Eparchy of Raska and Prizren has released a list of 30 Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries that were destroyed or severely damaged in the latest outbreak of violence in Kosovo-Metohija.
The list is not final and will be updated as the Eparchy continues to assess the damage to other churches and monasteries, particularly in the municipality of Urosevac, the Coordinating Centre for Kosovo-Metohija said in a statement."
terça-feira, 23 de março de 2004
"Quem vive pela espada, morre pela espada..."
Sobre a morte violenta do xeiquezinho que incitava ao ódio e ao assassinato, ocorre-me aquela frase que dizíamos quando eramos miúdos: "quem vai à guerra dá e leva..."!
Igualdade, Impostos e Sistemas Fiscais
Uma nota sobre a igualdade - se os funcionários do Estado não pagam impostos mas vivem exclusivamente da sua cobrança, como é que um sistema fiscal pode pretender o "igual esforço" ou igualdade perante a lei ou que quer que seja entre todos os cidadãos? No mínimo existem uns que pagam e os outros que recebem. E quanto maior for o Sector Público maior desigualdade existe, porque menos pagam mais para mais receberem mais.
Portanto, passemos a outras linhas de argumentação que só podem partir da premissa que nunca poderá ser integrado em nenhum sistema fiscal qualquer objectivo de equiparar os contribuintes a quem recebe as contribuições.
Portanto, passemos a outras linhas de argumentação que só podem partir da premissa que nunca poderá ser integrado em nenhum sistema fiscal qualquer objectivo de equiparar os contribuintes a quem recebe as contribuições.
Taxa Única de Impostos e o mito dos Impostos Neutrais
Fico à espera para saber porque o IRC é um imposto pior que os outros e porque isso põe em causa a bondade da proposta da Taxa Única de Impostos (20 % para IVA, IRS e IRC), a ser depois disputada pelas programas eleitorais, os quais estariam pelos menos em parte, impedidos de "brincarem" à descida de uns à custa da subida de outros, o que facilitaria uma mais clara leitura e decisão por parte do eleitorado.
Em Espanha está já proposto o IRS único e IRC nos 30%. Coincidências.
Em Espanha está já proposto o IRS único e IRC nos 30%. Coincidências.
Quando a diversidade é uniformização
"My question: doesn't the uniqueness of Japanese culture add to the diversity of the world?
And aren't we supposed to celebrate diversity?
Oh, excuse me, that's the wrong kind of diversity. We are supposed to celebrate the right kind of diversity—the kind where each country becomes so diverse in population, its culture so diluted by immigration, that all countries are eventually the same.
How silly of me to forget that the ultimate goal of "diversity" is global uniformity—and monotony."
Japanese Substitute Inventiveness for Immigration; NYT Shocked
And aren't we supposed to celebrate diversity?
Oh, excuse me, that's the wrong kind of diversity. We are supposed to celebrate the right kind of diversity—the kind where each country becomes so diverse in population, its culture so diluted by immigration, that all countries are eventually the same.
How silly of me to forget that the ultimate goal of "diversity" is global uniformity—and monotony."
Japanese Substitute Inventiveness for Immigration; NYT Shocked
Destaques
1. Analysis / Hamas may be only side to profit from Yassin's death. Haaretz.com
"The assassination of Hamas founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin may well turn out to be a blow, not to Hamas, but to the Palestinian Authority. In the power struggle waged for the past several years in Gaza between the PA and Hamas, it was Yassin's organization that enjoyed an ever-increasing advantage in the sphere of public opinion. Hamas is perceived as an organization whose leaders are free of corruption and ready to make sacrifices. (...) The more Israel hits Hamas leaders and rank-and-file members, the more their popularity climbs. (...) The assassination of Yassin could, therefore, merely contribute to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, and, by creating chaos in the Gaza Strip, turn Hamas into the only side to profit from Yassin's death."
Nota: As (antigas, porque nas novas pouco se respeita) leis da guerra e neutralidade convencionavam o não ataque directo às chefias. Porque seria?
2. Security chief opposed killing
"THE head of Israel's Shin Beth domestic security service, Avi Dichter, opposed today's controversial assassination of Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, army radio reported.
"The counter-terrorism chief argued that killing the revered wheelchair-bound leader would be "more harmful than useful for Israel", the radio said.(...)"
Nota: Vivemos num mundo em que os serviços de inteligência, os militares e os diplomatas, foram substituídos por sofa-warriors.
3. NATO: Albanians Orchestrated Kosovo Violence
Freedom Fighters que passaram a muçulmanos terroristas separatistas e uma estratégia de Ethnic Cleasing. Sempre o foram e sempre foi essa a sua estratégia, portanto, não teria sido melhor esperar que um novo equilibrio tivesse sido estabelecido sem a intervenção externa?
"The assassination of Hamas founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin may well turn out to be a blow, not to Hamas, but to the Palestinian Authority. In the power struggle waged for the past several years in Gaza between the PA and Hamas, it was Yassin's organization that enjoyed an ever-increasing advantage in the sphere of public opinion. Hamas is perceived as an organization whose leaders are free of corruption and ready to make sacrifices. (...) The more Israel hits Hamas leaders and rank-and-file members, the more their popularity climbs. (...) The assassination of Yassin could, therefore, merely contribute to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, and, by creating chaos in the Gaza Strip, turn Hamas into the only side to profit from Yassin's death."
Nota: As (antigas, porque nas novas pouco se respeita) leis da guerra e neutralidade convencionavam o não ataque directo às chefias. Porque seria?
2. Security chief opposed killing
"THE head of Israel's Shin Beth domestic security service, Avi Dichter, opposed today's controversial assassination of Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, army radio reported.
"The counter-terrorism chief argued that killing the revered wheelchair-bound leader would be "more harmful than useful for Israel", the radio said.(...)"
Nota: Vivemos num mundo em que os serviços de inteligência, os militares e os diplomatas, foram substituídos por sofa-warriors.
3. NATO: Albanians Orchestrated Kosovo Violence
Freedom Fighters que passaram a muçulmanos terroristas separatistas e uma estratégia de Ethnic Cleasing. Sempre o foram e sempre foi essa a sua estratégia, portanto, não teria sido melhor esperar que um novo equilibrio tivesse sido estabelecido sem a intervenção externa?
Re: A Killing in Gaza
Uma coisa é não fazer o julgamento das acções que os israelitas entendem por bem fazer, incluindo os tradicionais assassinatos a campo aberto ou pela calada da Mossad (e que inclui acções em países estrangeiros), outra é fazer o elogio da guerra total do bem contra o mal, habitual neste Canadiano, responsável por uma ideologia neo-jacobina e de interesses estratégicos estranhos aos americanos.
Uma vez que morreram, nesta intifada, cerca de 800 israelitas e 2800 palestinianos e que estes vivem ocupados, e muitos expulsos (ou descendentes de) sem direito de retorno às propriedades que detinham (caso do Sheikh Ahmed Yasin), se tivermos a capacidade de nos pormos no campo palestiniano, onde também têm existido a morte de mulheres e crianças, usando este mesmo discurso de FRUM, podemos indicar que se 800 mortes é mass-murder, 2800 são muitas mass-murder (3X). E que se 11/9 causou cerca de 3000 mortes, a sua punição já causou pelo menos 4 a 5 vezes mais mortes de civis.
Todos têm razão e a aniquilação mútua continua. E as pessoas mais ouvidas num campo e outro são as do incitamento ao mass murder contínuo. E deviam apenas ser estas a aniquilar-se mutuamente.
Uma vez que morreram, nesta intifada, cerca de 800 israelitas e 2800 palestinianos e que estes vivem ocupados, e muitos expulsos (ou descendentes de) sem direito de retorno às propriedades que detinham (caso do Sheikh Ahmed Yasin), se tivermos a capacidade de nos pormos no campo palestiniano, onde também têm existido a morte de mulheres e crianças, usando este mesmo discurso de FRUM, podemos indicar que se 800 mortes é mass-murder, 2800 são muitas mass-murder (3X). E que se 11/9 causou cerca de 3000 mortes, a sua punição já causou pelo menos 4 a 5 vezes mais mortes de civis.
Todos têm razão e a aniquilação mútua continua. E as pessoas mais ouvidas num campo e outro são as do incitamento ao mass murder contínuo. E deviam apenas ser estas a aniquilar-se mutuamente.
segunda-feira, 22 de março de 2004
Contribuições de Murray N. Rothbard para a Economia (1)
The Myth of Neutral Taxation
Documento com 108 páginas que, provando como não existem impostos neutros, é um pouco fútil, repudiar/favorecer uma forma de imposto a favor de outra. E por aí justifico também a minha proposta de Taxa de Impostos Única (20% para IRS, IRC, IVA).
Aqui fica como conclui:
"(...) The view that income taxes are "better" than excise taxes; the call for proportional or degressive income taxation; the Friedman negative income tax; the Buchanan-Tullock Unanimity Principle ; and the collective-goods, external-benefits, and transaction costs arguments for government and taxation, have all served to place the imprimatur of economics on the status quo or on extensions of government rather than to limit or roll back State power. All this has followed the course traced by Bertrand de Jouvenel three decades ago: From the idea of divine right down to modern times concepts originally meant to limit State power have been turned by the State and its advocates into rationales for its
further extension. (...)
The idea that taxation, and therefore government's fiscal operation, should be neutral to the market—should not disturb
the operations of the market nor divert it from its free course—is a noble but impossible one. As we have seen here, taxation can never be neutral to the market, and the impossibility of this dream is rooted in the very nature of taxation and government. Neutral taxation is merely a chimera. It is perhaps because of this impossibility that this concept, in the hands of the modern public-choice theorists and others, has so quickly become yet another device for ratifying the
status quo of State power. We are forced, then, to the realization of crucial points from which free-market economists seem to have been fleeing as from the very plague. That neutral taxation is an oxymoron; that the free market and taxation are inherently incompatible; and therefore either the goal of neutrality must be forsaken, or else we must abandon the institution of taxation itself."
Documento com 108 páginas que, provando como não existem impostos neutros, é um pouco fútil, repudiar/favorecer uma forma de imposto a favor de outra. E por aí justifico também a minha proposta de Taxa de Impostos Única (20% para IRS, IRC, IVA).
Aqui fica como conclui:
"(...) The view that income taxes are "better" than excise taxes; the call for proportional or degressive income taxation; the Friedman negative income tax; the Buchanan-Tullock Unanimity Principle ; and the collective-goods, external-benefits, and transaction costs arguments for government and taxation, have all served to place the imprimatur of economics on the status quo or on extensions of government rather than to limit or roll back State power. All this has followed the course traced by Bertrand de Jouvenel three decades ago: From the idea of divine right down to modern times concepts originally meant to limit State power have been turned by the State and its advocates into rationales for its
further extension. (...)
The idea that taxation, and therefore government's fiscal operation, should be neutral to the market—should not disturb
the operations of the market nor divert it from its free course—is a noble but impossible one. As we have seen here, taxation can never be neutral to the market, and the impossibility of this dream is rooted in the very nature of taxation and government. Neutral taxation is merely a chimera. It is perhaps because of this impossibility that this concept, in the hands of the modern public-choice theorists and others, has so quickly become yet another device for ratifying the
status quo of State power. We are forced, then, to the realization of crucial points from which free-market economists seem to have been fleeing as from the very plague. That neutral taxation is an oxymoron; that the free market and taxation are inherently incompatible; and therefore either the goal of neutrality must be forsaken, or else we must abandon the institution of taxation itself."
A ler
The Trouble With Catholic Social Teaching, Thomas E. Woods, Jr.
The Lou Church Memorial Lecture in Religion and Economics, Austrian Scholars Conference, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama, March 20, 2004.
The Lou Church Memorial Lecture in Religion and Economics, Austrian Scholars Conference, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama, March 20, 2004.
Burke divide Republicanos (à atenção de JPC)
Nation-Building Exposes GOP's House Divided
The neocon dream of exporting democracy clashes with the traditional Republican view of a foreign policy grounded in "realism."
By Jacob Heilbrunn
"(...)
"The principal problem is the mistaken belief that democracy is a talisman for all the world's ills, and that the United States has a responsibility to promote democratic government wherever in the world it is lacking."
Sound like a Democratic pundit bashing Bush for partisan gain? Nope. The jab came from Dimitri K. Simes, president of the predominantly Republican Nixon Center and co-publisher of the National Interest magazine. And he is not alone in calling on the administration to reclaim the party's pre-Reagan heritage — to abandon its moralistic, Wilsonian, neoconservative dream of exporting democracy, in favor of a more limited and realistic foreign policy.
The most profound foreign affairs ideological divide in the 2004 election might not be so much between liberals and conservatives as it will be among conservatives themselves. A growing number of so-called "realists," who feel that U.S. foreign policy should be shaped by a narrowly defined national interest rather than by a broad desire to promote global democracy and human rights, have gotten increasingly vociferous in warning about the perils of adventurism abroad.
These critics, unlike the anti-imperialists of the left, don't view U.S. power with antipathy: They revere it. But they fear squandering the country's might and are fond of recalling 18th century British statesman Edmund Burke's warning: "I dread our own power and our own ambition. I dread being too much dreaded." They see neoconservatives like the Weekly Standard's William Kristol as championing big government in the service of social engineering abroad. The debate between realists and neoconservatives over U.S. power and moralism could prove as poisonous to the Republicans as the foreign policy fights that racked the Democratic Party during the 1970s and 1980s. (...)"
The neocon dream of exporting democracy clashes with the traditional Republican view of a foreign policy grounded in "realism."
By Jacob Heilbrunn
"(...)
"The principal problem is the mistaken belief that democracy is a talisman for all the world's ills, and that the United States has a responsibility to promote democratic government wherever in the world it is lacking."
Sound like a Democratic pundit bashing Bush for partisan gain? Nope. The jab came from Dimitri K. Simes, president of the predominantly Republican Nixon Center and co-publisher of the National Interest magazine. And he is not alone in calling on the administration to reclaim the party's pre-Reagan heritage — to abandon its moralistic, Wilsonian, neoconservative dream of exporting democracy, in favor of a more limited and realistic foreign policy.
The most profound foreign affairs ideological divide in the 2004 election might not be so much between liberals and conservatives as it will be among conservatives themselves. A growing number of so-called "realists," who feel that U.S. foreign policy should be shaped by a narrowly defined national interest rather than by a broad desire to promote global democracy and human rights, have gotten increasingly vociferous in warning about the perils of adventurism abroad.
These critics, unlike the anti-imperialists of the left, don't view U.S. power with antipathy: They revere it. But they fear squandering the country's might and are fond of recalling 18th century British statesman Edmund Burke's warning: "I dread our own power and our own ambition. I dread being too much dreaded." They see neoconservatives like the Weekly Standard's William Kristol as championing big government in the service of social engineering abroad. The debate between realists and neoconservatives over U.S. power and moralism could prove as poisonous to the Republicans as the foreign policy fights that racked the Democratic Party during the 1970s and 1980s. (...)"
sábado, 20 de março de 2004
João Pereira Coutinho, Hayek e Burke
Na sua coluna do Expresso, irritado com a sugestão de Francisco Sarsfield Cabral em recomendar a leitura de Hayek e Burke aos (Neo) Conservadores Americanos comete alguns erros de palmatória como aliás já é seu costume (estou por exemplo a lembrar-me de ter acabado um artigo dizendo que o Estado serve especialmente para proteger o individuo de si próprio - pois eu pensei que para uma sensibilidade conservadora essa é a tarefa da religião).
1) Arruma com a sugestão da leitura de Hayek num ápice evocando o seu famoso texto "Porque não sou um Conservador", mas esquece-se que Hayek falava, em termos gerais, do conservadorismo como uma força imobilizadora e não no tradicional conservadorismo americano muito desconfiado da acção do Estado e até algo anti-state, fundado numa revolução pela Secessão do Império Britânco a favor duma república ultra-liberal ou até libertarian.
2) Esquece-se também que foi Hayek um dos inspiradores da revolução conservadora-liberal de Tatcher e Reagan.
3) E da insistência em Hayek referir como somos limitados no nosso conhecimento e na dificuldade em podermos arrogar-nos em saber o que é melhor para a sociedade e ainda menos para outras sociedades que não a nossa.
4) Depois fala de Burke e a sua análise da Revolução Francesa que repudiava e até combatia como um mal para a civilização (diga-se que o que ficou por fazer por esta e Napoleão, foi acabado na Grande Guerra – as monarquias desapareceram e substituídas por utopias republicanas à direita e esquerda). E fala dela querendo de alguma maneira provar que a actual estratégia americana reaviva esse combate.
5) Mas JPC aqui, espalha-se ao comprido. Burke que em tudo pode ser identificado como um conservador-liberal no sentido americano e não do imobilismo conservador de que Hayel falava, combatia o espírito jacobino de quem quer reconstruir uma nova realidade social com o mote de “humanistas com um guilhotina”. Napoleão quis transformar a Europa, iluminando-a com um novo espírito mais racionalista, com mais direitos, e para isso a quis conquistar e mudar regimes.
6) Pois tenho uma notícia para si, na base do “nation-building”, da “liberation”, da imposição de valores universais, está precisamente esse espírito jacobino de querer exportar a democracia e transformar outras culturas, como se isso em si, fosse a solução para resolver questões concretas de segurança (muitas delas já de si causadas por esse espirito intervencionista).
7) Na verdade, são os neo-jacobinos que hoje estão aos comandos, tendo uma plateia de supostos conservadores a aplaudi-los.
Recomendo uma leitura: The Ideology of American Empire, by Claes G. Ryn
“(…) There are similarities between the advocates of the ideology of
American empire and the ideologues who inspired and led the French
Revolution of 1789. The Jacobins, too, claimed to represent universal
principles, which they summed up in the slogan ‘‘liberte´, e´galite´, et fraternite´.’’
The dominant Jacobins also wanted greater economic freedom. They thought
of themselves as fighting on the side of good against evil and called themselves
‘‘the virtuous.’’ They wanted a world much different from the one they had
inherited. The result was protracted war and turbulence in Europe and
elsewhere. Those who embody the Jacobin spirit today in America have
explicitly global ambitions. It is crucial to understand what they believe, for
potentially they have the military might of the United States at their complete
disposal.(…)
Claes G. Ryn is professor of politics at the Catholic University of America and chairman of the National Humanities Institute. He is editor of Humanitas and author of numerous books, including Unity Through Diversity: On Cultivating Humanity’s Higher Ground (Beijing University, 2000) and Will, Imagination and Reason: Babbitt, Croce and the Problem of Reality (2nd ed., Transaction, 1997). This article is adapted from a chapter in his America the Virtuous: The Crisis of Democracy and the Quest for Empire (forthcoming, Transaction 2003).
1) Arruma com a sugestão da leitura de Hayek num ápice evocando o seu famoso texto "Porque não sou um Conservador", mas esquece-se que Hayek falava, em termos gerais, do conservadorismo como uma força imobilizadora e não no tradicional conservadorismo americano muito desconfiado da acção do Estado e até algo anti-state, fundado numa revolução pela Secessão do Império Britânco a favor duma república ultra-liberal ou até libertarian.
2) Esquece-se também que foi Hayek um dos inspiradores da revolução conservadora-liberal de Tatcher e Reagan.
3) E da insistência em Hayek referir como somos limitados no nosso conhecimento e na dificuldade em podermos arrogar-nos em saber o que é melhor para a sociedade e ainda menos para outras sociedades que não a nossa.
4) Depois fala de Burke e a sua análise da Revolução Francesa que repudiava e até combatia como um mal para a civilização (diga-se que o que ficou por fazer por esta e Napoleão, foi acabado na Grande Guerra – as monarquias desapareceram e substituídas por utopias republicanas à direita e esquerda). E fala dela querendo de alguma maneira provar que a actual estratégia americana reaviva esse combate.
5) Mas JPC aqui, espalha-se ao comprido. Burke que em tudo pode ser identificado como um conservador-liberal no sentido americano e não do imobilismo conservador de que Hayel falava, combatia o espírito jacobino de quem quer reconstruir uma nova realidade social com o mote de “humanistas com um guilhotina”. Napoleão quis transformar a Europa, iluminando-a com um novo espírito mais racionalista, com mais direitos, e para isso a quis conquistar e mudar regimes.
6) Pois tenho uma notícia para si, na base do “nation-building”, da “liberation”, da imposição de valores universais, está precisamente esse espírito jacobino de querer exportar a democracia e transformar outras culturas, como se isso em si, fosse a solução para resolver questões concretas de segurança (muitas delas já de si causadas por esse espirito intervencionista).
7) Na verdade, são os neo-jacobinos que hoje estão aos comandos, tendo uma plateia de supostos conservadores a aplaudi-los.
Recomendo uma leitura: The Ideology of American Empire, by Claes G. Ryn
“(…) There are similarities between the advocates of the ideology of
American empire and the ideologues who inspired and led the French
Revolution of 1789. The Jacobins, too, claimed to represent universal
principles, which they summed up in the slogan ‘‘liberte´, e´galite´, et fraternite´.’’
The dominant Jacobins also wanted greater economic freedom. They thought
of themselves as fighting on the side of good against evil and called themselves
‘‘the virtuous.’’ They wanted a world much different from the one they had
inherited. The result was protracted war and turbulence in Europe and
elsewhere. Those who embody the Jacobin spirit today in America have
explicitly global ambitions. It is crucial to understand what they believe, for
potentially they have the military might of the United States at their complete
disposal.(…)
Claes G. Ryn is professor of politics at the Catholic University of America and chairman of the National Humanities Institute. He is editor of Humanitas and author of numerous books, including Unity Through Diversity: On Cultivating Humanity’s Higher Ground (Beijing University, 2000) and Will, Imagination and Reason: Babbitt, Croce and the Problem of Reality (2nd ed., Transaction, 1997). This article is adapted from a chapter in his America the Virtuous: The Crisis of Democracy and the Quest for Empire (forthcoming, Transaction 2003).
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